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"Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will now become full members of our 
Alliance, with the full responsibilities of membership ... The responsibility to 
meet NATO's high military standards and to help to bear its cost, because true 
security requires strength and readiness." 
President Clinton's Remarks to the Citizens of Warsaw, July 10, 1997 
The acquisition of goods and services for a country's military establishment is a complex 
and vital undertaking. The context within which it occurs is necessarily different for 
every government and is subject to change over time. That context includes, among other 
variables, assumptions concerning the security environment and the resources available 
to the government to satisfy national security requirements. Democratic governments 
have developed a variety of arrangements for systematically linking resources to 
requirements under different security conditions. There is no single best solution. 
Rather, a review of the acquisition systems of western democracies reveals a family of 
solutions, none of which is completely satisfactory. 
Indeed, acquisition reform is a policy perennial among NATO countries. The imperative 
to improve acquisition processes has been given further impetus at the close of the 
twentieth century as a consequence of such factors as the general reduction in defence 
spending in the decade of the 1990s, the emergence of electronic commerce and the 
policy of adopting private sector business practices within governmental defence 
bureaucracies. Where governments find themselves adapting to other, more significant 
changes, such as fundamental shifts in national security and economic policy 
orientations, acquisition reforms become even more problematic. 
Poland finds itself in such a situation in 2000. With respect to providing for its military 
needs, the Polish government faces a series of challenges. It has a relatively new 
democratic political order, most recently refined by the 1997 constitution. It is 
privatizing its economy, though major portions of the military industrial complex remain 
in the public domain. It has accepted membership in NATO and is working towards 
membership in the European Union. 
Thus, development of a market-based acquisition system in Poland is no minor 
undertaking. It is as much about acquisition policy development as it is about acquisition 











amended, we must understand in some detail how acquisition for the Polish military now 
takes place. Section III of this document is an attempt to capture the essential elements 
of military acquisition in Poland as we found them in the summer of 2000. Section II 
contains suggestions for improvements to that system. 
This work is based upon information obtained by a team of U.S. defense academics and 
practitioners associated with the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. The 
composition of the team is provided at the end of this document. Information used in the 
report came from many sources, including lengthy interviews with officials from the 
Senate, the National Security Bureau of the Office of the President, the Department of 
Defence Affairs of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Office of Public Procurement Policy, and various offices within the Polish Ministry of 
National Defence. These interviews took place in Warsaw in July 2000, and were in 
some cases augmented by subsequent communications with these officials. In addition, 
Professor Krzysztof Santarek, Colonel Andrzej Ciarka, and Captain Marek Powalski of 
the Polish Ministry of National Defence provided invaluable additional insight during 
their visit to the Naval Postgraduate School in August 2000. The views and 





I. Executive Summary 
This report consists of recommendations and implementation proposals that are designed 
to assist the development of a robust National Acquisition Strategy for the Polish 
Ministry of National Defense. It is the collective work of a team assembled at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey California. The team's skills composition consisted of 
acquisition, program management, contracting, political science, finance and budget, 
policy analysis and the law. 
The four -month study included a literature review, in-country briefings and interviews 
and additional meetings with Polish MoND personnel in Monterey. The report is 
functionally divided into four sections: 
1. Recommendations and supporting rationale for transitioning the Ministry of 
National Defense to an acquisition/ program management organizational 
structure; 
2. Observations made by the team during the literature/documents survey and a 
description of the current acquisition environment in Poland (governmental 
structure, needs assessment, military requirements, defense policy and 
external factors, including NATO membership and European Union (EU) 
membership application); 
3. An implementation time line, which discusses in detail how Poland could 
move from the current system to the program management organizational 
structure, 
4. Reference materials and supporting documents. 
The vision for the Polish National Acquisition System is the capability to deliver on a 
timely basis the best value product or service to the customer, while maintaining the 
public's trust and fulfilling public policy objectives. Participants in the acquisition 
process should work together as a team and should be empowered to make decisions 
within their area of responsibility. Recommendations and time line include the 
development of a professional acquisition workforce with a supporting education and 
training system utilizing civilian and military institutions of higher education and 
specialized training facilities. Also included are the delineation of new functional 
specialties that would allow for acquisition system implementation and management, and 
office, department and institutional changes that would provide for structure and 
personnel that would effectively manage the entire acquisition process. The process 
review considered the following items: 
a. Mission review 
b. Need based on mission determination 
c. Requirements Generation 




e. System Development Phase 
f. Contract Solicitation Phase 
g. Contract Source Evaluation/Selection Phase 
h. Contract Negotiation Phase 
i. Contract A ward Phase 
j. Contract Administration Phase 
k. Ownership Phase (Operation & Support) 
1. Disposal considerations 
Two heretofore unknown positions in the Polish acquisition process-program manager 
and contracting officer-are described in detail in the report recommendations, and are 
considered to be of prime importance in reorganizing the Ministry of National Defense. 
The program manager is the leader of the acquisition team and as such has a broad 
overview of the entire system and must be capable of managing each phase of the 
acquisition process. He or she is responsible for: 
• Developing specifications 
• Planning logistical support for the warfighting system 
• Planning an acquisition strategy 
• Supervising systems engineering 
• Integrating product and process development 
• Overseeing procurement planning and contract management 
• Supervising programming and budget process 
• Overseeing testing and evaluation 
• Managing risk 
This acquisition system management function is of prime importance to centralize and 
control the acquisition process and is vital to implement efficiency. Previous 
management of acquisition programs has not been tightly integrated is unwieldy. 
The contracting officer manages the documentation and process of contract planning and 
execution. This person must be trained, formally appointed, and given the requisite 
authority to enter into, administer and/or terminate contracts and make related 
determinations and findings. The position is important because the legal, business, and 
financial functions of procurement come together in the execution of the contractual 
agreement, a process that must be effectively managed by a trained professional. The 
education and training requirement for this position are identified. Some of the 
acquisition functions related to this position include: 
• Market research 
• Acquisition planning 
• Source selection planning/execution 
• Negotiation planning/execution 
• Contract formation/award 




• Business and supplier management 
• Contract close-out 
• Acquisition/contracting process innovation 
Contracting officers are key business advisors in the acquisition process. Not only do 
they help ensure that customer needs are satisfied in terms of cost, quality and timeliness, 
they are responsible for: (1) promoting competition, (2) minimizing administrative costs 
and (3) conducting business with integrity, fairness and openness. Additionally, they 
should take the lead in encouraging business process innovations and ensuring that 
business decisions are sound. 
Following these reforms in education and personnel structure, additional 
recommendations also address systemic weakness in the acquisition process: it is strongly 
recommended that integrated product and process development (IPPD) be adopted. We 
strongly recommend the thoughtful implementation of a planning, programming and 
budgeting system (PPBS) to effectively manage defence resources allocated by the 
national government. PPBS will simultaneously address needs within the force structure 
and maintain the technical means to evaluate solutions and systems that purport to meet 
requirements. This document attempts to describe in detail the existing system, analyze 
weaknesses and provide recommendations for solutions. Most issues addressed are 
systemic problems and the sum of our recommendations are systemic solutions that will 
address Polish defence needs while concomitantly suggesting policy solutions that are 
both pragmatic and feasible. Suggested solutions are generic and have been gleaned from 





The Requirements Generation System, the Acquisition System, and Planning, 
Programming, and Budget System (PPBS) are all essential to the acquisition of 
warfighting systems. Mission deficiencies or opportunities are shaped into statements of 
requirements through the requirements generation process. While the requirements are 
being formulated, the PPBS is identifying the resources stream necessary to obtain the 
warfighting systems. At such time as the clearly articulated statement of performance 
requirements is handed off for acquisition, the funding stream should be in place to 
support the acquisition. 
Our recommendations will address various facets of all three systems described above. 
• Acquisition management-specifically, the introduction of program 
management, including integrated product and process development 
• Procurement-specifically, the statutory basis, contracting organization and 
processes required 
• Requirements generation 
• Planning, programming and budget system (PPBS) 
• Education and training associated with acquisition and PPBS 
• Privatization of government factories. Privatization of these facilities is 
inextricably tied to acquisition because of: (1) the lack of incentives for 
government plants to become more efficient and reduce cost; and (2) the lack 
of a level playing field when government plants compete against private 
sector contractors for the manufacture of MoND warfighting systems. 
Acquisition Recommendations 
Transition to Program Management 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends that the Ministry of National 
Defence transition to a program management organizational structure and 
processes for acquisition. Program management and the rationale supporting this 
recommendation are described below. 
Background 
The Polish Ministry of National Defence does not currently assign program managers and 
program management teams to lead the acquisition of warfighting systems. This means 
that acquisition of warfighting systems is accomplished within or among bureaucracies, 
where various organizational elements and activities accomplish their work in accordance 
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-with detailed central plans but without benefit of dedicated program or product 
leadership. It is possible to make generalized predictions about such an organization. 
First, this organizational arrangement may be able to accomplish work successfully 
within departments, but usually struggles at the organizational boundaries when 
coordination must occur between organizational elements, such as between branches or 
between departments. 
Second, acquisition of a new warfighting system includes the work of many different 
functional specialists, accomplished by the technicians within the various functional 
bureaucracies. In the absence of program management, most of the functional tasks 
would normally be done without benefit of discussion with technicians from other 
functional areas. For example, design engineers, would have little opportunity for 
discussion with maintenance personnel, training personnel, or spare parts provisioning 
personnel. Each of these technicians would normally work apart from one another in 
separate functional bureaucracies. 
Third, excessive changes or adjustments in the warfighting system and its support may be 
required as the result of this organizational structure due to the lapses in cross-functional 
communication. 
Fourth, processes may have to be done sequentially, rather than simultaneously in such 
an organizational structure, stretching out the acquisition process schedule. 
Fifth, technicians working· on an acquisition project are unlikely to feel a sense of 
ownership or of personal satisfaction because they are not able to exert much influence 
over the whole process. 
Sixth, there can be little or no synergy in such an organization because of the 
impossibility of close teamwork among the different functions. 
Finally, the organizational culture does not foster cooperation within organizations. In 
fact, if a crisis occurs, the separate organizational elements often will try to blame each 
other. In such an arrangement, it is difficult for individuals in different functional areas 
to have discussions with each other because the cultures are different. Major 
disagreements must be resolved at a high level, such as the office chief level or 
department chief level. 
The Design of a Program Management Organization 
Key Success Factors. Program management is successful if it delivers into the hands of 
the military customer within cost estimates, and on time or ahead of schedule, a 
warfighting system that performs and is sustainable as specified in the requirement. In 
fact, these are success factors for any acquisition, whether accomplished by program 
management or any other organizational structure. 
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Values. The transition to program management must retain or achieve the following 
values. 
• Acquisition of warfighting systems must be accomplished as specified by law 
and regulation. 
• Acquisitions should be well coordinated and efficient in terms of cost and 
time. 
• Program managers must manage risk. 
• Program managers must be responsible for all aspects of their programs, know 
the status of their programs, and provide information on the status of their 
program. Such information may be needed for a leadership decision, by senior 
government members to engender political support or to answer criticism. 
• New warfighting systems must be of high quality and perform as required. 
• New warfighting systems must be sustainable. They must meet their 
reliability and maintainability goals and must be supportable within the means 
provided. 
Vision. The program manager and his team coordinate the efforts of all the organizations 
and individuals who participate in the acquisition of a warfighting system. The program 
management team integrates the work of functional experts to accomplish the necessary 
work simultaneously, cooperatively, and efficiently. 
Organizationffasks/Jobs. Program management offices may be organized in different 
ways. For large programs, program management offices sometimes include most or all 
the functional skills necessary to develop, acquire, and field a new warfighting system. 
However, the more common practice is to organize small to medium sized program 
offices that contain the essential functional skills for coordination, and engage the 
functional organizations to achieve the required work. In general, small to medium sized 
program management offices offer an economical approach that would fit either full 
developmental programs or non-developmental programs such as FMS. Program 
managers with small or medium sized staffs must accomplish their mission by 
coordinating the work of other organizations; therefore, they must be given strong, 
clearly defined authority, described in a "PM charter." See Appendix C for "The 
Program Manager's Bill of Rights" and an example of a PM charter. 
The tasks and jobs related to program management are described in DoDD 5000.1 and 
DoD 5000.2-R, available on the Defense Acquisition Deskbook. The Polish MoND 
would need to construct similar documents. A useful approach might be for the MoND 
to use published DoD guidance as a model, extracting and tailoring sections that are 
relevant for their use. 
The program manager is responsible for coordinating all activities during program 
acquisition, within the authority delegated to him. He must manage the enterprise and 
coordinate all the essential activities, such as systems engineering, risk management, 
testing, logistics support planning, financial management, program documentation, 
contracting, and reporting. His project team is comprised of functional experts who 
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coordinate the various tasks simultaneously, in an integrated effort, according to a 
schedule. 
Some of the specific functions of a program management team are listed below to help 
describe the breadth of program management activities. This list is illustrative, not 
exhaustive. Some of these tasks might actually be accomplished within the program 
management office, while others might be done elsewhere in one of the government 
matrix organizations (functional bureaucracies), or by a contractor. In every one of the 
examples the program manager would be responsible, irrespective of where the work is 
performed. 
Functions of a Program Management Team: 
• Develop specifications 
• Plan logistical support for the warfighting system 
• Obtain resources 
• Provide oversight/insight for contractor activities 
• Manage risk 
• Oversee testing 
• Provide information on progress to senior leadership 
• Prepare information and documents for milestone decisions and at the 
specified intervals 
• Ensure compliance with law and regulation 
Organizational Structure. An organization for program management within the MoND 
might be as follows. 
Armament Policy Department Chain of Command. The program manager should report 
to the Chief of the Armament Policy Department, who reports directly to the State 
Secretary, First Deputy Minister of National Defence. 
Program Management Team Composition. The team members reporting to the program 
manager might include a system engineer, logistics planner, financial manager, test 
planner/coordinator, and others as necessary. A contracting officer would be on the 
program team but for technical matters should report to the senior member of the 
contracting activity. 
Procurement Relationship. The contracting officer who works on a program management 
team should report to the senior contracting officer in the Supply Department. The 
contracting officer receives technical direction through the contracting chain but 
programmatic direction from the program manager. 
Authority. The program manager and his team must be authorized within prescribed 
bounds to work with any MoND or contractor organization or individual. 
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-The program management team would work directly with sustainment organizations, 
organizations involved in testing, and Planning, Programming and Budget organizations, 
and users. 
The Workforce 
Functional Skills. The acquisition workforce is comprised of many different functional 
skills. Those who work on product management teams must be knowledgeable in their 
own functional areas but also know how to coordinate activities with technical specialists 
in the other functional disciplines. 
Education and training are essential to a workforce of empowered people. Specific 
comments and recommendations on education and training are located in the 
recommendation entitled, hnprovements in Acquisition Education. 
Assignment and Rotation Policies. Program managers should choose their teams based 
on technical skills, experience, and ability to work cooperatively. Program managers and 
functional chiefs should collaborate in the selection and assignment of personnel. 
Process/Subsystems. 
There are numerous processes within program management, some of which are listed 
below. A more detailed list might be extracted from DoD 5000.2-R. Each of these 
processes is highly specialized. MoND guidance should be prepared to explain the 
processes used in program management. The above reference and, more generally, the 
Defense Acquisition Deskbook, contain useful material that MoND might review and 
tailor as appropriate. 
Processes Within Program Management: 
• Phases and decision milestones 
• Program control and review 
• Planning an acquisition strategy 
• System engineering process 
• Integrated product and process development (IPPD) 
• Procurement planning and contract management 
• Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process 
• Testing and evaluation processes 
• Risk management process 
• Acquisition logistics planning process, including fielding 
• Planning for total ownership cost (TOC) 
The Outputs and Outcomes of Program Management 
Changing Organizational Culture. Transition to program management should effect 
valuable organizational cultural change over time, if vigorous leadership support is 
present. Cultural change does not occur instantaneously but can occur over time, 
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-particularly through education and training. It will occur at different rates in different 
organizations. Major changes need "champions" at the executive level who are 
motivators and apply pressure to change (i.e., be the "forcing function"). Intermediate 
managers are likely to resist change unless they see its benefits or are forced to change; 
often middle managers feel threatened by change and create obstacles to it. Lower level 
personnel frequently see the value in change, and respond to education and training if 
leadership establishes the environment for change. 
Integrated Product and Process Development (teaming). This approach offers great 
benefit and, to a large degree, can be taught. Nearly immediate benefit should result from 
teaming. However, improvement will fall short of its potential unless team members feel 
empowered to make decisions. 
Coordination. Coordinated work through teaming should result in fewer, less costly 
mistakes during acquisition of a warfighting system. Coordinated teamwork should show 
immediate benefit. 
Educated and Empowered Workforce. As described above, cultural change takes time 
and must be relentlessly supported by the leadership. Superiors are often reluctant to 
empower their subordinates. However, empowerment of a well-educated workforce 
unleashes creativity and ingenuity that will result in cheaper and better warfighting 
systems. 
Integrity and Ethics in the Program Management Workplace. Because integrity and 
ethical behavior are essential to empowerment, ethics should be incorporated in the 
education and training of acquisition personnel. The absence of integrity and ethical 
behavior will result in loss of confidence by taxpayers, contractors, and the Services that 
receive the new warfighting systems. 
Outputs from Project Managed Programs. Program management is consistent with high 
quality warfighting systems that are acquired in a timely and efficient manner. Program 
management should result in products that perform to requirements, meet quality 
standards, are delivered on schedule, are supportable, and are within cost (to include 
development, production, operation, sustainment, and disposal). 
Reorganization of Acquisition Functions 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends organizational alignment of 
acquisition functions as follows. 
--All system level Program Management should be managed by the 
Armament Policy Department. 
10/27/00 13 
--Program Managers should oversee and coordinate programs during the 
developmental process (R&D) and during serial production at least until the 
completion of fielding. 
--Technical Support should continue to be overseen by the Armament Policy 
Department throughout production, fielding and sustainment. 
--All R&D and production contracting related to system acquisition should 
be accomplished in the Supply Department, to include solicitation and contract 
award, quality assurance, contract payment, and contract administration. 
--Contracts for R&D should be accomplished by the Supply Department in 
support of the Program Manager (or other assigned manager). 
--Procurement of repair parts and services should remain in the Supply 
Department. 
Organizational Changes in the Armament Policy Department and the Benefits. The 
structure described above will pennit a single reporting channel through the Director of 
the Armament Policy Department for all program managers. This will simplify change 
management during the transition to a program management structure and facilitate the 
dissemination of lessons learned by the new program management offices. The PM will 
reach across organizational boundaries as necessary to obtain functional support. 
Organizational Changes in the Supply Department and the Benefits. Contracting 
expertise will be focused in the Supply Department for all contract requirements for 
major systems. There will be a single chain of authority for large system contracts, 
flowing through the Director of the Supply Department. This will simplify change 
management during the transition of the contract management structure and facilitate the 
dissemination of lessons learned on each contract. 
Process Changes. The organizational changes described above will require integrated 
product and process development. Program management will depend on the integrated 
efforts of multiple functional organizations. Participants will have to coordinate their 
efforts, including the flow of information across the boundaries of functional 
organizations. All functional participants will need to recognize the authority and 
responsibility of both the Program Manager and Contracting Officer. 
Barriers to Organizational Change. Moving personnel into new organizations causes 
discomfort and frustration. In some instances, even senior personnel may lose some of 
their authority and may be asked to assume new responsibilities or participate in new 
processes with which they may be unfamiliar. Such difficulties are transitory and may be 
made less severe through introductory training and open communications channels. 
However, the difficulty of cultural change should not be minimized. 
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Improvements to Requirements Generation 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends that the Ministry of National 
Defence review the requirements generation process and modify it as necessary to 
incorporate the key success factors, described below. 
Overview 
The requirements generation process precedes the acquisition process. Ordinarily, the 
acquisition program office is not even formed until a statement of performance 
requirements has been produced. 
Requirements generation is the process by which the user requirement or need is 
developed and validated. The Polish Ministry of National Defence currently has such 
processes through which the Services prepare requirements documents and hand them off 
to the MoND Armament Policy Department for acquisition of the warfighting systems. 
The Design of a Requirements Generation System 
Key Success Factors. A requirements generation system should include the following 
factors. 
• A clear statement of performance requirements for a warfighting system 
delivered into the hands of the acquisition team. 
• Requirements that address warfighting deficiencies or opportunities. 
• Requirements that describe in performance terms the warfighting needs of the 
user (whether single service or joint). 
• Statements of performance requirements that are consistent with the National 
Security Strategy/National Military Strategy. 
• Statements of performance requirements that are validated for Joint Service 
applicability and reviewed to ensure that the need cannot be met by non-
materiel means (such as a change in doctrine or training). 
• Statements of performance requirements that provide performance 
"thresholds" and "objectives" defining ranges of successful performance. 
• Statements of performance requirements that provide key performance 
parameters, such that failure to meet any of the key performance parameters 
would be reason for program reconsideration or termination. 
• The integration of users and functional experts working together 
simultaneously and cooperatively to achieve a statement of need in 
performance terms. 
• Decisions that take into consideration the total ownership cost and 
sustainability of the future system. 










The requirements generation process must be described in such a way that it can be 
accomplished by those personnel who must use it. The MoND should review published 
guidance and processes and, if necessary, incorporate changes consistent with the key 
success factors described above. A useful approach would be to use published U.S. 
guidance as a resource and extract relevant sections that could be tailored for MoND use. 
See extracts from "Requirements Generation System," CJCSI 3170.0lA in Appendix C. 
An outline of essential elements is described below. 
Responsibilities 
The Minister of National Defence or his designated representative approves the statement 
of performance requirements that has been submitted by the Service Commander and 
validated by the Chief of the General Staff. In the event that approval of the statement of 
performance requirement is beyond the authority of the Minister of National Defence, he 
forwards it to the Council of Ministers or Prime Minister, as appropriate. Following 
appropriate coordination and approvals, the Minister of National Defence forwards the 
statement of performance requirements, along with funding recommendation, to the 
Director of the Armament Policy Department for initiation of the acquisition. 
The Chief of the General Staff must perform review and oversight. He is responsible for 
validating the Service requirement after ensuring that it is consistent with National 
Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. He must also verify whether or not the 
Service's statement of performance requirements is fully funded in the Planning, 
Programming and Budget System. Additionally, he should validate that the requirement 
cannot be met by a more cost-effective means. 
Each Service bears the responsibility for requirements generation. The Service 
Commander designates the user representative and approves the study team chairman. 
The Service Commander must decide whether to fund the new requirement within 
Service funding levels or submit it as an unfunded requirement. Following Service 
approval, the Service Commander forwards the requirement to the Chief of the General 
Staff for validation. 
The Study Team Chairman reports to the Service Commander and is responsible to 
manage the requirements generation process and coordinate all the essential activities, 
within the authority delegated to him. An excellent study team approach for preparing the 
requirements document is the Integrated Concept Team (ICT). This is described in 
"Requirements Determination" (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) 1996 
published in the Defense Acquisition Deskbook. An extract is provided in Appendix C. 
Overview of the Requirements Study Team 
The requirements generation process can best be accomplished by a study team. 
Membership of the study team should include the user who is the chairman of the team. 
Logistics planners should represent the interests of such functions as maintenance and 








insight on technical feasibility, schedule considerations, and costs. Budget analysts must 
prepare cost estimates for the various alternatives. Other participants may be full time or 
part time study team members, depending on the particular requirement under 
consideration. All team members must be empowered to make recommendations and 
decisions in their areas of expertise and actively participate in the analysis of alternatives. 
Study Team Structure 
The Service Commander or the user representative should decide the study team 
structure. Likely team members include the following. 
• Experienced operational personnel who thoroughly understand the 
environment within which the required system must operate. 
• Experienced logistics support personnel who thoroughly understand logistics 
support requirements. 
• Functional experts knowledgeable in such areas as system design, software 
development, manufacturing, logistics planning, testing, contracting, and cost 
analysis. These functional experts might come from R&D laboratories, 
academic institutions or contractor organizations. 
Interfaces and Coordination 
Phases and Decision Milestones. Logical phases of requirements generation are 
definition, documentation, validation, and approval. These phases are described in 
"Requirements Generation System," CJCSI 3170.0lA. See extract in Appendix C. 
The Chain of Command and Reporting Structure. The Chairman of the study team 
reports through the Service Commander to the Minister of National Defence. 
Following validation and funding review by the Chief of the General Staff, the Service 
Commander provides the validated statement of performance requirements to Minister of 
National Defence, with coordination copies to the Armament Policy Department Director 
and the Budget Department Director. 
Budgeting process. The Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS) must work 
together with the requirements generation process. As the performance requirements are 
being assembled, the program funding needs must be identified. Otherwise, the result 
will be an operational requirement without the necessary funding to acquire and support 
it. 
The requirements generation process should smoothly lead into the acquisition process. 
Based on validation and necessary approvals, priority of need, technical feasibility, 
affordability and schedule requirement, the Minister of National Defence directs the 
Armament Policy Department Director to accept the statement of performance 
requirements and initiate the acquisition phase. The Armament Policy Department 






The Outputs and Outcomes of Requirements Generation 
Outputs from the Requirements Generation Process. The study team creates a statement 
of performance requirements for the new warfighting system, suitable for entry into 
acquisition. The statement includes user performance requirements, consideration of 
total ownership cost, and sustainability. Fully integrated, multi-functional teams are 
likely to produce statements of requirements for warfighting systems that are superior to 
those produced by other means. 
As part of the approval and coordination of the statement of performance requirements, 
the Chief of the General Staff validates the requirements to ensure that they are consistent 
with the National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy and that a materiel 
solution is necessary. Additionally, he determines whether or not program funding to 
support an acquisition has been addressed in the PPBS. 
Outcomes from the Requirements Generation Process. The requirements generation 
process, as described above, should result in a cultural change wherein all of the multi-
functional team members contribute to the process cooperatively and simultaneously. The 
study team coordinates and blends the perspectives of all the functional participants. 
Team members are empowered to fully participate in the requirements generation 
process, freely expressing their views, and making decisions or recommendations within 
their areas of expertise. Fully integrated, multi-functional teams achieve improved 
efficiency and effectiveness over other processes. It has been found that front-end effort 
contributes to a better product and lower cost. 
Reorganization of Test Management 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends that the Government of 
Poland reorganize the management of military systems testing. 
Testing is currently the responsibility of the MoND and the National Standards 
Organization. Both participants exercise their responsibility separately, adding 
unnecessary R&D time and cost. 
As system acquisition management transitions to a Program Management structure, there 
is an opportunity for improved testing efficiency. Making the Program Manager 
responsible for test planning will permit coordinated testing but separate, independent 
evaluation. That is, the Program Manager along with the various testers and other 
interested participants form an integrated test team that plans for integrated testing in the 
most efficient manner. The integrated test team agrees on the test regimen that will meet 
test requirements and fit within budgetary limitations. Then, as the testing is conducted 
by independent test activities, independent evaluations are accomplished as required by 
the legal and regulatory mandates. 
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Organizational Changes. The Program Management Office assigns a staff officer to 
coordinate test activities. This may be part time or full time, depending on the amount of 
testing planned or ongoing. Most of the work will continue to be performed by the 
various functional organizations that currently perform testing, but efficiencies should 
result through reductions in the total amount of testing. 
Process Changes. Coordinated test planning activities for a specific developmental 
program are accomplished by participating organizations, working together. This 
coordination requires the expenditure of planning time but achieves significant 
efficiencies in testing if the participants work cooperatively. 
Benefits. One person-the Program Manager-is responsible for test planning. This 
allows the PM to use testing as a risk reduction tool aimed at finding and fixing weapon 
system deficiencies. The independent evaluators still provide their independent views 
regarding the new weapon system, as mandated; however, coordinated testing costs less 
than the totally independent testing presently done. 
Barriers to Change. Because the total amount of testing is reduced, the various test 
activities may argue that this is a poor idea. It is expected that the arguments will be 
based on the possibility of improper test influence. This argument is not valid if 
independently conducted testing is done rigorously. 
Resource Allocation and Financial Management 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy team recommends that the Ministry of National 
Defence establish a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to assist . 
in making choices about the allocation of resources among competing or possible 
programs and alternatives to accomplish the specific objectives of national defence. 
The ultimate goal is to provide the best mix of forces, equipment and support 
attainable within fiscal constraints. 
Overview 
PPBS can be summarized in a few words. Based on the anticipated threat, a strategy is 
developed. The requirements of that strategy are then estimated and programs are 
developed to package and execute the strategy. Finally, a budget is developed to pay for 
the programs. 
PPBS, itself, operates on a continuous basis; each of the three functions of the system 
(planning, programming and budgeting) operates on a near-continuous basis, although 
not simultaneously in the same fiscal year. The process moves from broad planning 











price out the programs. PPBS differs from a traditional budgeting process in two 
significant ways. First, PPBS tends to focus less on the existing base and annual 
incremental improvements to it. Instead, its focus is more on objectives and purposes and 
the long-term alternatives to achieve them. As a result of this emphasis, planning has 
been elevated to a level equal to budgetary management and control. Secondly, PPBS 
brings together planning and budgeting by means of programming, a process which 
essentially defines a procedure for distributing available resources among the many 
competing or possible programs. 
Planning 
The "global" threat is assessed and a strategy to meet that threat is defined. 
The first phase of PPBS would begin with a review of the state of Polish national security 
objectives, consideration of broad strategies for dealing with the threats to national 
security, an assessment of current capabilities, and development of force structures and 
levels that will support those strategies. Development of defense-wide policies and 
guidance with respect to manpower, logistics, acquisition, and other functional areas 
follow those steps. The planning horizon must encompass a sufficient period of time to 
ensure consistency (approximately 8-10 years). The detail must be sufficient to identify 
both long and short-range security objectives. 
Programming 
Strategic plans are translated into programs defined in terms of forces, manpower, and 
funding requirements. 
In the programming phase, the broad strategic plan is translated into a financial plan of 
effective and achievable packages. The specific requirements for each of the services to 
accomplish the national strategy are identified in this phase, as well as an assessment of 
current capabilities. The overall purpose is to assign funding resources to programs in 
order to achieve the best mix of forces possible within fiscal constraints. Because it is 
more detailed and resource dependent, the programming phase covers a shorter period of 
time than the planning phase (approximately 5-7 years). 
Budgeting 
Programs are expressed in terms of specific funding requirements tied to an annual 
budget. 
Budgeting is the final phase in the PPBS cycle. The budget expresses the financial 
requirements necessary to support approved programs that were developed during the 
preceding phases of planning and programming. It is through the budget that planning 
and programming are translated into annual budget requirements. A key difference 
between programming and budgeting is the level of precision and accuracy associated 
with resource estimates. During the programming phase, many different program 
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alternatives are considered and a high level of precision in estimates is not required. 
However, once program decisions are made, more precise budget estimates are required 
to ensure the executability of the budget. The budgeting phase provides decision-makers 
with the final opportunity to refine estimates to reflect the most accurate and up-to-date 
data available, which comes from the organizations responsible for executing the budget. 
Acquisition and Contract Management 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends that the Ministry of National 
Defence establish "Contracting Officer'' positions and associated career paths, 
education, training and certification programs. 
Background 
During our interviews with MoND officials, it was noted that Poland does not have a 
designated "Contracting Officer" position, training or career path. Once a requirement is 
identified, it is assigned to a procuring activity. The head of that activity is responsible 
for the "execution" of that procurement and, depending upon the anticipated contract 
value, may be delegated responsibility for signing the ensuing contract. Day to day 
management for the procurement is usually delegated to a junior or mid-grade official 
depending upon the value and complexity of the procurement. This individual usually 
has an advanced technical degree but typically does not have any significant business 
experience, education or training. If the procurement is complex, the leader of the 
procurement may call in experts from other functional fields to provide technical, 
financial, legal and operational expertise. By their own admission, these procurement 
leaders and teams are typically assigned on an ad hoc basis. As a result, procuring 
organizations may lose valuable corporate knowledge and team synergy when these 
teams are disbanded. Additionally, the lack of formal contracting and business training 
for procurement team leaders, coupled with the lack of documented procurement 
processes/procedures, may adversely impact acquisition efficiency and effectiveness. 
Vision 
The vision for Poland's National Acquisition System is to maximize available resources 
and deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service to the customer. At the 
same time, the acquisition system should contain safeguards that maintain the public's 
trust and support public policy objectives. Contracting personnel and associated laws, 
regulations and processes have a tremendous potential impact on a nation's ability to 
successfully equip, modernize and support its military forces. Therefore, it is critical that 
agency leaders select contracting personnel carefully and, more importantly, provide 
those individuals with the necessary support, training and tools to accomplish their 
mission. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of recommended 






Contracting Officer Authority, (3) Contracting Officer Responsibility, (4) Contracting 
Officer Appointment, and (5) Contracting Officer Selection. Specific Contracting 
Officer education, training and certification recommendations will be addressed in the 
section titled "hnprovements in Acquisition Education." 
Contracting Authority 
Unless specifically prohibited by another provision of law, authority and responsibility to 
contract for authorized supplies and services should be vested in the head (leader) of an 
agency. As necessary, the agency head should be given the authority to establish 
contracting activities to support its mission and delegate broad authority to manage the 
agency's contracting functions to heads of such contracting activities. (The "Head of the 
contracting activity" is typically the official who has overall responsibility for managing 
the contracting activity). 
Contracts should be entered into and signed on behalf of the government only by duly 
appointed contracting officers acting within the authority granted by law and their 
respective agency. In some smaller agencies, it may be desirable to designate a relatively 
small number of high-level officials as contracting officers solely by virtue of their 
positions. Contracting officers below the level of a head of a contracting activity should 
be selected and appointed in writing. 
To facilitate the efficient use of resources, agency heads should be given the authority to 
mutually agree to assign contracting functions and responsibilities from one agency to 
another and/or create joint or combined offices to exercise acquisition functions and 
responsibilities. 
Contracting Officer Authority 
Contracting officers should have the authority to enter into, administer, or terminate 
contracts and make related determinations and findings. "Determinations and findings" 
refers to a special form of written approval by an authorized official that is required by 
statute or regulation as a prerequisite to taking certain contracting actions. A 
"determination" is a conclusion or decision supported by "findings." The findings are 
statements of fact or rationale essential to support the determination and must cover each 
requirement of the statute or regulation. 
Contracting officers may bind the government only to the extent of the authority 
delegated to them. Contracting officers should receive from the appointing authority 
clear instructions in writing regarding the limits of their authority. Information on the 
limits of the contracting officers' authority should be readily available to the public and 
agency personnel. 
No contract should be entered into unless the contracting officer ensures that all 
requirements of law, executive orders, regulations, and all other applicable procedures, 
including clearances and approvals, have been met. 
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Contracting Officer Responsibilities 
Contracting officers should be responsible for ensuring performance of all necessary 
actions for effective contracting, ensuring compliance with the terms of the contract, and 
safeguarding the interests of the government in its contractual relationships. In order to 
perform these responsibilities, contracting officers should be allowed wide latitude to 
exercise business judgment. Contracting officers should: 
1. Ensure that they operate within their authorized authority; 
2. Ensure that sufficient funds are available for obligation; 
3. Ensure that contractors receive impartial, fair, and equitable treatment; and 
4. Request and consider the advice of specialists in audit, law, engineering, 
transportation, and other fields, as appropriate. 
Contracting Officer Appointment 
Agency heads should establish and maintain a procurement career management program 
and a system for the selection, appointment and termination of appointment of 
contracting officers. Agency heads or their designees should be able to select and 
appoint contracting officers and terminate their appointments. These selections and 
appointments should be consistent with standards for skill-based training in performing 
contracting and purchasing duties. 
Contracting officers should be appointed in writing and provided a Certificate of 
Appointment, which should state any limitations on the scope of authority to be 
exercised, other than limitations contained in applicable law or regulation. Appointing 
officials should maintain files containing copies of all appointments that have not been 
terminated. 
Termination of a contracting officer appointment should be by letter, unless the 
Certificate of Appointment contains other provisions for automatic termination. 
Terminations may be for reasons such as reassignment, termination of employment, or 
unsatisfactory performance. No termination should operate retroactively. 
Contracting Officer Selection 
In selecting contracting officers, the appointing official should consider the complexity 
and monetary value of the acquisitions to be assigned and the candidate's experience, 
training, education, business acumen, judgment, character, and reputation. Examples of 
selection criteria include: 
10/27/00 23 
._ 
1. Experience in government contracting and administration, commercial 
purchasing, or related fields; 
2. Education or special training in business administration, law, accounting, 
engineering, or related fields; 
3. Knowledge of acquisition policies, procedures, laws and regulations; 
4. Specialized knowledge in the particular assigned field of contracting; and 
5. Satisfactory completion of acquisition training courses. 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends that the Ministry of National 
Defence spearhead efforts to shift the country's current acquisition system (and 
laws) from a risk avoidance to a risk management based system. Specifically, 
procurement laws, regulations and processes need to be changed to permit more 
system flexibility, innovation and empowerment of acquisition team members. 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends that the Ministry of National 
Defence establish a "Procurement Management Review" to increase insight into 
acquisition activities and explore opportunities for system improvement. 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends that the Ministry of National 
Defence integrate Contract Administration activities and establish a contract 
administration feedback mechanism to enhance overall acquisition system efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends that the Ministry of National 
Defence establish an internal "Pricing/Cost Estimating" function to support 
contracting, program management and resource allocation decisions. 
Background 
Many respondents from the Office of Public Procurement and Ministry of National 
Defence believed that the Act on Public Procurement provided definitive "guidance" on 
how to conduct an acquisition. This common viewpoint fails to recognize that there could 




l_ strategies could all be acceptable from a legal and business standpoint, but could have 
vastly different strengths and weaknesses. Conversely, a competing strategy could be 
legal in accordance with the Public Procurement Act, but could be a blatantly unethical or 
borderline ethical business approach. Blind adherence to the Act in these cases could 
undermine the integrity of the acquisition process and could adversely impact crucial 
business relationships. 
Although the Act is extremely detailed, it does not cover every potential circumstance 
that could confront a contracting official. Nor does it provide detailed guidance on how 
to implement and manage procurement, resourcing and business decisions. The strict 
interpretation and enforcement of the Public Procurement Act limits the use of potentially 
sound business strategies, promotes unhealthy risk aversion, hinders flexibility, increases 
cycle time, and stifles innovation and process improvement. 
The acquisition of major weapon systems is a complex undertaking, often requiring the 
integration of numerous functional specialists. One of the key tenets of our 
recommended National Acquisition Strategy involves the use of empowered individuals 
and teams to accomplish the acquisition mission. The Acquisition Team consists of all 
participants in government acquisition including not only representatives of the technical, 
supply, and procurement communities but also the customers they serve, and the 
contractors who provide the products and services. 
Empowerment of Acquisition Personnel 
The role of each member of the Acquisition Team should be to exercise personal 
initiative and sound business judgment in providing the best value product or service to 
meet the customer's needs. Empowerment is a relatively easy concept to grasp, but 
extremely difficult to implement due to human nature and organizational culture. 
Acquisition leaders should support prudent risk taking and avoid "punishing" those who 
attempt seemingly sound business approaches, but fail. Also, it is extremely important 
that acquisition related laws and regulations provide sufficient implementation flexibility 
for contracting officers and others involved in the acquisition process. For instance, if a 
specific strategy, practice, policy or procedure is in the best interests of the Polish 
government and is not addressed in agency regulations nor prohibited by law (statute or 
case law), that strategy, practice, policy or procedure should be construed as a 
permissible exercise of authority. The contracting official should not have to wait until 
the current Act on Public Procurement Policy is changed or amended to permit use of the 
desired strategy. The Act should be amended to foster flexibility, innovation and prudent 
risk taking. Toward this end, the Polish National Acquisition System (and associated 
laws, regulations and policies) should strive to achieve the following guiding principles: 
1. All participants in the System should be responsible for making acquisition 
decisions that deliver the best value product or service to the customer. Best 
value must be viewed from a broad perspective and is achieved by balancing 
the many competing interests in the System. The result is a system that works 
better and costs less. 
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2. The System must be responsive and adaptive to customer needs, concerns, and 
feedback. Implementation of acquisition policies and procedures, as well as 
consideration of timeliness, quality, and cost throughout the process, must 
take into account the perspective of the user of the product or service. 
3. The System must perform in a timely, high quality, and cost-effective manner. 
4. All members of the Team are required to employ planning as an integral part 
of the overall process of acquiring products or services. Although advance 
planning is required, each member of the Team must be flexible in order to 
accommodate changing or unforeseen mission needs. Planning is a tool for 
accomplishing tasks, and its disciplined application should be commensurate 
with the size and nature of a given task. 
5. In order to ensure that maximum efficiency is obtained, rules, regulations, and 
policies should be promulgated only when their benefits clearly exceed the 
costs of their development, implementation, administration, and enforcement. 
This applies to internal administrative processes, including reviews, and to 
rules and procedures applied to the contractor community. 
6. The System must provide uniformity where it contributes to efficiency or 
where fairness and predictability are essential. The System should also, 
however, encourage innovation and local adaptation where uniformity is not 
essential. 
7. An essential consideration in every aspect of the System is maintaining the 
public's trust. Not only must the System have integrity, but the actions of 
each member of the Team must reflect integrity, fairness, and openness. The 
foundation of integrity within the System is a competent, experienced, and 
well-trained, professional workforce. Accordingly, each member of the Team· 
is responsible and accountable for the wise use of public resources as well as 
acting in a manner that maintains the public's trust. Fairness and openness 
require open communication among team members, internal and external 
customers, and the public. 
8. To achieve efficient operations, the System must shift its focus from "risk 
avoidance" to one of "risk management." The cost to the taxpayer of 
attempting to eliminate all risk is prohibitive. The government should accept 
and manage the risk associated with empowering local procurement officials 
to take independent action based on their professional judgment and recognize 
that not all innovation will be successful. 
9. The government should exercise discretion, use sound business judgment, and 




prospective contractors. All contractors and prospective contractors should be 
treated fairly and impartially but need not be treated the same. 
The purpose of defining the "Acquisition Team" (Team) in the above guiding principles 
is to ensure that participants in the System are identified -- beginning with the customer 
and ending with the contractor for the product or service. By identifying the team 
members in this manner, teamwork, unity of purpose, and open communication among 
the members of the Team in sharing the vision and achieving the goal of the System are 
encouraged. Individual team members will participate in the acquisition process at the 
appropriate time. 
Role of the (Empowered) Acquisition Team 
The following principles should be adopted when defining the various roles and 
responsibilities of the Acquisition Team members within the Polish National Acquisition 
System. 
1. Government members of the Team must be empowered to make acquisition 
decisions within their areas of responsibility, including selection, negotiation, 
and administration of contracts consistent with the System's guiding 
principles. In particular, the contracting officer must have the authority to the 
maximum extent practicable and consistent with law, to determine the 
application of rules, regulations, and policies, on a specific contract. 
2. The authority to make decisions and the accountability for the decisions made 
should be delegated to the lowest level within the System, consistent with law. 
3. The Team must be prepared to perform the functions and duties assigned. The 
government should be committed to provide training, professional 
development, and other resources necessary for maintaining and improving 
the knowledge, skills, and abilities for all government participants on the 
Team, both with regard to their particular area of responsibility within the 
System, and their respective role as a team member. The contractor 
community should be encouraged to do likewise. 
4. The System should foster cooperative relationships between the government 
and its contractors consistent with its overriding responsibility to get the best 
value for the taxpayers. 
5. The Act on Public Procurement Policy outlines procurement policies and 
procedures that are used by members of the Acquisition Team. If a policy 
procedure, strategy or practice is in the best interest of the government and is 
not specifically addressed in the Act, nor prohibited by law (statute or case 
law), or other regulation, government members of the Team should not 
assume it is prohibited. Rather, absence of direction should be interpreted as 
permitting the Team to innovate and use sound business judgment that is 
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otherwise consistent with law and within the limits of their authority. 
Contracting officers should take the lead in encouraging business process 
innovations and ensuring that business decisions are sound. 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends that the Ministry of National 
Defense vigorously pursue simplification and streamlining of the Public 
Procurement Act and any other procurement laws that now limit the exercise of 
judgment by contracting officials, and hence limit their ability to acquire best value 
in contracting for goods and services. The detailed requirements of the present 
statute should be republished as guidance in a separate set of regulations. 
Background 
As noted in several contexts throughout the report, the Public Procurement Act is 
extremely detailed, and is both prescriptive and proscriptive. It covers not only virtually 
every action which the contracting officials are to take, but it is interpreted to preclude 
them from making decisions or judgments about any facet of a procurement which is not 
directly addressed in the law. Rewriting the law to be a set of basic principles, and 
providing for detailed procedures to be issued in regulations implementing these 
principles, is the first step (and a very important one) in empowering the acquisition 
workforce. 
Suggested content of a simplified Public Procurement Act 
1. The substance of the current Chapter 1, which includes definitions, statements 
of applicability and exclusions. 
2. The basic principles now enumerated in Chapter 3, which includes the range 
of tendering procedures, requirements for public notice, requirement for equal 
treatment of all offerors, and requirements with respect to qualification of 
contractors. However, details such as thresholds for unlimited tendering, 
actions that would disqualify a prospective contractor, the criteria for a 
qualified contractor, and the procedures for handling bids, would be best left 
to regulations which the law should authorize to be issued by the Director of 
Public Procurement in coordination with the Ministry of National Defense. 
3. Any special considerations or national policies, such as Buy Poland, or ensure 
fair treatment of small businesses, etc. 
4. A provision for protests and appeals, but without the detailed procedures now 
contained in Chapter 8. These should be in regulations authorized by the law 
to be issued as noted above. 
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5. A requirement for checks and balances and reasonable oversight of the 
process, including the regulations to ensure that they are modified as 
necessary to meet changing conditions. 
Most if not all the detailed procedures with respect to the various methods of tendering 
which are contained in Chapters 4-7 of the current Act would be more appropriately 
included in regulations. The principles enumerated above in connection with the 
discussion of empowerment, and the role of the empowered acquisition team, are equally 
important in establishing the statutory basis for acquisition and crafting implementing 
regulations. 
Attached in Appendix C are several extracts from the Defense Acquisition Deskbook 
which illustrate how detailed procedures are promulgated in regulations rather than in 
statute. For example, the coverage of requirements for competition in Part 6 of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation is similar to the tendering requirements in Poland's 
Public Procurement Act. However, additional guidance can be added to the regulatory 
implementation that enhances the contract specialist's ability to make judgments as to the 
best course of action. The extracts from Part 15 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation go 
into greater detail and provide more guidance on negotiated procurements. These are 
generally the larger and more complex procurements, which require many judgments and 
trade-offs between price and other evaluation factors, so this is one of the more critical 
areas for regulatory coverage. In the past, most major system procurements were priced 
on the basis of costs - either costs estimated to be incurred or cost experience on a 
previous purchase. However, as more commercial components are used in defense 
systems, the whole process of evaluating technical features and determining best value 
becomes more complicated and requires greater knowledge of the marketplace. The 
contracting officer can no longer rely on the opportunity to review a prospective 
contractor's actual costs, but must be able to determine the fairness and reasonableness of 
the prices for commercial components based on marketplace competition. 
As the Polish Ministry of National Defence moves toward privatization of its defence 
manufacturing capability, it is reasonable to assume that there will be greater competition 
among potential suppliers to fill defence needs. Much of the guidance and procedures 
governing negotiated procurement should prove very useful under those circumstances. 
Clearly, such guidance, as well as most of what is now contained in Chapters 4-7 of the 
Public Procurement Act, should be in regulations that can be modified as necessary 
without having to go back to Parliament. The procurement regulatory system in the US is 
updated several times a year through the use of Federal Acquisition Circulars that modify 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Subsidiary regulations are then modified as well if 
necessary. Two Federal Acquisition Circulars (FACs) are included in Appendix C to 
illustrate how regulatory changes are originated, developed, and made a part of the 
Regulation. 
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Improvements in Acquisition Education 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends that the Ministry of National 
Defence establish an acquisition education and training program, including 
program management and contracting as the centerpieces. 
Overview 
As acquisition becomes more complex and important in carrying out Poland's military 
modernization and integration into NATO, the roles of acquisition managers become 
increasingly critical. In addition to having strong technical backgrounds, they will need 
business and leadership skills to successfully manage major acquisition programs. A 
model acquisition system ought to include a more responsible role for procurement 
personnel than they have generally exercised in the past. An empowered system calls for 
more informed judgments about what is available in the global marketplace and about 
opportunities for competition. It calls for earlier participation by procurement personnel, 
as the government's business managers, in the development of acquisition strategies. 
Further, it calls for reducing the micromanagement in existing laws and permitting 
broader latitude for judgment, while holding acquisition managers accountable for the 
results of decisions within their control. (Ref. 33) 
Education and training in the acquisition specialties should encompass all the functional 
areas that participate in the acquisition process. Program management, contracting, 
systems engineering, manufacturing and quality assurance, logistics, financial 
management and testing are a few of the functional areas. A more complete list, taken 
from the US DoD system, is enclosed in Appendix C. Specialists from each functional 
area need to have knowledge and experience in their functional area but also have a 
general knowledge of acquisition-specifically in the areas of program management, 
contracting, financial management, and integrated product and process development. 
Basic instruction in these areas should be embedded in the education and training plan for 
each functional specialty. 
A. Comprehensive Education Support System 
To support the early conversion to a program managed acquisition system, a 
comprehensive education (and training) support system is recommended. Such a system 
would be comprised of three principal phases: 
I. Initial education phase 
II. Advanced education and training phase 
III. Senior education and training phase 
The initial education phase would consist of civilian undergraduate business educational 






Baccalaureate programs such as that at the University of Warsaw are quite capable of 
supplying finance, budget, management and contract personnel for the Ministry of 
National Defence personnel pool. After recruitment, specialized training in military 
acquisition management could be developed within the MoND education structure. The 
Military University of Technology (MUT) seems an appropriate institution to consolidate 
training for Phase I as well as II and III. It already has much of the faculty expertise 
needed to establish a Defense Acquisition Training Institute capable of conducting 
specialized training for initial entry personnel and more advanced professional 
development for mid-career personnel. 
Phase II would consist of graduate level education programs, primarily at the master's 
degree level. This phase can be supported by Polish institutions of higher education and 
by external civilian and military schools, such as the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 
business schools and civilian universities. Advanced professional training to support mid-
career professional development already exists at several US military institutions, e.g., 
NPS, and the Defense Acquisition University and can be developed at MUT as 
previously mentioned in reference to Phase I training support for contract officers. 
During the transition period, training, development of certification requirements, etc., can 
be supported by augmenting the MUT faculty with the appropriate skills. 
Additionally, Phase II educational opportunities should be supplemented by a 
certification program. Training, education and experience would be tested by a 
certification examination. The examination would set standards for time on the job and 
other qualifications, e.g., Level I- two years acquisition experience, baccalaureate in 
business, finance or related field; Level II -- five years experience, advanced training 
program; Level III - ten years experience, master's degree level education in related 
field. 
Each of these levels for acquisitions professionals would be supported by defining 
specific academic programs and/or training courses that would meet the requirements set 
for specialty or sub-specialty areas, e.g., program management, contracting, systems 
engineering, finance and budgeting. Here it would be necessary to establish both an 
education coordinator who would certify external education and training facilities as 
meeting the MoND stated requirements, and an examination/certification board that 
prepares, reviews and administers the exams at each successive level. This process may 
be incorporated into existing certification functions at the Military University of 
Technology (MUT), building upon its expertise in the appropriate subject areas. 
Phase ill education supports the requirement for senior leadership in the MoND 
acquisition system. Here we should look to educational support and training programs 
that support both the integration of knowledge of the various acquisition subspecialties, 
the process of military acquisition as national strategic resource management and a 
complete understanding of the military planning process. Education at senior service 
academies and experience in key positions should be a prerequisite for those selected for 
senior leadership positions. Additional post-graduate level education might be developed 






institute could be established at MUT to support this recommendation. Alternatively, 
MUT and the University of Warsaw may wish to establish a joint program where a broad 
based military-civilian education partnership would draw upon expertise and experience 
from both sectors to assist senior managers in improving their decision- making skills. 
Everyone involved in the acquisition process should receive education and ongoing 
training in ethics and fraud detection. Ethical conduct is crucial to maintaining the public 
trust and confidence in the government's acquisition system. Accordingly, these 
concepts should be incorporated in all public sector certification, training and education 
systems. 
B. Program Management Education 
The establishment of an education and training program is multifaceted. First, there must 
be a core of personnel with the necessary education and training to initiate the 
educational program. A solid approach would be to educate an initial core in project 
management at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. These 
individuals would, upon their return to Poland, establish a program management 
education curriculum. A complement of acquisition-trained personnel would eventually 
result, most of them receiving the necessary instruction in Poland. 
Second, a short course of about two weeks could be provided in Poland by faculty of the 
Naval Postgraduate School (later by MUT) for any personnel assigned to a program 
management team. Such a course would introduce personnel to the basic principles of 
program management. 
Third, any personnel designated to be a program manager or deputy program manager 
must receive instruction prior to assuming the new position. 
Fourth, principles of program management would need to be embedded in functional 
curricula for acquisition personnel involved in project management. For example, 
specialists in systems engineering, logistics, manufacturing management, quality 
assurance, testing, contracting and cost accounting should receive instruction in the 
principles of program management, to include integrated product and process 
development. 
C. Financial Management Education 
The Financial Management education program should be offered at both the graduate and 
postgraduate levels. In addition to management fundamentals, the program of instruction 
should include such topics as funds management, internal control and auditing, cost 
management and analysis, concepts of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and 
strategic planning and control. It is also important that financial managers be cognizant 
of the acquisition management process in which they will be asked to participate. They 
should understand the acquisition process and the application of project management 






are critical skills for the financial manager. They are used for solving complex and 
unstructured management problems in which alternatives must be identified, evaluated 
and selected to assure the most efficient utilization and economic procurement of 
resources, and the effective accomplishment of MoND goals and objectives. 
D. Logistics Education 
The acquisition logistics educational structure should be technically oriented, and taught 
at the graduate or postgraduate level. The program of instruction ought to include 
integrating studies, such as program management, contracting principles, systems 
engineering and integrated product and process development. Good logistics planners 
become better and more useful to a warfighting program insofar as they understand the 
broad range of acquisition functional specialties involved in the development. 
Privatization 
Recommendation: 
The National Acquisition Strategy Team recommends privatization to the maximum 
extent practicable the government factories that currently supply the majority of 
defence needs. 
There appears to be a general acknowledgement that the government needs to privatize 
most if not all the factories that currently supply the majority of defence needs. They are 
admittedly not as efficient as private enterprise, and the products they supply are 
therefore more costly. There is no incentive for them to become more efficient so long as 
they do not have to compete for business. The efficiencies of privatization, enabling the 
government to acquire significantly more products within its current defence budget, 
should be a strong incentive to privatize as soon as possible. Studies and analyses in the 
following areas are needed to facilitate future decisions on privatization of defence 
plants: 
1. Are private sector enterprises now competing with government factories to fill 
defence needs? Are the savings from such competitions measurable when 
contracts are awarded to private sector companies? 
2. Are any of the government facilities engaged in research or manufacture that 
cannot be performed in the private sector? Some of the considerations that 
might warrant the use of government facilities could be security of highly 
classified research, or significant investment in facilities that cannot be 
recouped because of low quantity production requirements. 
3. Are there any critical skills and/or core capabilities that the government needs 
to maintain and protect in its plants, research facilities, maintenance depots, 
etc. because such skills and capabilities are either not available or cannot be 
relied on to be available in the private sector in time of need? 
4. Are there private sector manufacturers, investors, entrepreneurs, etc., available 






5. Are there alternative uses for any of the government-owned factories, or is 
conversion to commercial uses a feasible consideration? 
6. Develop a plan and timetable for conversion of government factories to 










III. The Acquisition System in Poland 
Baseline Organization and Processes 
35 
-1. The Current Structure of Political Power in Poland 
A. The Political Framework 
Poland adopted a new constitution in 1997, modifying a structure of political power that 
has become dramatically more democratic since the first post-WWII free elections were 
held in 1989. According to this constitution, Poland is a unitary state and a parliamentary 
democracy. Power exercised by the legislative, executive and judicial branches is to be 
balanced and separated. Legislative authority belongs to Parliament, composed of a 
Sejm, or lower chamber, and a Senate, or upper chamber. Parliamentarians are elected, 
in accordance with a detailed set of rules. Most of the deputies in the Sejm are elected by 
proportional representation from multi-seat constituencies. The remainder are elected, 
again by proportional representation, from national constituencies among the political 
parties that won at least seven percent of the vote. Executive power is vested in a 
popularly elected President and the Council of Ministers, headed by a Prime Minister 
nominated by the President and approved by the Sejm. Courts and tribunals exercise 
judicial power. (Ref. 7) 
Political parties are critical to the functioning of the new constitutional order in Poland. 
It is premature to gauge the patterns according to which the parties will aggregate 
interests, including those associated with national defence, and gain support for their 
views sufficient to win and retain office for extended periods of time. Nor is it evident 
where the defence interests of the most successful parties converge, except in general 
support for the institution of the Polish military and its affiliation with NATO. The 
landscape of political parties in Poland has changed significantly and continuously since 
1989. As of May of 2000, there were over 200 parties, though a half dozen tend to 
dominate in parliamentary elections, and hence figure prominently in the coalition 
governments that have been characteristic of contemporary Polish politics. (Ref. 15) Nine 
parties are represented in the Sejm as of June 2000 (Ref. 24). No single party has been 
able to win control of Parliament in successive elections. In terms of ideological 
developments, parliamentary power has been transferred via the ballot box from 
relatively conservative to relatively liberal coalitions and back again over the course of a 
series of elections since 1989. 
The picture on the executive branch side of Polish government is, not surprisingly, 
similar. Poland has had two presidents since 1989, Lech Walesa and Aleksander 
Kwasniewski. Walesa, president from 1990 until 1995, came from the Solidarity Party, 
once the most powerful labor union in the country. The current president, Mr. 
Kwasniewski, is a former communist minister. Both presidents have experienced 
difficulty with the prime ministers they have nominated and the coalition governments 
these prime ministers have led. Elections for Parliament, unless triggered earlier, will 
take place in September of 2001. 
Elected officials in Poland must work within relatively new governmental structures and 
a challenging array of political, economic and social problems. Thus it is not surprising 




politics. That observation applies across the policy spectrum, including national defence, 
and, therefore, acquisition. In this environment, it is quite difficult to develop and sustain 
comprehensive policy initiatives. That said, it is noted that the transfers of power in 
Poland, though frequent by comparison with much older democracies, continue to be 
lawful and peaceful. Democracy in Poland is clearly a success at the level of popular 
commitment, rule of law and regime change. The problem, as noted, lies in working 
through or modifying further the structures of government and the alignment of parties to 
facilitate long-term policy development and implementation. 
B. The Economic Framework 
The economy of Poland is responding reasonably well to the transformation begun ten 
years ago. At that time, significant changes were made, including ending price controls, 
cutting subsidies and reducing barriers to imports. The GDP initially faltered, but has 
since recovered, showing positive growth each year since 1992 (Ref. 24). Between 1992 
and 1999, GDP growth averaged nearly 5 percent (Refs. 24 and 25). The emerging 
private sector, now well over half of Poland's GDP, is the engine for this growth. In 
1999, the GDP of Poland was 611,576 MPLN, reflecting growth of 4.1 percent. Inflation 
was 7.3 percent, while unemployment was 13 percent (Ref. 24). 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) extended 
membership to Poland in 1996, signaling confidence in Poland's adaptation to 
international rules on finance and trade. EU membership is, however, proving more 
difficult. The government hopes to resolve the many issues associated with membership 
in the EU by 2003. At the heart of the transformation of the Polish economy and its 
further integration into European and world markets is the effort to complete 
privatization. The government plans to transfer ownership of government-owned plants 
to private entities, but must resolve many issues before this can be fully accomplished. 
More than a third of the employees working for defence companies would be retired early 
or would require retraining according to this plan (Ref. 14). Within Defence, 
privatization must be linked to the National Military Strategy and a national acquisition 
strategy. Plans for privatizing defence activities are addressed in two documents: The 
first, Restructuring and Privatization of the Defence Industry, provides a blueprint for 
state-owned, partially privatized, and wholly privatized companies. The second 
document is the Offset Law. 
Poland is experiencing difficulty achieving a balanced budget. Putting aside the costs 
associated with privatization, the Ministry of Finance is attempting to eliminate the 
deficit by 2003. As of 1999, the deficit was 2 percent of GDP, and it is expected to grow 
slightly in 2000 (Ref. 24). Increases in spending to achieve NATO force goals, as with 
other commitments for new or expanded governmental programs, will continue to 
conflict with this objective. Besides defence, other major drivers on the spending side of 




When NA TO membership was extended to Poland in 1997, it was observed in the 
Protocols to the treaty providing for that membership that "Poland has the most 
significant military resources in Central Europe, ... and now spends 2.27 percent of its 
Gross Domestic Product on defense." (Ref. 30) That figure is slightly greater than the 
average of 2.2 and 2.1 percent in 1997 and 1998, respectively, for European NATO 
countries (Ref. 25). However, Poland undertook no specific commitment with respect to 
defence spending when it became a member of NATO. Rather, there was an 
understanding that membership in NA TO "requires a commitment to assume the requisite 
financial responsibilities." (Ref. 29) It was also agreed that Poland's contribution to 
NATO's common budget would be 2.48 percent (Ref. 32). 
When the government of Poland accepted these responsibilities, it was assumed by Allied 
Heads of State and Government that the costs they would generate were "manageable, 
and that the resources necessary to meet those costs will be provided in accordance with 
established procedures under which each Ally bears its fair share." (Ref. 29) President 
Kwasniewski has stated that concrete measures would be taken to meet all targets set "in 
connection with NATO membership." (Ref. 31) To further that end, the President said 
that Poland's armed forces would be fundamentally transformed, "in step with the 15-year 
modernization programme now being drafted by the government." (Ref. 29) Within this 
programme was to be "a defence budget estimate for the first five years in which the 
programme will be operative, as well as a general forecast of military expenditure in the 
following decade." (Ref. 29) 
As a share of the growing Polish economy, spending for defence over the period 1989-
1997 has ranged from 1.8 percent to 2.7 percent of GDP. (See box below) The average 
for this period is 2.3 percent (Ref. 26). While defence spending as a share of the Polish 
economy has been relatively stable, measured in constant currency it declined from 1989 
























2. Acquisition and the Defence Budget Process 
A. Governmental Structure and Budget Process 
Before examining the process of developing defence budgets for approval by the Council 
of Ministers and Parliament, we should understand the basics of government in Poland 
and how it addresses budgets in general. We begin by clarifying the use of the word 
government, which means something different in the Polish political context from what it 
means to those familiar with presidential political systems. Unless it is used in the more 
general sense to refer to all of the institutions of governance at the national level, the term 
government in this report refers to the cabinet or the Council of Ministers. The role of 
the government or cabinet in budgeting in general and defence budgeting in particular is 
addressed below. 
As a hybrid of a parliamentary system of government, the Polish system features a 
distinct blending of legislative and executive power. This is evident in the office of the 
President, who is popularly elected every five years. The President is also the Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces of Poland. In exercising his authority under the 
constitution, the President can issue Official Acts that must be signed by the Prime 
Minister. 
For purposes of exercising control over the armed forces, the President, as commander-
in-chief, chairs a National Defence Committee. Deputy Chairmen are the Prime Minister 
and the Minister of National Defence. The Committee is comprised of the Presidents of 
the Sejm and the Senate, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Finance 
and the Chief of the General Staff (Ref. 16). 
The President shares general executive power with the Prime Minister and Council of 
Ministers. The President nominates the Prime Minister (PM) who, in tum, proposes a 
government, or Council of Ministers. Once this government has been named, the 
President formally appoints the PM and the rest of the Council of Ministers. The 
government is then approved by the Sejm. If the President has not named a PM or the 
appointed government has not been able to win approval, the Sejm may select a PM and 
Council of Ministers and the President must accept them. If neither of these procedures 
results in a government approved by the Sejm, the President may appoint a PM and his 
Council of Ministers and submit them to a vote of confidence in the Sejm. If that vote 
fails, the President calls for elections to form a new Sejm. Once in office, the Prime 
Minister, in directing branches of the Polish government, issues policy documents. 
The Council of Ministers conducts executive matters by ensuring that laws are 
implemented and, notably, by drafting the State Budget and supervising its 
implementation. The Council also exercises "general control in the field of national 
defence" (Ref. 7). The Council is comprised of the PM, who acts as its President, and the 
ministers. Deputy Prime Ministers and presidents of committees specified in statutes 
may also serve on the Council. Ministers direct their branches of government under the 
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leadership of the PM, performing their work by issuing regulations. Members of the 
Council are collectively responsible to the Sejm for the activities of the Council and may 
be individually responsible to that body for matters within their competence. The 
composition of the Council may be changed by the President upon the request of the PM. 
It may also be changed should the Sejm vote no confidence in an individual minister. 
This structure for the exercise of executive power is intended to ensure that power is both 
limited and coordinated in its employment. In combination with a very fragmented and 
evolving political party system, this structure puts a premium upon the leadership and 
management skills of both executives and legislators. This is particularly the case where 
long-term planning (including identification of resources) for major government 
programs is concerned. The process of passing budgets illustrates this problem and is 
central to acquisition policy reform. 
In general, budget development begins within the executive branch, moves to the 
legislative branch, and after approval there, returns to the executive branch for final 
approval and execution. 
Figure 1 
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Figure 1 is intended to capture the flow of budget events across these institutions of 
government, using the defence budget as an example. It suggests that the Ministry of 
National Defence (MoND) begins the process by submitting a defence budget proposal to 
the Council of Ministers for approval. Once the Council has made its adjustments, this 
budget, as part of the overall State Budget, will be given to the Parliament for 
consideration and approval. Following parliamentary approval, which, of course, 




President for final approval and execution. Each of these steps will be discussed in 
further detail below. 
B. Development of the Defence Budget within the Ministry of Defence 
We begin by noting the organization of the Ministry of National Defence, captured in 
Figure 2 below. Within the MoND, the most important players in the annual process of 
developing defence budgets are the Minister of National Defence, the Budget 
Department, the General Staff and the Level II Budget Holders. These offices are 
organized as a MoND Budget Committee, chaired by the Minister of National Defence 
and supported by the three Permanent Subcommittees. Because the Permanent 
Subcommittees and the Level II Budget Holders are neither self-evident nor identified in 
the MoND organization chart (Fig. 2), a word on their composition is in order before 
beginning the discussion of the budget process within MoND. 
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The Minister of National Defence is the main Budget Holder for the budget of the 
Ministry of National Defence in Poland. Level II Budget Holders are the commanders of 
the three services, i.e., the Land Forces (Army), the Air Forces and the Navy, 
commanders of designated units and heads of the departments that report directly to the 
Minister of National Defence. Level III Budget Holders are commanders of units that 
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report directly to Level II Budget Holders. (Ref. 4) Budget Holders, supported by chief 
accountants, are responsible for the funds they receive and for executing contracts. 
The Permanent Subcommittees focus on three separate matters. These subjects and the 
composition of the subcommittees are as follows: 
1. Permanent Subcommittee on R&D and implementation, armament, military 
equipment and spare parts procurement and maintenance. 
Chair: Director, Armament Policy Department 
2. Permanent Subcommittee on construction investment 
Chair: Director, Infrastructure Department 
3. Permanent Subcommittee on other expenditures 
Chair: Deputy Director, Budget Department 
Membership on these Permanent Subcommittees is comprised of representatives from the 
Armament Policy, Infrastructure, Budget and Supply Departments, the General Staff, and 
certain other military units (see Annex 1 of Ref. 9). 
How do these offices within the MoND interact to produce the annual request for defence 
spending? It begins each March, when the Budget Department prepares for the Ministry 
of Finance estimates of funding requirements for the following calendar year (which is 
also the fiscal year). The Budget Department works with the Level II Budget Holders 
and the General Staff in preparing these estimates. The estimates compare estimated 
current year spending with the amounts required for the next year, including funds for 
new investments mandated by law. 
That same month, the General Staff establishes overall military priorities and tasks for the 
next year. Specific activities such as participation by the Polish military in peacekeeping 
activities in Kosovo would be addressed at this stage; however, it is not clear that broader 
inputs deriving from the national security and military strategies are. Estimates of the 
costs associated with the achievement of these military priorities and tasks are not 
developed at this stage. 
In April the Budget Department forwards estimates for material plans to the Finance 
Ministry. In May they issue a document--Ministerial Guidelines--indicating the military 
goals and tasks for the next year taken from the work of the General Staff. This 
document does not include estimates of the costs of achieving these goals and priorities. 
The link between tasks, priorities and the resources estimated as necessary to achieve 
them, on the one hand, and the estimated funding requirements sent to the Finance 
Ministry referred to above is not clear. 
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In early June, Level II Budget Holders submit budget and material plans to the Budget 
Department and in late June, this information is reviewed by the Permanent 
Subcommittees. 
In July, the Finance Ministry is to provide a defence budget to the Ministry of National 
Defence. This budget is a response-and almost always an adjustment-to the MoND 
request for funding described above. The budget provided by the Ministry of Finance is 
not allocated by function or military service. The MoND has 21 days to adjust its budget 
plans to this budget. The MoND Budget Committee makes this adjustment and allocates 
the budget by service. The Budget Department then allocates spending among Level II 
Budget Holders. This revised budget data is provided to the Ministry of Finance in 
August. Budget justification materials are prepared by the Budget Department to be used 
when MoND officials testify before the Defence Committees in Parliament. 
By September, the defence budget submission, based upon the July guidance provided by 
the Ministry of Finance, is to be finalized and incorporated within the State Budget. This 
State Budget, in tum, is submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers, and 
subsequently, to Parliament. The expectation is that the Council of Ministers and 
Parliament will make their decisions on defence (and other spending) by October. This 
would allow the Budget Department to develop detailed financial plans, resulting in a 
MoND Budget Decision. The Minister of National Defence has 21 days to sign this 
document once Parliament passes and the President signs the Budget Bill. If these events 
occur in a timely manner, the MoND can approve material plans and begin 
implementation by 1 January. The financial plans submitted by the Level II Budget 
Holders and approved by the Minister of National Defence serve as the basis for public 
tenders. Contracts, however, can be signed after January 1. If a Budget Decision is not 
made by 1 January, MoND uses the drafts of financial plans submitted in December to 
the Budget Department by the Level II Budget Holders. 
The Ministry of Finance determines the schedule of events that MoND and other 
ministries must follow in preparing budget submissions. The schedule is subject to 
annual revision. Schedule slippage may and does occur, owing in part to the complex, 
important and frequently difficult budget decisions that must be made by the Council of 
Ministers and the Parliament. These decisions are addressed below. Figure 3 is intended 
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Once the Defence budget request prepared by the MoND has been finalized, as per the 
procedures outlined above, it lies with elected senior officials to make the final decisions. 
The first of these decisions occurs within the Council of Ministers, led by the Prime 
Minister. Figure 4 is intended to depict the defence budget activities within the Council 
of Ministers. 
In making a decision regarding the appropriate level of funding for defence, the Prime 
Minister must take into consideration other governmental priorities, as well as the impact 
of the budget upon the economy. The case for defence spending is made by a committee 
within the Office of the Prime Minister, called the Committee for Defence Affairs. That 
Committee, led by the Minister of National Defence, is comprised of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Economics, Finance, Communications and Education. 
The Committee for Defence Affairs takes into consideration information of several kinds. 
Some of this information is necessarily classified. Other inputs include the budget 
materials and other documents pertaining to national security and national defence 
strategy prepared and submitted by the MoND. Particular attention is paid to major 
acquisitions proposed by the MoND. 
Central to the decision on spending for defence and all other activities are the decisions 
made by the Ministry of Finance. This Ministry works with all other ministries and with 
the Prime Minister to make decisions on spending intended to achieve the different policy 
objectives of the Government. Once a final decision has been reached regarding the 
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levels of spending to be proposed by the Government to Parliament for defence and other 
activities, Parliament is supposed to act within three months, typically, the period 
between October and December, when the new fiscal year begins. (See Figure 4) 
Figure 4 
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In 1997, the Council of Ministers adopted the "Outlines of the Government Programme 
for the Armed Forces Modernization 1998-2012." (Ref. 3) This action was apparently 
taken in response to President Kwasniewski's NATO accession initiative. It was to 
identify the funding needed to meet the procurement requirements deriving from NATO 
membership. The impact of this Programme is not evident in subsequent defence budget 
decisions made by the Council. 
Budgeting for Defence Within the Parliament 
The elected members of the two chambers of the Polish Parliament review the budgets 
for all activities of the Polish government, including the Ministry of Defence. The 
defence budget is first reviewed in the Sejm, then in the Senate. In the Sejm, the 
committees that play the critical role are the Public Finances Committee and the National 
Defence Committee. In the Senate, the relevant committees are the National Economy 
Committee and the National Defence Committee. While the political logic of 
parliamentary government suggests that the budgets developed by the Council of 
Ministers would generally reflect the views of the Parliament, it should be assumed that 
the committees in Parliament that act on the State Budget and the Defence Budget may 
make changes. Figure 5 is intended to depict the activities of the Parliament in shaping 
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The Defence budget approved by the Council of Ministers is sent to the Sejm as part of 
the State Budget, where the Public Finances Committee first examines it. This 
examination focuses on total spending within the budget submitted by the Council of 
Ministers and the priorities reflected within that budget. The budget for defence is 
section 29 of the State Budget. Within the same time frame, i.e., early October, the 
MoND sends detailed budget data to the National Defence Committees of the Sejm and 
the Senate, to support the request for MoND spending. 
In the Sejm, the defence budget is separately reviewed by the National Defence 
Committee. Officials from the MoND are called upon to explain and justify the request 
for defence spending to the Committee. The Committee then provides its views on the 
defence budget, including suggested changes, to the Public Finances Committee when 
that body meets in plenary session. Members of the Public Finances Committee may 
suggest changes to the defence budget during this session. 
Once the Public Finances Committee reaches agreement on spending totals, the State 
Budget bill is sent to the Senate for consideration. There the review takes the same form 
as in the Sejm, that is, the defence portion of the budget is reviewed by a committee 
specializing in defence (the National Defence Committee) as well as the committee with 
authority to approve the entire State Budget, i.e., the National Economy Committee. The 











In both the Sejm and the Senate, members vote for the defence budget when they vote on 
the overall budget, i.e., the State Budget. If the Senate approves a budget bill passed by 
the Sejm, the legislation is forwarded to the President for action. Should the Senate not 
act upon such a bill within 30 days after passage by the Sejm, the bill automatically goes 
to the President. The Senate may also amend or reject a budget passed by the Sejm. If a 
majority in the Sejm votes to override Senate amendment or rejection of legislation, it is 
sent to the President for action. In the absence of a vote to override, the Sejm must 
address the action taken by the Senate and pass a revised version of the bill at issue, thus 
restarting the cycle. 
The Presidency and the Defence Budget 
We have noted that executive power in Poland is shared between the President and the 
Prime Minister and his Government, and that executive power is balanced against the 
power of the Parliament. We can see the effect of this arrangement in the process of 
budgeting for defence. For example, as Commander in Chief, the President chairs the 
National Defence Committee, as noted above, and appoints the Chief of the General Staff 
and the commanders of each of the Services. His National Security Bureau (BBN) 
provides critical advice to the Minister of Defence in developing the budget and to the 
defence committees in Parliament during their deliberations on defence budget matters. 
And perhaps most importantly, the President has the political power to commit the 
resources of the country to a major security undertaking, as has occurred in Poland in the 
decade of the 1990s. 
But the defence budget finally presented to the President may differ from the preferences 
he has articulated at earlier stages of the budget process. Trade-offs involving 
constituencies represented in Parliament are not uncommon, nor are changes reflecting 
difference between Ministers. Whatever the situation, the President has several options 
to exercise when the State Budget is presented to him by Parliament. 
The President may approve the budget, in which case the funds are immediately made 
available to the MoND. 
He can also choose to refer a bill to the Constitutional Tribunal. If this body agrees with 
the President that it violates some constitutional rule, he cannot sign it until the problem 
has been resolved. If they do not find a constitutional problem with the bill, the President 
must sign it. 
Finally, the President can send a bill back to the Sejm for reconsideration. Should a 3/5 
majority of that body vote to approve the bill again, it must be accepted by the President. 
In the absence of a 3/5 majority voting to override the president's disapproval, a major 
political stalemate is in effect. The Sejm has the option of meeting the President's 
objections to the bill, in which case the stalemate is resolved. Another, more hazardous 
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C. Resource Planning and Allocation 
The centralized budget planning process in place when Poland was a member of the 
Warsaw Pact was abandoned in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was felt that central 
planning was no longer needed and that an "invisible market hand" would supplant it. 
Long term state planning became non-existent and, as a result, the MoND essentially 
gave up planning for any term longer than one year. The only exceptions were the long-
term plan for the development of the Armed Forces and the main individual weaponry 
research and development plans. (Ref. 2) 
By 1994, when the Polish economy had started to stabilize, the government decided that 
an increase in the planning horizon was desirable. A social and economic program for the 
years 1994-1997 was established as a mid-term plan. While that plan did indicate the 
need for a strengthened military, it did not present a methodology or identify funding to 
achieve that goal. Internally, the MoND did develop a plan that identified requirements 
and funding out to 2010. The plan was used by the General Staff to prepare its program 
plans but it went no further. Externally, industry was clamoring for long term plans to use 
in planning development and production requirements. As a result of the military and 
industrial concerns, the Polish Parliament conducted a debate on National Defence in 
February 1995. The debate resulted in a parliamentary resolution recommending that the 
government propose the allocation of Defence funding as a percentage of GDP. While 
not law, it did result in an increase in Defence budgets (+5.3 percent in 1996, + .5 percent 
in 1997 and +3.8 percent in 1998). The significance of the increases may best be 
determined by noting that they followed a 60 percent decline in Defence expenditures 







Although NA TO membership has resulted in integration expenses and requirements to 
modernize the Armed Forces, the Polish Defense Budget faces significant competition for 
resources from domestic programs such as health care reform, the retirement pay system, 
education reform, and the new country administration model. The government wants to 
decrease public debt while increasing expenditures for state security (Justice and 
Defence). Additionally, the National Audit Office and parliamentary review committees 
have criticized the execution of previous defence budgets. Funding for procurement and 
research and development has been allowed to lapse and 2 percent of the planned 
expenditures were transferred to subsequent years. 
(Ref. 2) 
In FY 2000, the MoND received a budget equal to 2.04 percent of the GDP and 8.83 
percent of the State Budget. For FY 2001, the Minister of Finance has proposed a 
decrease to 1.9 percent of the GDP. (Ref. 11) That budget was still under review by the 
Council of Ministers at the time of this report. 
For FY 2000, MoND expenditures among the Services were broken down as follows: 
Land Forces -66 percent, Air Forces - 22 percent, Navy - 8 percent, and Others - 4 
percent. Overall, Personnel accounted for 32 percent, Pensions and Allowances in Kind 
were 26.6 percent, Operating, Maintenance and Training were 29 percent, and Equipment 
and Infrastructure were 12.4 percent. Defence spending for FY 2000 totaled 13,805.6 
MPLN. Of that total, 1,879 .6 MPLN were for tasks directly related to membership within 





3. Governmental Infrastructure Supporting Military Acquisition 
Overview 
With respect to Acquisition Organization, Policies, and Processes, the team would 
characterize the current system as "stovepiped." (The term "stovepiped" refers to a 
situation in which participants of functional bureaucracies or organizations do not 
coordinate their work with participants from other organizations.) The existing 
acquisition system is oriented toward local rather than broad goals, making it difficult to 
plan and coordinate processes. This is highly inefficient for decision-making, even on 
simple matters. The roles and responsibilities of the various disciplines that ought to 
influence the acquisition process are not clear, nor is it clear how coordination is carried 
out between and among the various disciplines. Contracting is considered a subordinate 
activity of logistics. Apparently the person responsible for executing the procurement 
does not function as the business manager of the acquisition process (responsible for 
pricing, terms and conditions and all the other factors that are considered in arriving at 
best value decisions). 
One cannot fault the basic principles stated in the Public Procurement Act, i.e., 
transparency, competition, best value, and equal treatment of bidders or the preference 
for unlimited tendering as the primary procedure for conducting public procurement. 
However, the Act then prescribes in great detail how the procurement function is to be 
carried out, leaving little or no room for the exercise of judgment by the contracting 
officer or others involved in the tendering and award process. Such detail would be 
onerous even in regulations, but regulations would provide some flexibility for waivers. 
In a statute, it stifles innovation and often prevents rather than promotes the basic 
principles. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the stated preference for unlimited tendering, it appears 
that, in practice, a majority of procurement dollars are spent either sole source or with 
limited tendering. The tendering process under these circumstances is not adequate to 
ensure that prices are fair and reasonable or that the government is acquiring best value. 
This is especially true since there are no provisions for price analysis or price negotiation. 
Finally, there is no provision for contract administration, which is at least half the 
acquisition process. A more recent update of the 1994 statute, scheduled to take effect 
January 1, 2001, is even more voluminous and does not address any of the shortcomings 
noted here. 
A. Acquisition Organization, Policies, and Processes 
The Polish Ministry of National Defence does not currently assign program managers and 
program management teams to lead the acquisition of warfighting systems. This means 
that acquisition of a warfighting system is addressed within or among bureaucracies, 
without the benefit of a full-time single manager who is uniquely focused on the progress 






The Armament Policy Department is responsible for development of new warfighting 
systems. It receives the user's statement of performance requirements as a starting point 
and launches the development of warfighting systems through a progression of steps. 
The final steps in development are manufacturing in limited quantity and testing. Upon 
satisfactory completion of tests, the Armament Policy Department hands off 
responsibility for the new system to the Supply Department for serial production. See 
Figure 7 for the organizational links between the Armament Policy Department, the 
Supply Department and the Budget Department. 
Figure 7 
MoND Staff Relationship Among the Armament Policy, 
Supply and Budget Departments 
Minister of Defense 
J 
Secretary or State Chier or Commands & 
!st Deputy Minister General Starr Other Principal Starr 
t--1 Director, Armament Director, Budgetary Policy Department Department 
(Special Starr) 
1-1 Director, Supply Other Special Department Starr 
'--I Director, Infrastructure Department 
Acquisition of warfighting systems and equipment are accomplished in four phases, as 
follows: Requirement Definition, Feasibility Study, Product Development, and 
Production. The principal participants are the Users (i.e., Service Commanders), Mission 
Specialists (i.e., General Staff members who represent the user in the cases of joint 
requirements), the P-5 (Strategic Plans), the Supply Department, Armament Policy 
Department (including planning/product development and military industrial plants and 
technical institutes that report to the Director of Armament Policy), External Developers 
(both public and private), and the Committee of Scientific Research (KBN). 
The R&D phases are accomplished with MoND funding, often in combination with R&D 
funding provided by the Committee of Scientific Research. fu general, basic research is 
funded by multi-year R&D funds provided by the Committee of Scientific Research. 
During system development approximately 50 percent of funding comes from the 
Committee of Scientific Research and the other 50 percent from MoND. The Committee 
of Scientific Research sets priorities for its R&D budget, even within that portion 
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designated for the MoND. The MoND has only a small voice in deciding those research 
priorities. MoND establishes its own priorities for the R&D funding it provides. In 
practice it is unlikely that the MoND funding priorities would match those of the 
Committee of Scientific Research. 
Requirement Definition begins with the Service, except in the case of a joint requirement 
that begins with a mission specialist on the General Staff. As described in the report 
section on Requirements Generation, the user or mission specialist provides a statement 
of the required capabilities, the funding needed, and the proposed schedule. The General 
Staff P-5 (Strategic Plans) reviews the statement of performance requirements to verify 
that it is consistent with the National Military Strategy. The Armament Policy 
Department takes the statement of performance requirements and consolidates it into the 
list of requirements. The Armament Policy Department then prepares or oversees 
preparation of the corresponding specification. Following user review, the Director of 
Armament Policy makes the formal decision approving the specification and authorizing 
entry into the next phase, i.e., either into feasibility study or into serial production if there 
is a clear requirement and the product already exists. 
The intent of the Feasibility Study is to gain confidence that a warfi.ghting system can be 
built that meets the user's needs. The Feasibility Study process includes use of models 
and prototypes. Prototypes are designed and fabricated by the developer (public, private, 
or in concert) and are tested in user trials to ensure they meet performance requirements. 
The Supply Department pays the developer upon completion of pre-established 
milestones-as determined by the Armament Policy Department. The Director of 
Armament Policy approves entry into Product Development. 
Product Development includes two major steps, (1) detailed design and (2) 
manufacturing investment. Pre-production systems are manufactured in small quantity 
by the developer and are tested in user trials. As in the previous phase, the Supply 
Department pays the developer upon completion of pre-established milestones-as 
determined by the Armament Policy Department. After the new system successfully 
passes required tests, the Director of Armament Policy makes the decision to hand the 
new system over to the Supply Department for serial production. Transition into 
production is a difficult step, made more complicated by a handoff between managing 
departments, i.e., from the Armament Policy Department to the Supply Department. As 
the handoff draws near, the Supply Department provides liaison personnel to work with 
the Armament Policy Department to smooth the transition. At the time of handoff for 
serial production, the Armament Policy Department provides the detailed technical 
documentation, processes, and manufacturing tooling. 
User Trials during the R&D phases, described above, are the responsibility of the user. 
The user designs and participates in or oversees the trials. The trials may be conducted 
by one of the institutes. 
After the handoff to the Supply Department for serial production, the Armament Policy 




The process described above is used solely for products developed within Poland, 
although components or sub-systems may come from international sources. To provide 
management of the developmental process, the Armament Policy Department assigns a 
supervisor to oversee each new system. The developer also assigns a supervisor. Each 
year the Armament Policy Department supervises between one and two hundred 
programs of varying sizes with about 30 supervisory personnel. (Ref. 34) 
The Armament Policy Department. The Armament Policy Department is comprised of 
about 85 technical supervisors. In addition to the 30 involved in management oversight 
of program development, an additional 55 technical supervisors provide management 
oversight for the nine institutes and 29 factories. The institutes vary in workforce size 
from about 80 personnel to about 300. The factories vary from about 100 personnel to 
3000. The institutes must compete for their work, taking on commercial work to fill in 
gaps in their military workload. (Ref. 34) 
The Supply Department. The Supply Department accomplishes its procurement function 
with approximately 150 technical personnel. (Ref. 34) This staff activity is responsible 
for serial procurement (i.e., production in quantity) in support of the Services. Branches 
within the department include armaments, ammunition, radar and electronics, 
communications and information systems, armored vehicles, chemical defence systems, 
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, and quartermaster. (See Figure 8) 
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The tender process is conducted within each branch. While the Supply Department 
determines which tendering procedure it will use for routine procurements, that 
determination is made by the Minister of National Defence for complex military systems. 
This will include most if not all items resulting from the development phases described 
above. The Supply Department must, however, ensure that awards are made to 
technically qualified and fiscally responsible companies, both government-owned and 
private sector. There are very few private sector contractors capable of competing with 
government factories; hence, more contracts for defence equipment are awarded to these 
factories. 
The Supply Department administers all contracts except for R&D, which go to the 
Armament Policy Department as described above. Contract administration includes 
ensuring that contractors comply with quality requirements and meet production 
schedules. The Supply Department locates quality assurance personnel onsite for 
oversight into both government and private sector manufacturing facilities. It also makes 
periodic payments as a contractor achieves certain pre-established milestones. Finally, it 
modifies contracts as required to incorporate changes and subsequent price revisions. 
Written procedures covering contract administration functions exist, but were not 
furnished to the team. 
Testing. There are two test types: The first is military testing, conducted as field trials or 
in laboratories. Such testing supports milestone decisions. It includes confirmation of 
performance and military utility and is observed by military representatives. System 
qualification tests are performed under the supervision of an ad hoc government 
committee that is chaired by the user to confirm that system performance is in accordance 
with the latest version of technical and tactical requirements. The second type of testing, 
required by the Polish law on standards, includes such aspects as safety, health and 
military capability. This testing is accomplished separately from the first type. fu 
combination, the two types of testing are redundant, thereby adding cost and time to the 
acquisition process. 
Oversight and Reports. There are several principal reports addressing acquisition. 
Financial reports are prepared on a monthly basis, by Level II Budget Holders and 
submitted to the Budget Department. Every quarter, an appendix is added to the monthly 
reports detailing the main activities that have occurred and the associated financial 
figures. This report is submitted to MoND. It is then reviewed by a committee that 
includes the Minister, Vice Ministers, Chief of the General Staff and major department 
directors. After the end of the fiscal year (approximately February), progress reports on 
all programs are sent to the Parliamentary Commission on National Defense. 
Additionally, a report is submitted to the Committee on Scientific Research (KBN) once 
a year on the expenditures for research and development financed by KBN. The 
Supreme Chamber of Control conducts audits on MoND budget expenditures. The final 
audit report goes to the Minister of National Defence and to the Chief of the Supreme 








Planning as a Part of Acquisition. Planning for procurement begins with MoND planning 
guidance and Budget Department fiscal guidance for preparation of the budget request. 
The MoND planning directive is issued in June (e.g., in June 2000, the planning directive 
was issued for 2001). The directive includes, among other concerns, the priorities, 
modernization by areas, and expenditure limits. In response, the Services each prepare a 
budget. The Armament Policy Department, in concert with the General Staff, then 
combines the user procurement plans and performs an analysis. The analysis includes 
multiple year issues, pricing review, serial production, expenditure limits, and 
improvement programs within cost targets and force goals. 
When the Armament Director approves the procurement plan, it goes to the vice 
ministers for review, then to the Minister of National Defence. The Committee for 
Defence Affairs of the Council of Ministers reviews all the plans and then forwards them 
to the Parliament for vote. 
B. Financial Management Organizations, Policies, and Processes 
The Act of 26 November 1998 on Public Finances sets the framework for the financial 
management infrastructure supporting military acquisition and is the underlying basis for 
the policies and processes governing the funding for military acquisition. 
The following is a general description of the annual process used to develop a budget for 
the MoND. Time lines for the various actions are as indicated. 
March 
Planning is done on a one-year basis starting in March when the Budget Department 
prepares documents to inform the Finance Ministry of system changes that have occurred 
during the current year that will affect the next year's budget. The MoND provides 
instructions for the preparation of the budget and P-5 (Strategic Planning) of the General 
Staff (GS) allocates financial controls for the General Staff Departments to work with. 
Using these controls as guidelines, the General Staff determines military priorities and 
requirements for the following year. (Poland's General Staff (designated by the prefix 
"P" is organized in the typical military staff arrangement, numerically consistent with the 
US Joint Staff. A General Staff organization chart is shown in Figure 9. Each of the 
Services has a general staff, designated by the prefix "G" (e.g., G-1-Personnel)) 
April 
The Budget Department prepares a budget request based on Level II Budget Holder plans 
and sends it to the Ministry of Finance for approval. 
May 




General Staff Structure 
June (First Halt) 
Based on the above issued guidelines, Level II Budget Holders submit their proposed 
budgets to the Budget Department who consolidates the inputs and forwards the budget 
to the Budget Department, which sends it to the Budget Committee for review. 
June (Second Halt) 
The permanent subcommittees review the budget drafts, recommend changes and provide 
inputs to the Budget Department. 
July 
The Budget Department and Level II Budget Holders make adjustments to the proposed 
budgets to conform to the limits assigned by the Ministry of Finance. The Budget 
Department prepares a consolidated MoND Budget Draft and supporting justification. 
August 
MoND submits its budget, with justification, to the Finance Ministry. 
September 
MoND and Finance Ministry work together on smoothing the budget (clarification, 
adjustments, amendments, etc.) and send the budget to Parliament for approval. 
October 
Parliamentary hearings are held in the Sejm and the Senate by the Public Finances, 
National Economy and National Defence Committees. 
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October/November/December 
Parliament debates the detailed budget submissions, makes adjustments and approves 
budgets. (Following approval of the budget recommendation by the Prime Minister and 
the Council of Ministers, Parliament has three months to approve the budget (Oct-Dec). 
Failure to approve the budget results in parliamentary elections.) Upon approval by 
Parliament, the State Budget is submitted to the President for final approval. 
December 
Approved budgets are promulgated. 
C. Requirements Generation 
The sequential requirements generation process and the exact organizational structure 
that manages requirements generation were not described to the National Acquisition 
Strategy Team in detail. However, numerous facets were described, as follows. 
Planning for new weapon systems is not performed on a cyclic basis; rather the planning 
cycle is initiated by a "requirement" or need. Requirements may come from a deficiency 
that shows up in the field, e.g., a battlefield deficiency might be experienced by Polish 
forces in Bosnia. In the case of the new fighter aircraft, it appears that the requirement 
may have been driven by a NATO concern; this program is discussed in slightly more 
detail below. 
Requirements are described as minimum performance attributes, specified in a statement 
of performance requirements. Performance ranges, that is, threshold (lowest acceptable 
performance) and objective (desired performance), are not used in describing 
performance requirements. This makes it difficult to accomplish cost-benefit tradeoffs. 
The Service Commanders are the "users" or designate the "user representative" for their 
Service. The user is responsible for preparing statements of requirements that describe a 
warfighting need and also the associated schedule requirements. New requirements must 
be consistent with the National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy but it is not 
known by the team who is responsible for performing the verification review. 
Within each Service, a statement of performance requirements for a warfighting system 
would progress through the Service G-5 (Plans) during the budget process. 
"Requirements" for spare parts must also be put together as part of the budget process, 
but would progress through the Service G-4 (Logistics). 
Land Forces. In the Land Forces case, the office of the Chief of Staff has a cell that 
prioritizes requirements, following which the Chief submits his recommendations to the 
Land Forces Commander. Additionally, the Land Forces Chief of Logistics and the 
Chief Accountant make their recommendations to the Land Forces Commander. After 
the Land Forces Commander establishes his priorities, he (as one of the Level II Budget 
Holders within the Polish budgeting system) sends his budget request to the Minister of 
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National Defence. New warfighting system requirements are part of the budget 
submission. 
Navy. The Navy described a slightly different organization and process. First, their 
process links user requirements to the National Military Strategy (NMS). It is not clear 
whether operational deficiency reviews occurred at the General Staff level or Navy staff 
level. The Navy Logistics Department is responsible for coordinating technical reviews. 
When that is completed, the Navy Commander prioritizes requirements with the 
assistance of the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Logistics and the Navy Chief Accountant, 
each of whom submits separate recommendations. The G-5 (Plans) then consolidates 
requirements as the Navy Commander directs. The G-5 has staff responsibility for 
modernization planning. The Navy Chief of Staff and the G-5 are responsible for 
reconciling resource shortfalls. 
Air Forces. The Air Forces' system for requirements is top-driven, but requirements are 
also passed from users up through the chain of command. System specifications are 
coordinated in Training, G-4 and G-5, following which the Chief of Staff, the Air Force 
Chief Accountant and the Chief of Logistics advise the Air Forces Commander. The 
Logistics Department consolidates requirements. The Military Institute for Aviation, 
sometimes in conjunction with corresponding civilian institutes, assists with analysis of 
the deficiencies. 
For a large acquisition such as the fighter aircraft, an extensive ad hoc group would 
participate in a review of the requirements. The group would include an inter-ministerial 
team and representatives from R&D, the General Staff, Air Command, the Military 
Institute of Aviation, the Office of Public Procurement Policy and Treasury. This team 
would be chaired by the user and would consider such elements as threat analysis and 
total lifecycle cost. 
New requirements are reviewed as part of the MoND budget process-soon to be 
Planning, Programming, and Budget System. Currently, no single General Staff section 
has responsibility for new requirements. Under reorganization, the P-5 (Strategic Plans) 
will be responsible for collection of requirements. 
The General Staff acts as an advisory body for the Minister, and harmonizes all the 
Services' requirements. In most cases, the General Staff does not conduct cost-benefit 
analyses. 
Successful completion of the requirements generation process occurs when the new 
statement of performance requirements and associated funding come to the Armament 
Policy Department for action. At this point the statement of performance requirements is 
further defined until the description is sufficiently detailed that the warfighting system 





D. Logistics Planning (Acquisition Logistics). 
Logistics planning in support of acquisition was not described to the team. Therefore, no 
attempt is made in this section of the report to baseline logistics planning beyond the 




4. Law, Policy, and Implementation Guidance 
Overview 
The Act on Public Procurement appears to be the sole guidance for government 
procurement. It is both prescriptive and proscriptive, and is apparently interpreted to 
mean that what is not covered is not allowed, and that what is covered must be carried out 
exactly as prescribed. Thus, there is little flexibility or opportunity for judgment by those 
who are implementing this law. While the Act does provide for further implementing 
"ordinances" in a few places, it is so detailed that implementing regulations would be 
redundant. While the Act was undoubtedly well intended when it was enacted as a means 
of injecting some discipline into the procurement process, it will not serve well in a 
system that must be flexible, responsive to both national and international needs, and 
capable of being revised to meet changing conditions. Any deviation from the law would 
require parliamentary approval. 
A. Law/Policy Environment 
The current Polish acquisition system has developed over the past decade within the 
context of general European Civil Law principles, the revised Polish Constitution (1997), 
the Act of June 10, 1994 on Public Procurement (as amended on August 29, 1997 and 
April 9, 1999) and the Act of November 26, 1998 on Public Finance, as amended. 
Generally, Civil Law systems, like Poland's, operate under a theory of specific legislative 
grants of rights and authorities, and hence are referred to as Civil Code Systems. The 
rights of each individual and the authority of the government, or correspondingly of 
government officers, must be specified by statute, both as to definition of the right or 
authority and the concomitant method of execution of same, i.e., Nulle legae sine 
potentiatus (no law, no authority). Given such a requirement for definitions and 
specifications, statutory schemes tend to be detailed, extensive and somewhat 
cumbersome. 
Civil Law in Poland creates several effects upon the acquisition legal and policy 
environment that determine the general parameters of designing an acquisition system 
and defining the execution of duties and responsibilities within that system. The 
functions, format, powers and limitations of the acquisition system must be delineated 
and specified in such manner as to clearly and thoroughly define just how the system 
must operate with sufficient detail for an executive officer to know and to perform his or 
her functions. Under the present system, the tender process, the method of review and 
award, the requirements for a protest, the grounds for appeals, etc., and even, the 
operating culture tend to significantly limit any interpretation or initiative that seems to 
exceed statutory grants of power and where functional areas overlap (e.g., fund 
administrator vis-a-vis chief accountant). Collaborators diffuse the overall goals of 






functional rules within their purview of responsibility and use the "rule" to delay the 
entire process and hence reduce or decentralize the responsibility of each participant. 
B. Contracting 
The current Polish public procurement system was adopted in 1995, when the Act on 
Public Procurement of June 10, 1994 came into force. This Act created a uniform public 
procurement system and introduced a precisely described legal framework for the 
competition among entities pursuing public contracts. The Act intends for the 
government to solicit and select the "best offer" when it spends public money on goods, 
services and construction. The leading principle of the Act is fair and open competition. 
It requires fair and equal treatment of competitors, full and open competition, and clear, 
precise disclosure of information. Since its introduction, the Act has been amended twice, 
mainly to clarify rules and definitions, broaden its scope and provide more 
decentralization and transparency. In 1999 an amendment to the Act on Public 
Procurement was presented to the Parliament for adoption. This new law seeks to bring 
Poland's procurement laws in consonance with European Union law. It is anticipated 
that this new law will be adopted January 1, 2001. 
There is an exclusion that overrides the Public Procurement Act. Before participating in 
defence procurement, the company must first comply with security requirements for 
certain projects or time periods (i.e., a company security clearance and individual 
employee security clearances). This is consistent with NATO requirements. 
The Polish public procurement system is based upon the following principles: 
• Clear definition of procurement and its methods 
• Fostering competition 
• Equal treatment of bidders 
• Publication of tenders 
• Transparency in bidding procedures 
• Establishment of clear contract award criteria 
• Economic use of resources 
• Public access to contract award information 
• The right to review 
The Public Procurement Act generally applies to all state, municipal and local self-
government procurement entities, unless regulated by separate provisions of law. The 
Act prescribes the following six tendering/bidding procedures: 
1. Unlimited Tendering. In consonance with Poland's objective of maximizing 
competition, this is prescribed as the primary procedure for conduct of public 
procurement. The use of other than unlimited tendering, under the other five 
tendering procedures, is permitted only under special conditions specified in the 

















2. Limited Tendering. Tenders may be submitted only by those potential 
contractors who were provided an invitation by the procuring activity. The 
procuring activity may only limit tenders when one of the following two 
conditions is met: (1) the specialized nature of the good or service limits the 
number of potential suppliers who have the requisite capability to satisfy 
contract requirements; (2) the costs of an unlimited tendering are substantially 
out of proportion to the value of the intended procurement. 
3. Two-Stage Tendering. In the first stage, offerors are invited to submit their 
technical proposals without pricing. In the second stage, selected "highly rated" 
offerors are invited to submit priced tenders. The second stage may be preceded 
by negotiations between the procuring activity and the offerors. 
4. Negotiations with Retaining Competition. In the event there is adequate 
competition (at least 2 potential bidders), the procuring activity may conduct 
negotiations with a "sufficient" number of offerors. At the completion of 
negotiations, the procuring activity requests all participants to submit their final 
bid/price. Contract award is then made to the offeror with the best offer. Per 
discussion with Office of Public Procurement officials, "best offer'' could be 
construed as providing the "best value" to the government. Thus, procurement 
officials may award a contract to an offeror with a higher price as long as that 
offer satisfies stated best value criteria, such as lowest life cycle cost or higher 
quality. 
5. Request for Quotations. This method is used when goods and services are 
readily available with established quality standards. Contracts are awarded to 
supplier(s) offering the lowest price. 
6. Single Source Procurement. The procuring activity signs a contract after 
negotiating with only one supplier or contractor. The Act states that this tender 
method should only be used under the following circumstances: 1) The 
procuring activity wants to increase order quantities on an incumbent contract 
under the same terms and conditions, provided the additional orders do not 
exceed 20 percent of the original contract value. 2) The contract is for research, 
experiment, or preparation of a scientific opinion. 3) There is only one source 
capable of satisfying the activity's needs. 4) The contract is anticipated to be for 
a creative purpose in the area of arts and culture. 5) A contractor is specified as a 
result of a legally permitted national preference. 6) Urgency of need due to some 
unforeseen economic or social circumstance. 7) The value of the procurement 
(or financing) does not exceed 3,000 Euro. Contracts exceeding 20,000 Euro 
require approval by the Chairman of the Office of Public Procurement Policy. 
Although not specified in the Act on Public Procurement, various Polish Ministry of 
Defence (MoND) officials stated that they were allowed to legally award single source 
contracts to support urgent defence requirements. It was learned during various 









using single source tendering procedures and that these procurements were "justified" 
due to military urgency. Some of these procurements were for well-defined goods and 
services with adequately described quality standards. On the surface, these procurements 
should have been made under "Unlimited" or "Request for Quotation" tender procedures. 
It is possible that inadequate acquisition planning and/or lack of well-defined 
procurement processes may lead to an inordinate number of single source procurements. 
As a result, the Polish public procurement system may not be fully harnessing the 
benefits of competition and may be more prone to potentially illegal activities and 
unethical behavior. (The exact number and aggregate value of acquisitions conducted 
under Single Source Procurement tender procedures is not known.) 
In addition to having an "Open and Transparent" system, the Act on Public Procurement 
has established the following bidding principles and associated rules: 
• Transparency-requires announcement of public procurements. However, 
defence expenditures appear to be exempt from the requirement to publicize 
proposed tenders or contract awards. 
• Stability of Rules-requires that the tender specify such things as evaluation 
criteria, amendment procedures and time constraints. 
• Prohibition of Dividing Procurements-prohibits procuring activity from 
dividing or splitting requirements into parts to circumvent procedures or 
thresholds as described in the Act. 
• Strict Rules on Specifying Requirements-prohibit procuring activities from 
describing a requirement in such a way as to hinder fair competition. 
• Clear Criteria for the Rejection of a Bidder-address when a contractor can be 
legally precluded from participating in a public tender. These rules are 
closely related to the decisions a contracting officer might make with respect 
to a contractor's ability to satisfactorily complete a contract (i.e., 
responsibility determination). For instance, bankrupt contractors cannot 
receive a contract award. 
• Clear Requirements for Participation-require offerors to certify that they have 
satisfied all legal eligibility requirements to participate in the tender and that 
they possess the requisite capabilities to successfully complete the proposed 
contract. 
• Clear Rules on Annulment of Public Procurement Proceeding-provide 
specific circumstances under which the procuring activity must cease the 
public procurement proceeding. For instance, some of these rules are related 
to procedural errors (e.g., not following announcement procedures), while 
others are related to the government's sovereign powers (e.g., the procuring 
activity has insufficient funds to complete the procurement or the procurement 
is no longer in the government's best interests). 
The Office of Public Procurement, which reports directly to the Prime Minister, is the 
independent government agency responsible for public procurement policy and the 
administration of all matters related to public procurement. This office was created on 



















purchasing agency. The Polish system of procurement is mainly decentralized. Assigned 
budget holders are responsible for procurement management, execution and compliance 
with associated procurement acts and regulations. 
The Office of Public Procurement is authorized to perform the following key 
procurement policy, training and information collection/dissemination duties: 
• Reviews and approves administrative decisions related to public procurement 
conducted under other than "Unlimited Tendering" 
• Publicizes all Unlimited Tenders above 30,000 Euro in the official Public 
Procurement Bulletin 
• Prepares draft public procurement acts and regulations 
• Cooperates with foreign entities on matters concerning public procurement 
• Establishes and maintains a list of arbiters to facilitate procurement appeal 
proceedings 
• Develops and conducts public procurement training programs 
• Collects information on procurement planning, contract award and contract 
performance 
• Disseminates procurement policy, rules and standardized procedures 
Although the Office of Public Procurement charter calls for the review of administrative 
decisions related to public procurement, this office does not perform a significant 
procurement audit or overview function. It reviews administrative decisions to determine 
"strict" procedural compliance with Poland's Public Procurement Act. It does not assess 
the efficiency and effectiveness of procuring activities nor does it assess supporting 
business decisions. 
It became obvious during our numerous interviews that many respondents from the 
Office of Public Procurement and Ministry of Defence believed that the Act on Public 
Procurement provided definitive "guidance" on how to conduct an acquisition. When 
asked how they manage or conduct the procurements, almost every one of the 
respondents stated it was conducted in accordance with the Act on Public Procurement. 
When asked how they evaluate competing business decisions related to a planned 
acquisition, respondents reiterated, " ... The Act provides procurement and contract award 
guidance." Although the Act is extremely detailed, it does not cover every potential 
circumstance that could confront a contracting official. Nor does it provide detailed 
guidance on how to implement and manage procurement, resourcing and business 
decisions. 
The Polish procurement and legal system currently mandates "strict" interpretation and 
enforcement of the Act on Public Procurement. As a case in point, we asked the 
following question to assess the flexibility of their procurement system. "How would 
you proceed if you wanted to pursue an acquisition strategy that made good business 
sense and did not contravene any existing laws or statutes, but was not specifically 
addressed in the Public Procurement Act?" Every respondent, including a representative 






law was changed to include that specific strategy. Furthermore, an official from the 
Public Procurement Office was quick to point out that they rigorously enforce the Act 
and report all violations to the Justice Department for prosecution. Given this 
environment, it is not surprising that procurement officials are inclined to follow the Act 
verbatim. Such strict interpretation and enforcement of the Act limits the use of 
potentially sound business strategies, promotes unhealthy risk aversion, hinders 
flexibility, increases cycle time, and stifles innovation and process improvement. 
In general, there was little discussion of detailed implementation regulations, policies or 
desk guides with respect of procurement during our fact-finding visit to Poland, and the 
team did not receive copies of any such material. We understand there is some guidance 
in the Supply Department for certain aspects of contract award and administration that 
are not covered by the Public Procurement Act. The apparently limited amount of such 
guidance may be attributed to widespread acceptance of the Public Procurement Act as 
the sole and definitive source for procurement guidance. Additionally, it appeared that 
more complex procurements were "managed" on an ad hoc basis without the benefit of 
detailed procedures and well-defined processes. 
Development of procurement implementation guidance at the Agency and Budget Holder 
levels should reduce procurement administrative leadtime. Additionally, promulgation of 
well-designed procurement regulations and processes should lead to significant process 
innovation. However, this and other potentially beneficial guidance must be preceded by 
an overhaul of the Act on Public Procurement to eliminate the voluminous detail that 
virtually precludes the exercise of discretion by contracting personnel. The Act should be 
reduced to a set of broad principles, with implementing guidance to be provided within 
the Executive Branch. Such a process would not only provide the flexibility necessary to 
make day-to-day decisions without going back to Parliament for a statutory waiver, but 
would give the Executive the flexibility to change the regulations to meet changing 
marketplace conditions. (Ref. 21) 
C. Program and Budget 
The Act on Public Finances of 26 November 1998 defines the terms, the organizational 
and legal forms, the rules for drawing up draft budgets, the rules for passing budgets, and 
the penalties for violating those rules. It is explicit in defining the organizations involved 
with public finance as well as their responsibilities. The individual with overall 
responsibility for state budget preparation is the Minister of Finance. 
Specific policies related to Defence spending include the requirement for any multi-year 
program procurement greater than 100,000,000 PLN ($24M) to be approved by the 
Council of Ministers. During budget execution, up to five percent of one funding account 
can be moved to another budget account (subject to certain restrictions). 
At the end of the fiscal year, authority may be given to move some unexpended funds 
into the next fiscal year but no further. Mostly, this is restricted to unexpended balances 













Poland does have an anti-deficiency law, which precludes the expenditure of funds that 
have not been allocated. 
The Ministry of National Defence made the decision to adopt a Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1999. Currently, there is a plan for PPBS but it is not 
yet fully developed and implemented. 
D. Labor 
The availability of adequate skilled labor does not appear to be a problem in Poland. The 
relatively low unemployment rate and the high literacy rate are positive indicators. Thus, 
labor does not appear to be a problem vis-a-vis a national acquisition system. If there are 
any areas in which certain skills are lacking, these were not discussed. 
E. Offsets and External Affairs Concerns 
Off sets are required, by statute, for all procurements from foreign sources that are over a 
threshold amount (currently the Polish equivalent of 5M Euros). The offset must be for 
the full value of the arms or military equipment being purchased, and at least half must 
directly benefit the Polish defence industry. The present statute has not been in force for 
a year, so there is no history of experience. Like the Act on Public Procurement, this 
statute is quite precise in its terms. In effect, it functions as a law, a policy and a set of 
regulations. One important or potentially important area where the statute is silent is with 
respect to reciprocity of offset arrangements when dealing with NA TO partners or 
signatories to the Government Procurement Agreement. 
F. Environmental Issues 
Polish acquisition and procurement policy officials admit that concern for 
environment quality should be part of their consideration and planning. However, this is 
not formally required, either by legislation or regulation. It is acknowledged that NATO 
and European Community requirements form the models that do, or will, most likely 
apply, but as of now, no specific enactments have addressed this issue. European 
Community (EU) membership is contingent upon member states meeting prescribed 
standards relating to economic and fiscal policy, human rights and legal process 
standards and monetary policy, as well as environmental quality. It is most likely that 
Poland will either adopt EU guidelines as a separate legislative agenda prior to EU 
accession or that the Polish ratification process of EU membership will include adoption 
(and/or exclusion by exception) of European Community guidelines relating to 
environmental quality measures. 
G. Liabilities Affecting Military and Civilians in Acquisition and Contracting 
Under the Polish Civil Law system, a government official, military or civilian, who has 

















financially liable. All executive actions must have a legislative mandate, normally 
provided by one of three statutory sources: 
1. Establishment authority - general legislation creating an office or department 
of government and specifying responsibilities, actions to be taken, procedures 
and reporting channels; and 
2. Enabling legislation - usually part of the State Budget, e.g., a. line item that 
authorizes a specific expenditure, tender or acquisition process; or 
3. Classified materials - general legislation requiring a company or outside 
supplier (including employees) to obtain security clearance for handling 
classified materials. 
Acquisition personnel appear to carefully follow the "rules" so as not to exceed their 
authority and incur liability. We are informed that very few cases are referred to the 
courts by investigating authorities. Since most procurement decisions are collaborative 
and require a chief accountant to approve expenditures, the responsible administrator 
obtains a "budget review" before the expenditure is made and authorized limits are 
seldom exceeded. 
H. Socioeconomic Policies and Programs Affecting Military Acquisition 
The procurement process is apparently not being used as a wedge to control wages paid 
under government contracts, or to require performance of contracts in areas of high 
unemployment, or other similar measures which have long been part of the fabric of 
government contracting in the US or elsewhere. This appears to be true also with respect 
to socioeconomic policies and programs in general. One exception is the "buy Poland" 
policy, where a differential of up to 20 percent of labor costs is allowed in contracts for 
services. However, this differential does not apply to hardware. 
I. Public Versus Private Sector Determinations 
Poland is committed to developing a free market economy in which its defence needs can 
be acquired from the private sector. However, a significant, if not major portion, of 
defence acquisition is still awarded to government-owned factories. There are no studies 
or statistics available to show what private sector capabilities are available to compete 
with government factories, nor is there a clear plan for converting the government 
factories to private ownership. One of the barriers to achieving this appears to be a fear 
of social upheaval if significant numbers of workers in these factories are added to the 
ranks of the unemployed. The factories themselves, as well as most of the workers, could 
continue to work in the private sector, but privatization would lead to efficiencies that 
would reduce the number of workers needed. This is an area where the government will 
have to make some difficult decisions, and where the U.S. experience in defense 







5. Education of the Workforce 
Overview 
Polish government officials and procurement personnel currently lack the broad view of 
acquisition and its role in helping to carry out agency missions. In general, Polish 
acquisition managers view procurement as merely a "buying" function and have placed 
responsibility for its execution under logistics organizations. As such, acquisition 
planning, if done at all, tends to be conducted late in the acquisition cycle by ad hoc 
teams. This approach typically creates a fragmented process and normally leads to sub-
optimized, stove-piped decisions. This process may be appropriate to acquire low value, 
less complex and well-defined requirements. However, such a narrow focus and 
fragmented process may hamper an organization's ability to obtain best value and 
optimal ownership especially when acquiring major systems. 
Accordingly, procurement should be an integral part of the following acquisition process. 
1. Review the mission 
2. Determine need based on the mission 
3. Determine the operational requirements 
4. Define/describe/refine the technical requirements 
5. Conduct Acquisition Planning 
6. Solicitation Phase 
7. Source Evaluation/Selection Phase 
8. Negotiation Phase 
9. Contract Award Phase 
10. Contract Administration Phase 
11. Ownership Phase (Operation & Support) 
12. Disposal 
Successful acquisition systems and processes capitalize on the strengths of all 
participants in the acquisition process. Functional experts and different stakeholders in 
the process must work together as a team to build successful programs, identify problems 
early, and maintain a cooperative spirit of resolution. It became apparent during our fact 
finding that the Polish education system helps generate very professional and competent 
functional experts. However, the current education and training systems do not provide 
the various acquisition participants with an overview of the entire process and where 
those stakeholders fit into the process. Nor does the system provide acquisition mangers 
with the skills to manage cross-functional teams. 
As a case in point, numerous respondents knew their own specific duties, but could not 
articulate the primary roles and responsibilities of other functional organizations. This 
lack of the "big picture" may also be attributed to military officer placement procedures. 
Unlike the United States' system, Polish military officers tend to remain in one 
organization for many years. In fact, one mid-grade officer stated that he could finish out 
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the remaining ten years of his career at the Ministry of National Defence if he so chose. 
Being able to stay at one command for a long period has some potential specialization 
benefits. However, the potential downside is the tendency to advocate parochial views 
and to lose the opportunity to network and gain insight into other functional 
organizations. 
Procurement executives should be accountable for the results of what people do within 
the acquisition system and must, therefore, be primarily responsible for agency 
procurement career management. As such, these executives should analyze workforce 
needs and institute agency-wide plans, programs and standards for: 
• Ensuring proper classification of positions 
• Recruiting and selecting qualified individuals 
• Establishing and strengthening procurement intern programs 
• Educating and training the workforce 
• Appointing qualified program managers and contracting officers 
• Establishing accountability requirements and incentives for quality 
performance 
A. Development of an Educational Model 
A comprehensive education and training effort available for both military and civilian 
personnel is necessary to develop a professional acquisition workforce. The Polish 
education system begins to channel students in their high school years towards 
specialization. This produces a highly specialized workforce and professional cadre 
among the population, and is supported by a number of excellent universities in the civil 
sector and two universities administered by the Ministry of Defense (National Defense 
University, Military University of Technology). These schools have modem curricula in 
most of the subject areas of concern including, Management Sciences, Engineering, 
Information Sciences, Logistics and Economics. 
The current education scheme does not include a dedicated professional development 
format for either program managers or contracting officers, although engineers, 
technicians and logisticians seem experienced and very well trained, with department 
heads in these functional areas typically holding a Ph.D. A systemic weakness, as noted 
earlier in this paper is the lack of a development construct that produces a manager with a 
broad overview, capable of looking beyond his or her professional specialization and 
understanding the acquisition process in its entirety. Additionally, it appears that the 
current education system does not provide managers with the requisite skills to manage 
multi-disciplinary teams. 
Universities must be integrated with specialized training institutions to provide basic 
undergraduate education in business and technical fields, specialized graduate education 
in these fields, and concurrent skills training commensurate with various job assignments. 
This effort will be of prime importance in developing a professional acquisition 















to meet its national objectives. Integrating non-national assets such as the US Defense 
Acquisition University, the Naval Postgraduate School and various NATO schools will 
accelerate that developmental process and support and sustain the educational process 
already underway. 
B. Contracting Certification Program 
During our interviews with MoND officials, it was noted that Poland does not have a 
designated "Contracting Officer" position, training or career path. Once a requirement is 
identified, it is assigned to a procuring activity. The head of that activity is responsible 
for the "execution" of that procurement and, depending upon the anticipated contract 
value, may be delegated responsibility for signing the ensuing contract. Day to day 
management for the procurement is usually delegated to a junior or mid-grade official 
depending upon the value and complexity of the procurement. This individual usually 
has an advanced technical degree but typically does not have any significant business 
experience, education, or training. If the procurement is complex, the leader of the 
procurement may call in experts from other functional fields to provide technical, 
financial, legal and operational expertise. By their own admission, these procurement 
leaders and teams are typically assigned on an ad hoc basis. As a result, procuring 
organizations may lose valuable corporate knowledge and team synergy when these 
teams are disbanded. Additionally, the lack of formal contracting and business training 
for procurement team leaders, coupled with the lack of documented procurement 
processes and procedures, may adversely impact acquisition efficiency and effectiveness. 
A university degree is not a prerequisite for everyone who works in procurement. There 
are many areas of specialization within the acquisition process where technical training 
will suffice. However, a college degree should be an entry requirement for contracting 
officers who will be working at a level above routine credit card type purchases, and for 
other disciplines which complement the contracting officer (contract administration, 
auditing, contract review, pricing, etc.). This should be supplemented by periodic 
training to stay abreast of new developments, new techniques, new or revised statutes or 
regulations, etc. 
During our interviews, we learned that procurement managers and various acquisition 
participants did not receive any ethics training prior to assuming their duties. This may be 
attributed to the belief that the Public Procurement Act provides definitive guidance on 
how to manage and execute procurements. However, this viewpoint fails to recognize 
that there could be multiple acceptable approaches to satisfying a requirement. 
Competing contracting strategies could all be acceptable from a legal and business 
standpoint, but could have vastly different strengths and weaknesses. Conversely, a 
competing strategy could be legal in accordance with the Public Procurement Act, but 
could be a blatantly unethical or borderline ethical business approach. Blind adherence to 
the Act in these cases could undermine the integrity of the acquisition process and could 
adversely impact crucial business relationships. Those responsible for executing and 









C. Program Management 
Program management organizations and processes are not used or taught in Poland at this 
time. The Military University of Technology has proposed that Production Logistics 
(that is, acquisition), be embedded in a one-semester logistics postgraduate course. The 
government has made no decision on this proposal. The team members unanimously 
agreed that acquisition does not fit well within logistics. Because of its complexity, it 
should be taught as a separate curriculum. 
D. Financial Management 
The Institute of Economics of the National Defence University offers a 10-month 
postgraduate course in defence resources management, a 10-month course for senior 
accountants, and a 10-month course for accountants. The courses are considered part time 
and consist of 250-300 hours of instruction. The students are mostly military officers, 
with a few civilians. Civilian universities and institutes also teach financial management 
but are not oriented toward military needs. (Ref. 19) 
E. Logistics 
Although logistics subjects are taught at the Military University of Technology, 
acquisition logistics, that is, the logistics planning that is done concurrently with a 
development, is not. As noted above, the Military University of Technology has 












6. Balance of Public/Private Sector Capabilities 
A. Infrastructure 
The majority of defense manufacturing is still performed in government-owned factories. 
Much if not most of the repair, maintenance, and overhaul of defence hardware is also 
performed in government facilities. Some private sector capabilities are emerging, 
particularly in the high technology area, but there is apparently little if any duplication of 
government manufacturing facilities. There is, in most cases, not enough potential 
demand to warrant such an investment, and in many instances there is already excess 
capacity in the government factories. The situation is, in some respects, comparable to 
that faced by the US a generation ago as it began to reduce infrastructure by contracting 
out functions that could be performed cheaper in the private sector, and closing many 
shipyards and other military facilities. There was little information available to the team 
on what military requirements are being or can be procured in the private sector, or to 
what extent private sector capabilities exist. 
B. Critical Skills and Core Capabilities 
The skills and capabilities for Poland to meet its defence needs and NATO commitments 
are already in place in the current infrastructure. There have not been any studies to 
determine if any of these must be maintained by the government in order to ensure ready 
sources for defense hardware, or whether they would be just as available if the current 
infrastructure were privatized. 
C. Plans for Conversion/Modernization/Privatization 
The officials with whom the team discussed this subject stated that the government does 
plan to privatize the government factories, but has not yet developed an overall time-
phased plan for conversion to private ownership. 
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National Acquisition Strategy Implementation Plan and Time Line 
2001 
1 2 3,4,5 




6 7 8 
Oct Jan Apr Jul 
02 
1. Nov 00-Report-Out of National Acquisition Strategy 
2. Early 01-Short courses on PPBS 
2003 
9,10 
Oct Jan Apr Jul 
03 
3. Jul 01-Students begin Program Management Course at Naval Postgraduate School 
3. Jul 01-Students begin Contracting Management Course at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
4. Jul 01-First increment of Program Management short courses 
5. Jul 01-First increment of Contracting short courses 
6. Nov 01-Institute first Program Management Office 
7. Jan 02-Program Management Office Implementation Review and Workshop 
8. Oct 02-Contracting Management Workshop 
9. Jul 03-lmplement Program Management postgraduate course 









































National Security Bureau 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
Department of Defense 
European Union 
Gross Domestic Product 
General Staff 
Integrated Concept Team 
Integrated Product and Process Development 
Committee of Scientific Research 
Ministry of National Defence 
Million Polish Zloty 
Military University of Technology 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Program Manager 
Prime Minister 
Planning, Programming and Budget System 
Polish General Staff 
Research and Development 















• Program Manager's Bill of Rights and Responsibilities 
• Program Manager's Charter for an Automated Information System 
• Extracted from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.0lA, 
Requirements Generation System, Enclosure A 
• Extracted from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.0lA, 
Requirements Generation System, Enclosure E, Operational Requirements 
Document Generation Process 
• Extracted from Requirements Determination, U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command, March 1996, Integrated Concept Teams for 
Requirements Determination 
• Federal Acquisition Regulation -- Part 6, Competition Requirements (FAC 
97-14), 23November1999 
• Federal Acquisition Regulation, FAR-- Part 15, Contracting by Negotiation 
(FAC 97-14), 23November1999 
• Federal Acquisition Regulation, FAR Subpart 15.2 -- Solicitation and Receipt 
of Proposals and Information 
• FAC 97-13, July 2, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 127) [Federal Register: July 2, 
1999 (Volume 64, Number 127)] [Rules and Regulations] From the Federal 
Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr02jy99-13] 
• FAC 97-05 June 22, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 119) 
[Federal Register: June 22, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 119)] [Rules and 
Regulations] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access 




Program Manager's Bill of Rights and Responsibilities 
Program Managers have the Right to: 
• A single, clear line of authority from the Defense Acquisition Executive. 
• Authority commensurate with their responsibilities. 
• Timely decisions by senior leadership. 
• Be candid and forthcoming without fear of personal consequences. 
• Speak for their program and have their judgments respected. 
• The best available training and experience for the job. 
• Adequate financial and personal resources. 
Program Managers have the Responsibility to: 
• Accept program direction from acquisition executives and implement it 
expeditiously and conscientiously. 
• Manage their programs to the best of their abilities within approved resources. 
• Be customer focused and provide the user with the best, most cost-effective 
system. 
• Innovate, strive for optimal solutions, seek better ways to manage, and provide 
lessons learned to those who follow. 
• Be candid about program status, including risks and problems as well as potential 
solutions and likely outcomes. 
• Prepare thorough estimates of financial and personnel resources that will be 
required to manage the program. 
• Identify weaknesses in the acquisition process and propose solutions. 
• As the Program Manager, I have full program responsibility and accountability. I 
pledge to do everything in my power to warrant the rights granted to me and to 
fulfill these responsibilities. 
To signify our support for the Program Manager and our commitment to the Program 
Manager's Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, we affix our signatures below. 
Program Executive Officer Program Manager 
Acquisition Executive 
Defense Acquisition Executive 
10/27/00 80 
-Program Manager's Charter for an 
Automated Information System 
This Charter is a written contract between the program manager (PM) and the chartering 
authority. The Charter: 
• Provides the authority for ensuring that system development and project transition 
are conducted within a clearly established management framework; 
• Establishes the objectives, scope, organization, responsibilities, methods of 
operation, and required resources for the system; and 
• Identifies the lines of authority and accountability, such as relationships among 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense Principal Staff Assistant, heads of the 
Department of Defense Components, participating and supporting organizations, 
and the Program Manager. 
Purpose: to establish a fully functional system, which will standardize data elements and 
support uniform business practices throughout the Department. 
Scope: program includes all contracting, receipt, storage, and distribution activities for 
goods and services required by the Department. The program will use open systems and 
relational database technology to provide timely and accurate information to improve the 
management of supplies and services. 
Functional Objectives: 
• Support the use of standard Department management policies, processes, and 
shareable data. 
• Improve timeliness, accuracy, and effectiveness of management information. 
• Optimize, streamline, and integrate disparate automated systems, subsystems, and 
databases. 
• Facilitate the Department-wide integration of a standard, robust, management 
environment through the implementation of standard processes, and standard 
shared data. 
• Provide for improved data management and data integrity by electronic input of 
selected data to a logically shared data repository. Standard data and data 
transmissions must be employed. The capability to exchange data within the 
Department, other Government agencies, and with industry must be provided. 
• Provide information exchange capabilities among Department components and 
related functional areas. 
• Provide for use of Department-wide electronic commerce/electronic data 
interchange (EC/EDI). 
• Streamline manual management processes, including the automation of manual 
management activities and the ability to input data only once at the source. 





• Provide the status of materials that are on order or on hand in a near-real-time 




Extracted from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.0lA, 
Requirements Generation System, Enclosure A 
1. Requirements Generation System. The requirements generation system, along 
with the acquisition management system and the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System, form DOD's three principal decision support systems (see 
Figure 1). A close and effective interface among these systems is required to 
ensure quality products are acquired for the nation's Armed Forces. The 
requirements generation system produces information for decision makers on the 
projected mission needs of the warfighter. These mission needs are defined in 
broad operational terms in a Mission Need Statement (MNS) document. MNSs are 
prepared for needs that develop into warfighter' s operational requirements that 
could result in new Defense acquisition programs. Validation of the MNS confirms 
the fact that a non-materiel solution alone cannot satisfy the identified need, and 
that a potential "new concept/system" materiel solution should be considered. 
Subsequently, the needs expressed in the MNS are developed into requirements by 
the Requirements Generation Process in the forms of Capstone Requirements 
Documents (CRDs) (if required) and Operational Requirements Documents 
(ORDs). CRDs provide ORD development guidance through validated 
performance based overarching capabilities for a mission area that forms a system 
of systems or family of systems. ORDs translate the MNS and (if applicable) CRD 
requirements into detailed, refined performance capabilities and characteristics of 
the proposed system. ORDs provide the specific requirements base for the 
Acquisition Management System and the PPBS for advanced Defense acquisition 
program development, programming and budgeting. (Figure 2) highlights the 
interface of the requirements and acquisition systems. 
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2. Two areas that will have significant impact on the future of the requirements 
generation system are joint requirements and DOD initiatives toward evolutionary 
acquisition which intends to provide quality products to the warfighter in a timely 
manner. 
a. Joint Requirements. Joint requirements are requirements that impact more 
than one DOD component. All C4I and ISR systems for purposes of 
compatibility and interoperability and integration are considered joint. 
Programs having a Joint Potential Designator (JPD) of Joint or programs 
designated as "joint" will become more numerous over time and need to be 
developed with participation of all DOD components. Joint requirement 
responsibilities and procedures are addressed in the enclosures of this 
instruction. 
b. Time-Phased Requirements in support of Evolutionary Acquisition. As 
DOD moves to reduce cycle time of traditional acquisition activities, through 
evolutionary acquisition, there needs to be an effective mechanism for 
specifying operational requirements to support this process. Time-phased 
requirements is an approach to consider requirements in an incremental 
manner over time such that they match projected threat and technology to 
deliver systems to the field in increasing increments of capability. Specific 




Extracted from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.0lA, 
Requirements Generation System, Enclosure E 
Operational Requirements Document Generation Process 
1. Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 
a. General. The ORD is a formatted document containing operational performance 
requirements for a proposed concept or system. The system proposed for continued 
evaluation in later acquisition phases shall be described in an initial ORD in terms that 
define the system capabilities needed to satisfy the mission need. The requirements, 
stated as operational performance parameters in the initial ORD, shall be tailored to the 
system (e.g., satellite, aircraft, ship, missile, or weapon) and reflect system-level 
performance capabilities such as range, probability of kill, platform survivability, and the 
timing of the need, etc. The four phases of the ORD generation process are definition, 
documentation, validation, and approval. 
b. ORD Definition Phase. The definition phase defines and justifies the 
development of a ORD. The ORD sponsor will apply Analysis-of-Alternatives (AOA), 
risk reduction demonstrations, military utility assessments, Advance Concept Technology 
Demonstrations (ACTD), Advanced Technology Demonstrations (A TD), 
experimentation, test and evaluation, cost-schedule-performance tradeoff, requirements 
cost tradeoffs, and affordability analysis in the development of draft ORD requirements 
(especially KPPs). These parameters best characterize the most promising concept(s) to 
be pursued in a new acquisition program. Also, as DOD moves to reduce cycle time of 
traditional acquisition activities, through evolutionary acquisition, the ORD will serve as 
the vehicle for documenting successive operational requirements and managing the scope 
of that acquisition process. The ORD should also identify the factors that drive the 
timing of the requirements such as retirement of existing systems or expected timing of a 
new threat. 
(1) Time Phased Requirements in support of Evolutionary Acquisition. Evolutionary 
acquisition is a streamlined acquisition strategy that fields a core capability, with a 
modular open structure and provides for additional future increments in capability 
upgrades. Time phased requirements support evolutionary acquisition in phases by 
allowing systems to be delivered to the field in increasing increments of capability. The 
future (follow on) increments are developed as blocks or models by the acquisition 
community as requirements are refined by the warfighter's increased understanding of the 
delivered capability, the evolving threat, and available technology. The proposed 
approach for subsequent incremental developments should be included in the acquisition 
strategy documents. Depending on the size and scope of the additional capability, some 
increments may need be covered by an annex to the existing ORD, may require a new 
ORD, or a manner agreed to by the JROC. Evolutionary acquisition plans should be 
consistent with other acquisition plans and developed by the acquisition community with 
the support of the user community. Evolutionary acquisition is a preferred approach but 
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..... is not necessarily appropriate for all development efforts. Automated Information 
Systems are prime candidates for evolutionary acquisition. 
(2) Demonstrations to assess military utility. Military utility demonstrations such as 
ACTDs, ATDs, requirements definition/technical demonstration activities during PDRR 
or experimentation should be considered for concurrent requirements generation and 
concept risk reduction. Military utility demonstrations should be conducted by the 
CINCs and Services to ensure user/warfighter involvement early in the requirements 
generation process. During PDRR the program may employ one or more design concepts 
to demonstrate technical maturity, facilitate analysis of alternatives, support CAN trades 
and refine threshold and objectives initially stated as broad measures of effectiveness. 
(3) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations. The goal of ACTDs is to assess 
the military utility of a significant new capability and to conduct that assessment at a 
scale size adequate to clearly establish operational utility and system integrity. The 
JROC will prioritize proposed ACTD candidates, together with proposed CINC sponsor 
and Lead Service/Agency. Once the ACTDs are prioritized the JROC will forward the 
prioritization with CINC sponsor and lead service or agency, via JROCM, to USD 
(A&T). This action equates to a mission need determination for each ACTD. The lead 
service is responsible to develop the Operational Requirements Document for ACTDs 
that have shown military utility and have been approved to transition to the formal 
acquisition process. The ACTD management plan should address the schedule for 
anticipated ORD development to ensure a smooth transition to the acquisition process. 
The JROC requests that if funding is insufficient to support the candidates in priority 
order, the JROC be consulted regarding the rationale for implementing the ACTDs out-
of-priority order. 
(4) CRD interface. DOD components will determine if the ORD they are developing 
falls under any existing CRD. If the ORD is under a CRD mission area then the ORD 
sponsor must work closely with the CRD lead during ORD definition and development. 
The JCPAT database and the Joint Staff J-8 will catalog all validated and approved 
CRDs. 
c. ORD Documentation Phase. The ORD format can be found in Appendix A of 
this enclosure. The ORD sponsor in coordination with the appropriate DOD components 
will prepare the ORD. The ORD provides a bridge that links the needs and capabilities 
identified in the MNS and CRD (if applicable) to the Acquisition Program Baseline 
(APB) and the contractual specifications for a program. The ORD should be written at 
the appropriate level to describe the system and is initially submitted at Milestone I with 
broad objectives and acceptable requirements. The initial ORD will include the 
evaluation of requirements based on commercial market potential required by reference 
b. As a program is further defined between the acquisition milestones, the ORD is 
updated to reflect the results of analysis, experimentation, testing, technology insertion, 
CAN and cost-schedule-performance trades. If the program falls under a CRD, the ORD 
will show linkage and the contribution to the appropriate CRD operational requirements 






shortcomings of existing systems and C4ISR architectures, capabilities required for the 
system, program support, force structure and schedule/program affordability for the 
system. 
(1) Description of Operational Capability 
(a) Summarizes the mission need. 
(b) Describes the overall mission area(s) that the system will support. Identify the 
CRD(s) that impact the system (if appropriate). 
(c) Describes the type of system proposed. 
(d) Define the missions that the system will perform (e.g., CAS, SEAD, Interdiction). 
(e) Defines the operational and support concept(s) for the proposed system. This 
includes the C4ISR (information exchange) operational concept. 
(t) Describes if fielding of increments (time phased) of system capability that support 
evolutionary acquisition is appropriate for the proposed system. 
(2) Threat. Defines the principal threat for the system (e.g., nature of threat, threat 
tactics, future threat capabilities). 
(3) Shortcomings of existing systems and C4ISR architectures. Defines shortcomings 
of fielded systems to counter all anticipated threats (e.g., weapon system, interoperability, 
lift). Describes why existing C4ISR architectures (operational, systems and technical 
views) cannot meet current or projected future Goint) information exchange requirements 
for the proposed system. 
( 4) Capabilities Required. The initial ORD will establish requirements describing the 
capabilities and characteristics of the proposed system. The requirements shall be written 
in output oriented and measurable terms in Threshold/Objective format with criteria and 
rationale for each. The ORD shall identify the specific requirements contributing most 
significantly to the desired operational capability and provide a relative importance of 
meeting or exceeding each requirement threshold or objective value. This will be used to 
guide the acquisition community in making trade off decisions between the threshold and 
objective levels of the stated requirements. The ORD requirements (especially KPPs) 
and supporting rationale should reflect analytic insights on the preferred altemative(s) 
identified in the Analysis-of-Alternatives (AOA), cost-schedule-performance tradeoffs, 
requirements cost tradeoffs, experimentation, test and evaluation, and affordability 
analysis. The ORD requirements shall be refined at successive milestone decision points 
based upon the trade-offs made during each phase of the acquisition process. One 
method to identify requirements is to list all the required capabilities for each mission 









(a) Information Exchange Requirements (IERs). The warfighter also needs to 
identify the top level essential interface requirements for information exchange needed to 
support the proposed system as described in reference r. IERs identify the elements of 
warfighter information used in support of a particular activity and between any two 
activities. IERs are to be used as the primary basis and measure for system 
interoperability in defining Interoperability KPP threshold (T) and objective (0) 
requirements for ORDs and CRDs. These IERs should be limited to only the top level 
requirements that identify the on-board and off-board informational needs for the system 
to support the interoperability requirement. The IERs will be extracted from the ORD 
along with the Interoperability KPP and utilized in the C4ISP as one of the tools used to 
develop the operational architecture for the system. The goal is to use established 
architectures for information exchange and identify unique system information 
requirements that can not be supported with current/projected architectures. The intent is 
to eliminate duplication and having individual systems creating their own (stovepiped) 
C4ISR architectures. 
(b) Interoperability. Joint Pub 1-02 definition (2) for interoperability defines it as the 
condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of 
communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged 
directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. Even though there are many 
facets of interoperability (e.g., fuel, ammunition, transportation, communications) that 
need to be identified in the ORD the focus for the interoperability ORD KPP will be the 
information exchange and interoperability level for the ORD system information needs. 
The intent is for the warfighter to outline the essential information exchange requirements 
for the system as described above. The requirements should reflect both the information 
needs necessary to satisfy the system under consideration and the information this new 
capability can provide to enhance fielded systems. The development of the information 
exchange requirements should cover both the communication requirements for command 
and control of the proposed system and the level of integration for cross system 
operations as depicted in Figure 14. 
Information Assurance (IA) is required for all DOD systems that are used to enter, 
process, store, display, or transmit DOD information regardless of classification or 
sensitivity. IA is defined as the Information Operations that protect and defend 
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation and included restoration through 
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. To assure balance or risk and gains, IA 
requirements must be co-developed and co-evolved with those for Information 
Interoperability (reference i). 
(c) ORD Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). ORD KPPs are those system 
capabilities or characteristics considered essential for successful mission 
accomplishment. The ORD should only contain a limited number of KPPs 
(approximately 8 or fewer) that capture the parameters needed to reach the overall 
desired capabilities for the system. Failure to meet an ORD KPP threshold can be cause 









ORD KPPs are extracted from the ORD and included in the performance section of the 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) document at each Milestone beginning with 
Milestone I. ORDs will have an Interoperability KPP. The following guidelines should 
be applied when selecting KPPs: 
Is it essential for defining system or required capabilities? 
Is it warfighting oriented or does it contribute to the improvement in warfighting 
capabilities? 
Is it achievable/testable? 
Can the numbers/percentages be explained by analysis? 
If not met, are you willing to look at canceling the program? 
( d) ORD KPP Development. Selection of valid KPPs is more than just identifying a 
requirement and providing a threshold/objective value. A KPP should be a roll-up of a 
number of supporting requirements developed listed in the ORD. The following is one 
methodology for developing KPPs: 
Step (1) List system required capabilities for each mission/function as described above. 
Step (2) Prioritize these requirements. 
Step (3) For each mission/function build one measurable performance parameter. 
Step ( 4) Determine the parameters that are most critical to the system and designate them 
as Key Performance Parameters in the ORD. 
Note: All missions/functions for the system to not need to create a KPP. Likewise, 
certain areas may create two or more KPPs. 
(e) ORD Interoperability KPP. The ORD Interoperability KPP should define the 
level of interoperability for the proposed system. (e.g. PAC-3 ORD Interoperability KPP 
criteria: TADIL-J (T), Joint Composite Tracking Network (JCTN) (0)). The 
Interoperability KPP will be derived from the set of IERs that characterize the 
information exchanges to be performed by the proposed system. ORDs that come under 
the umbrella of a CRD should ensure compliance with the CRD Interoperability KPP. 
(f) ORD sponsor/CRD lead interface. If the ORD falls under a CRD the ORD 
sponsor will work closely with the CRD lead to ensure ORD/CRD C4ISR 
interoperability. 
(5) Program Affordability. Cost will be addressed in the ORD. Inclusion of cost 











program. The cost figure should be stated in terms of a threshold and objective (not 
necessarily a KPP) in order to provide flexibility to allow for program evolution and 
CAIV trade studies. The DOD component sponsor may make cost a KPP if it desires and 
identify the cost it wishes to evaluate. The cost will be extracted from the ORD and 
included in the cost section of the APB. 
d. ORD Validation Phase. The validation phase for an ORD includes the formal 
review of the document to confirm the operational requirements for the system. The 
validation authority for the ORD is dependent upon potential ACAT level and/or if a 
program is designated JROC special interest. 
(1) JROC Validation. 
(a) Milestone I. All ACAT I/IA and designated JROC special interest ORDs will be 
reviewed and their KPPs validated by the JROC at Milestone I. 
(b) Milestone Il/111. The JROC will review ACA T ID/IAM and JROC special 
interest ORDs at Milestone II and ill to support each milestone decision. The JROC 
maintains validation authority for ACAT ID/IAM ORDs even if the JROC has delegated 
ORD approval authority to a DOD component. The JROC will also review the ACA T 
ID/IAM ORDs if a recommendation is made to change a KPP at any time during the life 
of a program. The JROC retains authority to review ACA T IC/IAC ORDs if there are 
changes to JROC validated KPPs, otherwise ACA T IC/IAC ORDs need not return to the 
JROC for Milestone II and ill decisions. 
(2) DOD Component Validation. The Chief/Head of a DOD component head (or as 
delegated) may validate their own ACAT IC/IAC and below ORDs at Milestone II and 
ill, if ORD approval has been delegated to the DOD component and JROC validated 
KPPs are not changed. 
(3) Formal ORD Review. The first step in obtaining validation is the formal review 
of the document. The review process is described in Enclosure B. Any ORD forwarded 
for JROC validation is considered draft and must have supporting analysis for proposed 
KPPs along with the AOA, if appropriate, included in the package. 
e. ORD Approval Phase. The ORD approval phase documents the approval 
authority's concurrence with the final validated document. Approval authority is 
dependent upon potential ACAT level, if designated JROC special interest, or if approval 
authority has been delegated. Delegation of approval authority allows the designated 
lead DOD component, with coordination with the appropriate DOD components, to make 
requirements trades between acquisition Milestones without JROC approval. Key 
Performance Parameters or other specifically identified items by the JROC can not be 
changed without JROC approval. 










(a) Milestone I. The approval authority, at Milestone I, for all potential ACAT I/IA 
ORDs and KPPs is the JROC. The JROC will normally delegate ORD approval authority 
for potential ACA T I/IA ORDs to the DOD component sponsor at the Milestone I JROC 
review. However, the JROC may retain approval authority for selected ACAT I 
programs. Following JROC approval, the JROC Chairman will forward a Milestone 
review and lead Service recommendation, including a list of Key Performance 
Parameters, to USD(A&T) via JROCM for consideration during the DAB or to 
ASD(C31) for consideration during the DOD CIO review. If a JROC special interest 
program is not going to a DAB or DOD CIO review, the recommendations will be 
forwarded to the appropriate DOD component milestone decision authority. 
(b) Milestone Wiii. The JROC will approve ACA T ID/IAM and JROC special 
interest ORDs at Milestone II and III to support each milestone decision. If the JROC 
retained approval authority for an ACA T I/IA, or JROC special interest program, then the 
JROC will review the ORD and KPPs prior to each milestone. The JROC Chairman will 
forward a Milestone review and lead Service recommendation, including a list of Key 
Performance Parameters, to USD(A&T) via JROCM for consideration during the DAB or 
to ASD(C31) for consideration during the DOD CIO review. 
(2) DOD component approval. The Chief/Head of the DOD component (or as 
delegated) are the approval authority ACAT IC/IAC, II and below ORDs if ORD 
approval has been delegated by the JROC at Milestone I. Approved ORDs are submitted 
by the approval authority to the appropriate DOD component MDA for action. 
f. ORD Review/Revalidation. The ORD is refined and updated when necessary and 
prior to each acquisition milestone to incorporate results of the activities during each 
acquisition phase (i.e., cost, schedule, and performance trades, testing, and analysis of 
alternatives (AOA)). There is no need to update the MNS because the ORD builds upon 
this initial document. The ORD should be thoroughly reviewed by the DOD component 
sponsor, including other appropriate DOD components for joint program ORDs. Any 
changes to the initial ORD will be carefully reviewed by the ORD validation and 
approval authorities to determine whether or not the changes in the requirements should 
apply to the system currently being developed, or they should be deferred to subsequent 
blocks if an evolutionary acquisition approach is used. Also, the ORD validation and 
approval authorities with assistance from the development and test communities will 
ensure the deficiencies and requirements are still valid when compared to the latest threat, 
guidance, and strategy documents. Also, the ORD should be vigorously scrubbed to 
ensure that the KPPs reflect the minimum essential requirements. 
2. Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) Procedures. The APB contains the cost, 
schedule, and key performance parameters for the program. APBs are described in 
reference b, section 3.2.2. With progression through the requirements evolution and 
acquisition milestone process, the APBs will change focus from concept (Milestone I) to 
development (Milestone II) to production (Milestone Ill). KPPs from the ORD, 
combined with cost and schedule measures, will be included within the APB with their 









the format specified in Appendix I to reference b.' APBs are submitted with the required 
milestone documentation for Milestone I and each succeeding milestone. The KPPs 
objectives and thresholds in the APB must be validated by the appropriate authority 
before the MDA's review. The MDA is the approval authority for all APBs in 
accordance with reference b, section 3.2.2.1, "Preparation and Approval." Before all 
major milestone decision reviews for ACAT ID, ACAT JAM, JROC special interest 
programs and for all APB changes, the JROC will review the APB 's cost, CAN 
objectives, schedule, and key performance parameters (objectives and thresholds) to 
ensure they satisfy the mission need. 
Appendix A to Enclosure E 
Operational Requirements Document Format 




Prepared for Milestone _ Decision 
Date 
1. General Description of Operational Capability. 
Summarize the mission need. (If a documented MNS did not precede the ORD, 
explain the process that investigated alternatives for satisfying mission need). 
Describe the overall mission area. 
Identify CRD the proposed system falls under (if appropriate). 
Describe the proposed system. 
Describe the analysis that supports the proposed system. 
Define the missions that the proposed system will be tasked to accomplish. 
Describe the operations and suppport concepts summarizing the system's place on 
the future battlefield, its employment/operation, its organizational setting, and its 
sustaining and support interfaces. 
Describe the C4ISR (information exchange) operational concept. 
Describe the benefits of Evolutionary Acquisition for proposed system (if 





capability described in the timeframes that will support evolutionary acquisition 
approach. The requirements must be time-based with the initial capability targeted for a 
6 year IOC from program initiation. Requirements beyond the initial IOC must be 
specified in a time phased manner and be matched to projected threats. Only those initial 
requirements that can be validated by the user as needed within the FYDP, should be 
defined for the initial acquisition. Subsequent requirements would take into account 
achievements in capability from preceding blocks. 
2. Threat. Summarize the threat to be countered and projected threat environment. 
(Reference DIA or Service Technical Intelligence Center approved documents. For 
potential MDAPs reference the DIA validated threat assessment.) 
3. Shortcomings of Existing Systems and C4ISR architectures. 
Describe why existing systems cannot meet current or projected requirements. 
Describe why existing C4ISR operational, system and technical architecture 
views cannot meet the requirements for the proposed system. 
4. Capabilities required . 
Identify the operational performance parameters (capabilities and characteristics) 
required for the proposed system. 
Articulate the requirements in output oriented, and measurable terms. Use 
Threshold/Objective format, and provide criteria and rationale for each requirement. 
Rationale should include mission unique environment for the system (e.g., wartime, 
peace-time, transition conditions). 
Timing of requirements should specify the time-based nature of the need and the 
events that are driving that need. 
ORD Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). Develop the ORD KPPs as outlined 
in Enclosure D. Figure 15 provides example KPP table summary. Develop the ORD 
IERs matrix, in accordance with procedures described in the C4ISR Architecture 
Framework and from the IER matrix develop the Interoperability CRD KPP as outlined 
in Enclosure D. 
Key Performance Parameter Threshold and Objective 










a. System Performance. 
Describe mission scenarios (wartime and peacetime, if different) in terms of 
mission profiles, employment tactics, countermeasures, and environmental conditions (all 
inclusive: natural and man-made, e.g., weather, ocean acoustics, information warfare). 
Identify system performance parameters such as range, accuracy, payload, speed, 
mission reliability, interoperability, etc. Recommend which parameter shall be 
considered a Key Performance Parameter. 
b. Information Exchange Requirements. Identify the top level Information 
Exchange Requirements for the system for each mission area that the system is proposed 
to support (e.g., CAS, AA W, surveillance, reconnaissance) as described in Enclosure E. 
c. Logistics and Readiness. 
Include measures for mission-capable rate, operational availability, frequency and 
duration of preventive or scheduled maintenance actions, etc. 
Describe in terms of mission requirements considering both wartime and 
peacetime logistics operations. 
Identify combat support requirements including battle damage repair capability, 
mobility requirements, expected maintenance levels, and surge and mobilization 
objectives and capabilities. 
d. Other System Characteristics. Characteristics that tend to be design, cost and risk 
drivers. 
Address electronic attack (EA) and Wartime Reserve Modes (WARM) 
requirements. 
Conventional, initial nuclear weapons effects, and nuclear, biological, and 
chemical contamination (NBCC) survivability. 
Natural environmental factors (such as climatic, terrain, and oceanographic 
factors). 
Unplanned stimuli (such as fast cook-off, bullet impact, and sympathetic 
detonation). 















Define the expected mission capability (e.g., full, percent degraded) in the various 
environments. Include applicable safety parameters such as those related to system, 
nuclear, explosive, and flight safety. 
Identify physical and operational security needs. 
5. Program Support. Establish support objectives for initial and full operational 
capability. Discuss interfacing systems (at the system/subsystem, platform, and force 
levels), specifically those related to command, control, communications, computers, and 
intelligence (C41), transportation and basing, and standardization and interoperability. 
Assign a joint potential designation (joint, joint interest, or independent). 
a. Maintenance Planning. Identify maintenance tasks to be accomplished and time 
phasing for all levels of maintenance. Include programmed maintenance and surveillance 
inspections such as nuclear hardness and structural integrity. Describe the envisioned 
planning approach for contract versus organic repair. 
b. Support Equipment. Define the standard support equipment to be used by the 
system. 
Describe the test and fault isolation capabilities desired of automatic test 
equipment at all levels, expressed in terms of realistic and affordable probabilities and 
confidence levels. 
c. C41/Standardization, Interoperability, and Commonality. 
Describe how the system will be integrated into the command, control, 
communications, computers and intelligence architecture that is forecast to exist at the 
time the system will be fielded. Include impact on current/planned C4ISR infrastructure, 
including methodology for assessment. 
Identify data and data fusion requirements (data, voice, video), computer network 
support, and anti-jam requirements. 
Identify unique intelligence information requirements, including intelligence 
interfaces, communications, and data base support pertaining to target and mission 
planning activities, threat data, etc. 
Describe considerations for joint use, NATO cross-servicing, etc. 
Identify procedural and technical interfaces, and communications, protocols, and 
standards required to be incorporated to ensure compatibility and interoperability with 
other Service, joint Service, NA TO and other allied and friendly nation systems. 
The system must comply with applicable information technology standards 







Address interface requirements with Global Command and Control System 
(GCCS) or Common Operational Picture (COP) (reference j). 
Address Information Assurance (IA) that covers the defensive capabilities that 
provide for the availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation 
of the information to be exchanged and used. IA should also include those characteristics 
needed for restoration through protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. To balance 
risks and gains, IA and Information Interoperability characteristics must be co-developed 
and co-evolved. This includes implementation of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
required to ensure information security over all voice, video, and data transmission. 
Interconnection of systems operating at different classification levels shall be 
accomplished by process (e.g., Secret and Below Interoperability (SABI)) that have been 
approved by the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) (references h and i). 
Address energy standardization and efficiency needs for both fuels and electrical 
power as applicable. 
Address Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) and Spectrum 
Supportability for systems and equipment. 
d. Computer Resources 
Identify computer resource constraints (examples include language, computer, 
database, architecture, or interoperability constraints). 
Address all mission critical and support computer resources, including automated 
test equipment. 
Describe the capabilities desired for integrated computer resources support. 
Identify any unique user interface requirements, documentation needs, and special 
software certifications. 
e. Human Systems Integration. Address HSI domains to include: 
. Establish broad manpower constraints for operators, maintainers, and support 
personnel. 
Identify requirements for manpower factors that impact system design (utilization 
rates, pilot-to-seat ratios, and maintenance ratios). 
Establish broad cognitive, physical, and sensory requirements for the operators, 



















Establish requirements for human performance that will achieve effective human-
system interfaces. Identify requirements for combining, modifying, or establishing new 
military occupational specialties. 
Describe the training concept to include requirements for training support package 
(e.g. imulators, training devices, embedded training), and training logistics. Include 
safety or health and critical errors that reduce job performance or system effectiveness 
given the operational environment. Determine objectives and thresholds for the above 
requirements, as appropriate. 
f. Other Logistics and Facilities Considerations. 
Describe the provisioning strategy for the system. 
Specify any unique facility, shelter, supporting infrastructure, environmental 
compliance requirements, and associated costs and availability milestone schedule in 
support of the requirement. 
Identify special packaging, handling, and transportation considerations. 
Define unique data requirements such as engineering data for depot support and 
technical orders for the system and depot. 
g. Transportation and Basing. Describe how the system will be moved either to or 
within the theater. Identify any lift constraints. Detail the basing requirements (main and 
forward operating bases) and associated facilities needed for training. · 
h. Geospatial Information and Services. Identify cartographic materials, digital 
topographic data, and geodetic data needed for system employment. Where possible, 
National Imagery & Mapping Agency standard military data shall be used. 
I. Natural Environmental Support. Identify the standard and unique weather, 
oceanographic, and astrogeophysical support required. Include data accuracy and 
forecast requirements. 
6. Force Structure. Estimate the number of systems or subsystems needed, including 
spares and training units. This is only an estimate of the number of systems/subsystems 
needed, and will not serve as the definitive source for documenting the distribution or 
basis of issue. Identify units or platforms and quantities of these platforms (including 
other Services' or Government agencies' if appropriate) that will employ the systems or 
subsystems being developed and procured to satisfy this Operational Requirements 
Document. 
7. Schedule. Define what actions, when complete, will constitute attainment of Initial 
and Full Operational Capability (leave flexible for these to be revised as the program is 











Clearly specify the operational capability or level of performance necessary to 
declare Initial and Full Operational Capability. fuclude the number of operational 
systems, operational and support personnel, facilities, supporting infrastructure and 
organizational, intermediate, and depot support elements that must be in place. If 
availability in a specific timeframe is important, specify an objective for initial 
operational capability. Describe the impact if this objective is not achieved and identify a 
window of acceptability if appropriate. 
8. Program Affordability. Cost will be addressed in the ORD. fuclusion of cost allows 
the DOD component sponsor to emphasize affordability early in the proposed program. 
The cost figure should be stated in terms of a threshold and objective (not necessarily a 
KPP) in order to provide flexibility to allow for program evolution and CAN trade 
studies. The DOD component sponsor may make cost a KPP if it desires and identify the 
cost it wishes to evaluate. The cost will be extracted from the ORD and included in the 














Extracted from Requirements Determination, U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command, March 1996 
Integrated Concept Teams for Requirements Determination 
By design, the process is very flexible; it is not a "one size fits all," "heel-to-toe" 
process. It accommodates spiral development and employs a variety of feedback 
mechanisms. The process has multiple entry and exit opportunities and is easily tailored 
to support different types and levels of requirements determination, e.g., Joint or Army 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TIP), hardware, software, etc. It employs 
multidisciplinary integrated concept teams (ICTs) representing appropriate major Army 
commands (MACOMs) and staffs, and appropriate Department of Defense organizations, 
other federal agencies, industry and academia. This methodology allows a concept to be 
looked at from many perspectives and crystallize doctrine, training, leader development, 
organization, materiel and soldier (DTLOMS) requirements more quickly. The ICTs 
"brainstorm" concepts from both visionary and practical perspectives with the goal of 
shortening the requirements determination "event" by providing it better early focus. 
Participation by the Scientific & Technical communities gives the ICT an awareness of 
the art of the possible, precluding pursuit of "dead end" requirements. The ICTs are not 
constrained by costs as they explore concepts, but do gather potential cost data that is 
used by senior leaders later in the requirements determination process. This methodology 
generates synergy and provides more thorough consideration of desired warfighting 
capabilities and the means to achieve them, all of which enable Army leaders to make 
better and faster decisions. 
The ICT complements the existing integrated product team (IPT) methodology 
used by materiel developers to manage system development. Formation of the ICT in 
early concept development enables the team to transition to an IPT when a materiel 
requirement is approved at Milestone I. Thus, continuity is maintained from concept to 
fielding for a materiel solution. The ICT is also applicable to other requirement 














Federal Acquisition Regulation -- Part 6 
Competition Requirements 
(FAC 97-14) 
23 November 1999 
6.000 -- Scope of Part. 
This part prescribes policies and procedures to promote full and open competition in the 
acquisition process and to provide for full and open competition, full and open 
competition after exclusion of sources, other than full and open competition, and 
competition advocates. As used in this part, full and open competition is the process by 
which all responsible off erors are allowed to compete. This part does not deal with the 
results of competition (e.g., adequate price competition), which are addressed in other 
parts (e.g., Part 15). 
6.001 -- Applicability. 
This part applies to all acquisitions except --
(a) Contracts awarded using the simplified acquisition procedures of Part 13 (but see 
13.501 for requirements pertaining to sole source acquisitions of commercial items 
under Subpart 13.5); 
(b) Contracts awarded using contracting procedures (other than those addressed in this 
part) that are expressly authorized by statute; 
( c) Contract modifications, including the exercise of priced options that were evaluated 
as part of the initial competition (see 17 .207(t)), that are within the scope and under 
the terms of an existing contract; 
(d) Orders placed under requirements contracts or definite-quantity contracts; 
( e) . Orders placed under indefinite-quantity contracts that were entered into pursuant to 
this part when --
(1) The contract was awarded under Subpart 6.1or6.2 and all responsible 
sources were realistically permitted to compete for the requirements 
contained in the order; or 
(2) The contract was awarded under Subpart 6.3 and the required justification 
and approval adequately covers the requirements contained in the order; or 
(t) Orders placed against task order and delivery order contracts entered into pursuant 
to Subpart 16.5. 
6.002 -- Limitations. 
No agency shall contract for supplies or services from another agency for the purpose of 





6.003 -- Definitions. 
"Full and open competition, " when used with respect to a contract action, means that all 
responsible sources are permitted to compete. 
"Procuring activity," as used in this part, means a component of an executive agency 
having a significant acquisition function and designated as such by the head of the 
agency. Unless agency regulations specify otherwise, the term "procuring activity" 
shall be synonymous with "contracting activity" as defined in Subpart 2.1. 
"Sole source acquisition" means a contract for the purchase of supplies or services that 
is entered into or pro-posed to be entered into by an agency after soliciting and 
negotiating with only one source. 
"Unique and innovative concept, " when used relative to an unsolicited research 
proposal, means that, in the opinion and to the knowledge of the Government 
evaluator, the meritorious proposal is the product of original thinking submitted in 
confidence by one source; contains new novel or changed concepts, approaches, or 
methods; was not submitted previously by another; and, is not otherwise available 
within the Federal Government. In this context, the term does not mean that the 
source has the sole capability of performing the research. 
Subpart 6.1 -- Full and Open Competition 
6.100 -- Scope of Subpart . 
This subpart prescribes the policy and procedures that are to be used to promote and 
provide for full and open competition. 
6.101 -- Policy. 
(a) IO U.S.C.2304 and 41 U.S.C.253 require, with certain limited exceptions (see 
Subparts 6.2 and 6.3), that contracting officers shall promote and provide for full 
and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding Government contracts. 
(b) Contracting officers shall provide for full and open competition through use of the 
competitive procedure(s) contained in this subpart that are best suited to the 
circumstances of the contract action and consistent with the need to fulfill the 
Government's requirements efficiently (10 U.S.C.2304 and 41 U.S.C.253). 
6.102 -- Use of Competitive Procedures. 
The competitive procedures available for use in fulfilling the requirement for full and 
open competition are as follows: 
(a) Sealed bids. (See 6.40l(a).) 
(b) Competitive proposals. (See 6.401(b).) If sealed bids are not appropriate under 
paragraph (a) of this section, contracting officers shall request competitive 












( c) Combination of competitive procedures. If sealed bids are not appropriate, 
contracting officers may use any combination of competitive procedures (e.g., two-
step sealed bidding). 
(d) Other competitive procedures. 
(1) Selection of sources for architect-engineer contracts in accordance with the 
provisions of Pub. L. 92-582 (40 U.S.C.541, et seq.) is a competitive 
procedure (see Subpart 36.6 for procedures). 
(2) Competitive selection of basic and applied research and that part of 
development not related to the development of a specific system or hardware 
procurement is a competitive procedure if award results from --
(i) A broad agency announcement that is general in nature identifying 
areas of research interest, including criteria for selecting proposals, and 
soliciting the participation of all offerors capable of satisfying the 
Government's needs; and 
(ii) A peer or scientific review. 
(3) Use of multiple award schedules issued under the procedures established by 
the Administrator of General Services consistent with the requirement of 41 
U.S.C.259(b)(3)(A) for the multiple award schedule program of the General 











FAR Part 15 
Contracting by Negotiation 
(FAC 97-14} 
23 November 1999 
Authority: 40 U.S.C.486(c); 10 U.S.C. chapter 137; and 42 
U.S.C.2473 (c). 
15.000 -- Scope of Part. 
This part prescribes policies and procedures governing competitive and 
noncompetitive negotiated acquisitions. A contract awarded using other 
than sealed bidding procedures is a negotiated contract (see 14.101). 
15.001 -- Definitions. 
As used in this part --
Proposal modification is a change made to a proposal before the 
solicitation closing date and time, or made in response to an 
amendment, or made to correct a mistake at any time before award. 
Proposal revision is a change to a proposal made after the solicitation 
closing date, at the request of or as allowed by a contracting officer, 
as the result of negotiations. 
15.002 -- Types of Negotiated Acquisition. 
(a) Sole source acquisitions. When contracting in a sole source 
environment, the request for proposals (RFP) should be tailored to 
remove unnecessary information and requirements; e.g., evaluation 
criteria and voluminous proposal preparation instructions. 
(b) Competitive acquisitions . When contracting in a competitive 
environment, the procedures of this part are intended to minimize the 
complexity of the solicitation, the evaluation, and the source 
selection decision, while maintaining a process designed to foster an 
impartial and comprehensive evaluation of offerors' proposals, leading 
to selection of the proposal representing the best value to the 
Government (see 2.101). 
Subpart 15.1 -- Source Selection Processes and Techniques 
L272630787:AFFARSL 
15.100 -- Scope of Subpart. 
This subpart describes some of the acquisition processes and techniques 
that may be used to design competitive acquisition strategies suitable 
for the specific circumstances of the acquisition. 












An agency can obtain best value in negotiated acquisitions by using any 
one or a combination of source selection approaches. In different 
types of acquisitions, the relative importance of cost or price may 
vary. For example, in acquisitions where the requirement is clearly 
definable and the risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, 
cost or price may play a dominant role in source selection. The less 
definitive the requirement, the more development work required, or the 
greater the performance risk, the more technical or past performance 
considerations may play a dominant role in source selection. 
15.101-1 -- Tradeoff Process. 
(a) A tradeoff process is appropriate when it may be in the best 
interest of the Government to consider award to other than the lowest 
priced offeror or other than the highest technically rated offeror. 
(b) When using a tradeoff process, the following apply: 
(1) All evaluation factors and significant subfactors that will 
affect contract award and their relative importance shall be clearly 
stated in the solicitation; and 
(2) The solicitation shall state whether all evaluation factors other 
than cost or price, when combined, are significantly more important 
than, approximately equal to, or significantly less important than cost 
or price. 
(c) This process permits tradeoffs among cost or price and non-cost 
factors and allows the Government to accept other than the lowest 
priced proposal. The perceived benefits of the higher priced proposal 
shall merit the additional cost, and the rationale for tradeoffs must 
be documented in the file in accordance with 15.406. 
15.101-2 -- Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Source Selection 
Process. 
(a) The lowest price technically acceptable source selection process 
is appropriate when best value is expected to result from selection of 
the technically acceptable proposal with the lowest evaluated price. 
(b) When using the lowest price technically acceptable process, the 
following apply: 
(1) The evaluation factors and significant subfactors that establish 
the requirements of acceptability shall be set forth in the 
solicitation. Solicitations shall specify that award will be made on 
the basis of the lowest evaluated price of proposals meeting or 
exceeding the acceptability standards for non-cost factors. If the 
contracting officer documents the file pursuant to 15.304(c) (3) (iii), 
past performance need not be an evaluation factor in lowest price 
technically acceptable source selections. If the contracting officer 
elects to consider past performance as an evaluation factor, it shall 
be evaluated in accordance with 15.305. However, the comparative 
assessment in 15.305(a) (2) (i) does not apply. If the contracting 
officer determines that a small business' past performance is not 














Administration for a Certificate of Competency determination, in 
accordance with the procedures contained in subpart 19.6 and 15 
u.s.c. 637 (b) (7)). 
(2) Tradeoffs are not permitted. 
(3) Proposals are evaluated for acceptability but not ranked using 
the non-cost/price factors. 
(4) Exchanges may occur (see 15.306). 
15.102 -- Oral Presentations. 
(a) Oral presentations by offerors as requested by the Government may 
substitute for, or augment, written information. Use of oral 
presentations as a substitute for portions of a proposal can be 
effective in streamlining the source selection process. Oral 
presentations may occur at any time in the acquisition process, and are 
subject to the same restrictions as written information, regarding 
timing (see 15.208) and content (see 15.306). Oral presentations 
provide an opportunity for dialogue among the parties. Pre-recorded 
videotaped presentations that lack real-time interactive dialogue are 
not considered oral presentations for the purposes of this section, 
although they may be included in offeror submissions, when appropriate. 
(b) The solicitation may require each offeror to submit part of its 
proposal through oral presentations. However, certifications, 
representations, and a signed offer sheet (including any exceptions to 
the Government's terms and conditions) shall be submitted in writing. 
(c) Information pertaining to areas such as an offeror's capability, 
past performance, work plans or approaches, staffing resources, 
transition plans, or sample tasks (or other types of tests) may be 
suitable for oral presentations. In deciding what information to 
obtain through an oral presentation, consider the following: 
(1) The Government's ability to adequately evaluate the information; 
(2) The need to incorporate any information into the resultant 
contract; 
(3) The impact on the efficiency of the acquisition; and 
(4) The impact (including cost) on small businesses. In considering 
the costs of oral presentations, contracting officers should also 
consider alternatives to on-site oral presentations (e.g., 
teleconferencing, video teleconferencing). 
(d) When oral presentations are required, the solicitation shall 
provide offerors with sufficient information to prepare them. 
Accordingly, the solicitation may describe --
(1) The types of information to be presented orally and the 
associated evaluation factors that will be used; 
(2) The qualifications for personnel that will be required to provide 









(3) The requirements for, and any limitations and/or prohibitions on, 
the use of written material or other media to supplement the oral 
presentations; 
(4) The location, date, and time for the oral presentations; 
(5) The restrictions governing the time permitted for each oral 
presentation; and 
(6) The scope and content of exchanges that may occur between the 
Government's participants and the offerer's representatives as part of 
the oral presentations, including whether or not discussions (see 
15.306(d)) will be permitted during oral presentations. 
(e) The contracting officer shall maintain a record of oral 
presentations to document what the Government relied upon in making the 
source selection decision. The method and level of detail of the 
record (e.g., videotaping, audio tape recording, written record, 
Government notes, copies of offeror briefing slides or presentation 
notes) shall be at the discretion of the source selection authority. A 
copy of the record placed in the file may be provided to the offeror. 
(f) When an oral presentation includes information that the parties 
intend to include in the contract as material terms or conditions, the 
information shall be put in writing. Incorporation by reference of 
oral statements is not permitted. 
(g) If, during an oral presentation, the Government conducts 
discussions (see 15.306(d)), the Government must comply with 15.306 and 
15.307. 
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Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FAR Subpart 15.2 Solicitation and Receipt of 
Proposals and Information 
15.200 -- Scope of Subpart. 
This subpart prescribes policies and procedures for 
(a) Exchanging information with industry prior to receipt of 
proposals; 
(b) Preparing and issuing requests for proposals (RFPs) and requests 
for information (RFis); and 
(c) Receiving proposals and information. 
15.201 -- Exchanges With Industry Before Receipt of Proposals. 
(a) Exchanges of information among all interested parties, from the 
earliest identification of a requirement through receipt of proposals, 
are encouraged. Any exchange of information must be consistent with 
procurement integrity requirements (see 3.104). Interested parties 
include potential offerers, end users, Government acquisition and 
supporting personnel, and others involved in the conduct or outcome of 
the acquisition. 
(b) The purpose of exchanging information is to improve the 
understanding of Gove.rnment requirements and industry capabilities, 
thereby allowing potential offerors to judge whether or how they can 
satisfy the Government's requirements, and enhancing the Government's 
ability to obtain quality supplies and services, including 
construction, at reasonable prices, and increase efficiency in proposal 
preparation, proposal evaluation, negotiation, and contract award. 
(c) Agencies are encouraged to promote early exchanges of information 
about future acquisitions. An early exchange of information among 
industry and the program manager, contracting officer, and other 
participants in the acquisition process can identify and resolve 
concerns regarding the acquisition strategy, including proposed 
contract type, terms and conditions, and acquisition planning 
schedules; the feasibility of the requirement, including performance 
requirements, statements of work, and data requirements; the 
suitability of the proposal instructions and evaluation criteria, 
including the approach for assessing past performance information; the 
availability of reference documents; and any other industry concerns or 
questions. Some techniques to promote early exchanges of information 
are 
(1) Industry or small business conferences; 
(2) Public hearings; 





(4) One-on-one meetings with potential offerers (any that are 
substantially involved with potential contract terms and conditions 
should include the contracting officer; also see paragraph (f) of this 
section regarding restrictions on disclosure of information) ; 
(5) Presolicitation notices; 
(6) Draft RFPs; 
(7) RFis; 
(8) Presolicitation or preproposal conferences; and 
(9) Site visits. 
(d) The special notices of procurement matters at 5.205(c), or 
electronic notices, may be used to publicize the Government's 
requirement or solicit information from industry. 
(e) RFis may be used when the Government does not presently intend to 
award a contract, but wants to obtain price, delivery, other market 
information, or capabilities for planning purposes. Responses to these 
notices are not offers and cannot be accepted by the Government to form 
a binding contract. There is no required format for RFis. 
(f) General information about agency mission needs and future 
requirements may be disclosed at any time. After release of the 
solicitation, the contracting officer shall be the focal point of any 
exchange with potential offerers. When specific information about a 
proposed acquisition that would be necessary for the preparation of 
proposals is disclosed to one or more potential offerers, that 
information shall be made available to the public as soon as 
practicable, but no later than the next general release of information, 
in order to avoid creating an unfair competitive advantage. 
Information provided to a particular offeror in response to that 
offerer's request shall not be disclosed if doing so would reveal the 
potential offeror's confidential business strategy, and would be 
protected under 3.104 or subpart 24.2. When a presolicitation or 
preproposal conference is conducted, materials distributed at the 
conference should be made available to all potential offerers, upon 
request. 
15.202 -- Advisory Multi-Step Process. 
(a) The agency may publish a presolicitation notice (see 5.204) that 
provides a general description of the scope or purpose of the 
acquisition and invites potential offerers to submit information that 
allows the Government to advise the offerers about their potential to 
be viable competitors. The presolicitation notice should identify the 
information that must be submitted and the criteria that will be used 
in making the initial evaluation. Information sought may be limited to 
a statement of qualifications and other appropriate information (e.g., 
proposed technical concept, past performance, and limited pricing 
information) . At a minimum, the notice shall contain sufficient 
information to permit a potential offerer to make an informed decision 
about whether to participate in the acquisition. This process should 
not be used for multi-step acquisitions where it would result in 
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-offerers being required to submit identical information in response to 
the notice and in response to the initial step of the acquisition. 
(b) The agency shall evaluate all responses in accordance with the 
criteria stated in the notice, and shall advise each respondent in 
writing either that it will be invited to participate in the resultant 
acquisition or, based on the information submitted, that it is unlikely 
to be a viable competitor. The agency shall advise respondents 
considered not to be viable competitors of the general basis for that 
opinion. The agency shall inform all respondents that, notwithstanding 
the advice provided by the Government in response to their submissions, 
they may participate in the resultant acquisition. 
15.203 -- Requests for Proposals. 
(a) Requests for proposals (RFPs) are used in negotiated acquisitions 
to communicate Government requirements to prospective contractors and 
to solicit proposals. RFPs for competitive acquisitions shall, at a 
minimum, describe the --
Government's requirement; (1) 
(2) Anticipated terms and conditions that will apply to the contract: 
(i) The solicitation may authorize offerers to propose alternative 
terms and conditions, including the contract line item number (CLIN) 
structure; and 
(ii) When alternative CLIN structures are permitted, the evaluation 
approach should consider the potential impact on other terms and 
conditions or the requirement (e.g., place of performance or payment 
and funding requirements) (see 15.206); 
(3) Information required to be in the offerer's proposal; and 
(4) Factors and significant subfactors that will be used to evaluate 
the proposal and their relative importance. 
(b) An RFP may be issued for OMB Circular A-76 studies. See subpart 
7.3 for additional information regarding cost comparisons between 
Government and contractor performance. 
(c) Electronic commerce may be used to issue RFPs and to receive 
proposals, modifications, and revisions. In this case, the RFP shall 
specify the electronic commerce method(s) that offerers may use (see 
subpart 4.5). 
(d) Contracting officers may issue RFPs and/or authorize receipt of 
proposals, modifications, or revisions by facsimile. 
(1) In deciding whether or not to use facsimiles, the contracting 
officer should consider factors such as 
(i) Anticipated proposal size and volume; 
(ii) Urgency of the requirement; 
(iii) Availability and suitability of electronic commerce methods; and 
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(iv) Adequacy of administrative procedures and controls for receiving, 
identifying, recording, and safeguarding facsimile proposals, and 
ensuring their timely delivery to the designated proposal delivery 
location. 
(2) If facsimile proposals are authorized, contracting officers may 
request offeror(s) to provide the complete, original signed proposal at 
a later date. 
(e) Letter RFPs may be used in sole source acquisitions and other 
appropriate circumstances. Use of a letter RFP does not relieve the 
contracting officer from complying with other FAR requirements. Letter 
RFPs should be as complete as possible and, at a minimum, should 
contain the following: 
(1) RFP number and date; 
(2) Name, address (including electronic address and facsimile 
address, if appropriate), and telephone number of the contracting 
officer; 
(3) Type of contract contemplated; 
(4) Quantity, description, and required delivery dates for the item; 
(5) Applicable certifications and representations; 
(6) Anticipated contract terms and conditions; 
(7) Instructions to offerers and evaluation criteria for other than 
sole source actions; 
(8) Proposal due date and time; and 
(9) Other relevant information; e.g., incentives, variations in 
delivery schedule, cost proposal support, and data requirements. 
(f) Oral RFPs are authorized when processing a written solicitation 
would delay the acquisition of supplies or services to the detriment of 
the Government and a notice is not required under 5.202 (e.g., 
perishable items and support of contingency operations or other 
emergency situations). Use of an oral RFP does not relieve the 
contracting officer from complying with other FAR requirements. 
(1) The contract files supporting oral solicitations should include -
(i) A description of the requirement; 
(ii) Rationale for use of an oral solicitation; 
(iii) Sources solicited, including the date, time, name of individuals 
contacted, and prices offered; and 
(iv) The solicitation number provided to the prospective offerers. 
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(2) The information furnished to potential offerors under oral 
solicitations should include appropriate items from paragraph (e) of 
this section. 
15.204 -- Contract Format. 
The use of a uniform contract format facilitates preparation of the 
solicitation and contract as well as reference to, and use of, those 
documents by offerors, contractors, and contract administrators. The 
uniform contract format need not be used for the following: 
(a) Construction and architect-engineer contracts (see part 36) . 
(b) Subsistence contracts. 
(c) Supplies or services contracts requiring special contract formats 
prescribed elsewhere in this part that are inconsistent with the 
uniform format. 
(d) Letter requests for proposals (see 15.203(e)). 
(e) Contracts exempted by the agency head or designee. 
15.204-1 -- Uniform Contract Format. 
(a) Contracting officers shall prepare solicitations and resulting 
contracts using the uniform contract format outlined in Table 15-1 of 
this subsection. 
(b) Solicitations using the uniform contract format shall include 
Parts I, II, III, and IV (see 15.204-2 through 15.204-5). Upon award, 
contracting officers shall not physically include Part IV in the 
resulting contract, but shall retain it in the contract file. Section 
K shall be incorporated by reference in the contract. 
Table 15-1. -- Uniform Contract Format 
Section Title 
Part I -- The Schedule 
A Solicitation/contract form. 
B Supplies or services and prices/costs. 
C Description/specifications/statement of work. 
D Packaging and marking. 
E Inspection and acceptance. 
F Deliveries or performance. 
G Contract administration data. 
H Special contract requirements. 
Part II -- Contract Clauses 
I Contract clauses. 
Part III -- List of Documents, Exhibits, and Other 
Attachments 
J List of attachments. 
Part IV -- Representations and Instructions. 
K Representations, certifications, and other statements of 
offerors or respondents. 




M Evaluation factors for award. 
15.204-2 -- Part I -- The Schedule. 
The contracting officer shall prepare the contract Schedule as follows: 
(a) Section A, Solicitation/contract form. 
(1) Optional Form (OF) 308, Solicitation and Offer-Negotiated 
Acquisition, or Standard Form (SF) 33, Solicitation, Offer and Award, 
may be used to prepare RFPs. 
(2) When other than OF 308 or SF 33 is used, include the following 
information on the first page of the solicitation: 
(i) Name, . address, and location of issuing activity, including room 
and building where proposals or information must be submitted. 
(ii) Solicitation number. 
(iii) Date of issuance. 
(iv) Closing date and time. 
(v) Number of pages. 
(vi) Requisition or other purchase authority. 
(vii) Brief description of item or service. 
(viii) Requirement for the offeror to provide its name and 
complete address, including street, city, county, state, and zip code, 
and electronic address (including facsimile address), if appropriate. 
(ix) Offer expiration date. 
(b) Section B, Supplies or services and prices/costs. Include a 
brief description of the supplies or services; e.g., item number, 
national stock number/part number if applicable, nouns, nomenclature, 
and quantities. (This includes incidental deliverables such as manuals 
and reports.) 
(c) Section C, Description/specifications/statement of work. Include 
any description or specifications needed in addition to Section B (see 
part 11, Describing Agency Needs) . 
(d) Section D, Packaging and marking. 
preservation, and marking requirements, 
Provide packaging, packing, 
if any. 
(e) Section E, Inspection and acceptance. Include inspection, 
acceptance, quality assurance, and reliability requirements (see part 
46, Quality Assurance). 
(f) Section F, Deliveries or performance. Specify the requirements 
for time, place, and method of delivery or performance (see subpart 
11.4, Delivery or Performance Schedules, and 47.301-1). 
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(g) Section G, Contract administration data. Include any required 
accounting and appropriation data and any required contract 
administration information or instructions other than those on the 
solicitation form. Include a statement that the offerer should include 
the payment address in the proposal, if it is different from that shown 
for the offerer. 
(h) Section H, Special contract requirements. Include a clear 
statement of any special contract requirements that are not included in 
Section I, Contract clauses, or in other sections of the uniform 
contract format. 
15.204-3 -- Part II -- Contract Clauses. 
Section I, Contract clauses. The contracting officer shall include in 
this section the clauses required by law or by this part and any 
additional clauses expected to be included in any resulting contract, 
if these clauses are not required in any other section of the uniform 
contract format. An index may be inserted if this section's format is 
particularly complex. 
15.204-4 -- Part III -- List of Documents, Exhibits, and Other 
Attachments. 
Section J, List of attachments. The contracting officer shall list the 
title, date, and number of pages for each attached document, exhibit, 
and other attachment. Cross-references to material in other sections 
may be inserted, as appropriate. 
15.204-5 -- Part IV -- Representations and Instructions. 
The contracting officer shall prepare the representations and 
instructions as follows: 
(a) Section K, Representations, certifications, and other statements 
of offerers. Include in this section those solicitation provisions 
that require representations, certifications, or the submission of 
other information by offerers. 
(b) Section L, Instructions, conditions, and notices to offerers or 
respondents. Insert in this section solicitation provisions and other 
information and instructions not required elsewhere to guide offerers 
or respondents in preparing proposals or responses to requests for 
information. Prospective offerers or respondents may be instructed to 
submit proposals or information in a specific format or severable parts 
to facilitate evaluation. The instructions may specify further 




(4) Past performance; and 
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-(5) Cost or pricing data (see Table 15-2 of 15.408) or information 
other than cost or pricing data. 
(c) Section M, Evaluation factors for award. Identify all 
significant factors and any significant subfactors that will be 
considered in awarding the contract and their relative importance (see 
15.304(d)). The contracting officer shall insert one of the phrases in 
15.304(e). 
15.205 -- Issuing Solicitations. 
(a) The contracting officer shall issue solicitations to potential 
sources in accordance with the policies and procedures in 5.102, 
19.202-4, and part 6. 
(b) A master solicitation, as described in 14.203-3, may also be used 
for negotiated acquisitions. 
15.206 -- Amending the Solicitation. 
(a) When, either before or after receipt of proposals, the Government 
changes its requirements or terms and conditions, the contracting 
officer shall amend the solicitation. 
(b) Amendments issued before the established time and date for 
receipt of proposals shall be issued to all parties receiving the 
solicitation. 
(c) Amendments issued after the established time and date for receipt 
of proposals shall be. issued to all offerers that have not been 
eliminated from the competition. 
(d) If a proposal of interest to the Government involves a departure 
from the stated requirements, the contracting officer shall amend the 
solicitation, provided this can be done without revealing to the other 
offerers the alternate solution proposed or any other information that 
is entitled to protection (see 15.207(b) and 15.306(e)). 
(e) If, in the judgment of the contracting officer, based on market 
research or otherwise, an amendment proposed for issuance after offers 
have been received is so substantial as to exceed what prospective 
offerers reasonably could have anticipated, so that additional sources 
likely would have submitted offers had the substance of the amendment 
been known to them, the contracting officer shall cancel the original 
solicitation and issue a new one, regardless of the stage of the 
acquisition. 
(f) Oral notices may be used when time is of the essence. The 
contracting officer shall document the contract file and formalize the 
notice with an amendment (see subpart 4.5, Electronic Commerce in 
Contracting) . 
(g) At a minimum, the following information should be included in 
each amendment: 




(2) Solicitation number and date. 
(3) Amendment number and date. 
(4) Number of pages. 
(5) Description of the change being made. 
(6) Government point of contact and phone number (and electronic or 
facsimile address, if appropriate). 
(7) Revision to solicitation closing date, if applicable. 
15.207 -- Handling Proposals and Information. 
(a) Upon receipt at the location specified in the solicitation, 
proposals and information received in response to a request for 
information (RFI) shall be marked with the date and time of receipt and 
shall be transmitted to the designated officials. 
(b) Proposals shall be safeguarded from unauthorized disclosure 
throughout the source selection process. (See 3.104 regarding the 
disclosure of source selection information (41 U.S.C.423)). 
Information received in response to an RFI shall be safeguarded 
adequately from unauthorized disclosure. 
(c) If any portion of a proposal received by the contracting officer 
electronically or by facsimile is unreadable, the contracting officer 
immediately shall notify the offeror and permit the offeror to resubmit 
the unreadable portion of the proposal. The method and time for 
resubmission shall be prescribed by the contracting officer after 
consultation with the offeror, and documented in the file. The 
resubmission shall be considered as if it were received at the date and 
time of the original unreadable submission for the purpose of 
determining timeliness under 15.208(a), provided the offeror complies 
with the time and format requirements for resubmission prescribed by 
the contracting officer. 
15.208 -- Submission, Modification, Revision, and Withdrawal of 
Proposals. 
(a) Offerors are responsible for submitting proposals, and any 
revisions, and modifications, or withdrawals, so as to reach the 
Government office designated in the solicitation by the time specified 
in the solicitation. Offerors may use any transmission method 
authorized by the solicitation (i.e., regular mail, electronic 
commerce, or facsimile). If no time is specified in the solicitation, 
the time for receipt is 4:30 p.m., local time, for the designated 
Government office on the date that proposals are due. 
(b) 
(1) Any proposal, modification, revision, or withdrawal that is 
received at the designated Government office after the exact time 
specified for receipt of proposals is "late" and will not be considered 





determines that accepting the late proposal would not unduly delay the 
acquisition; and --
(i) If it was transmitted through an electronic commerce method 
authorized by the solicitation, it was received at the initial point of 
entry to the Government infrastructure not later than 5:00 p.m. one 
working day prior to the date specified for receipt of proposals; or 
(ii) There is acceptable evidence to establish that it was received at 
the Government installation designated for receipt of proposals and was 
under the Government's control prior to the time set for receipt of 
proposals; or 
(iii) It was the only proposal received. 
(2) However, a late modification of an otherwise successful proposal, 
that makes its terms more favorable to the Government, will be 
considered at any time it is received and may be accepted. 
(c) Acceptable evidence to establish the time of receipt at the 
Government installation includes the time/date stamp of that 
installation on the proposal wrapper, other documentary evidence of 
receipt maintained by the installation, or oral testimony or statements 
of Government personnel. 
(d) If an emergency or unanticipated event interrupts normal 
Government processes so that proposals cannot be received at the 
Government off ice designated for receipt of proposals by the exact time 
specified in the solicitation, and urgent Government requirements 
preclude amendment of the solicitation closing date, the time specified 
for receipt of proposals will be deemed to be extended to the same time 
of day specified in the solicitation on the first work day on which 
normal Government processes resume. 
(e) Proposals may be withdrawn by written notice at any time before 
award. Oral proposals in response to oral solicitations may be 
withdrawn orally. The contracting officer must document the contract 
file when oral withdrawals are made. One copy of withdrawn proposals 
should be retained in the contract file (see 4.803(a) (10)). Extra 
copies of the withdrawn proposals may be destroyed or returned to the 
offeror at the offerors request. Where practicable, electronically 
transmitted proposals that are withdrawn must be purged from primary 
and backup data storage systems after a copy is made for the file. 
Extremely bulky proposals must only be returned at the offeror's 
request and expense. 
(f) The contracting officer must promptly notify any offeror if its 
proposal, modification, or revision was received late, and must inform 
the offerer whether its proposal will be considered, unless contract 
award is imminent and the notice prescribed in 15.503(b) would suffice. 
(g) Late proposals and modifications that are not considered must be 
held unopened, unless opened for identification, until after award and 
then retained with other unsuccessful proposals. 
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_ , (h) If available, the following must be included in the contracting 
office files for each late proposal, modification, revision, or 
withdrawal: 
(1) The date and hour of receipt. 
(2) A statement regarding whether the proposal was considered for 
award, with supporting rationale. 
(3) The envelope, wrapper, or other evidence of date of receipt. 
15.209 -- Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses. 
When contracting by negotiation --
(a) The contracting officer shall insert the provision at 
L410009603:52.215-1L, Instructions to Offerors -- Competitive 
Acquisition, in all competitive solicitations where the Government 
intends to award a contract without discussions. 
(1) If the Government intends to make award after discussions with 
offerors within the competitive range, the contracting officer shall 
use the basic provision with its Alternate I. 
(2) If the Government would be willing to accept alternate proposals, 
the contracting officer shall alter the basic clause to add a paragraph 
(c) (9) substantially the same as Alternate II. 
(b) 
(1) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 
L410009604:52.215-2L, Audit and Records-Negotiation (10 U.S.C.2313, 41 
U.S.C.254d, and OMB Circular No. A-133), in solicitations and 
contracts except those for --
(i) Acquisitions not exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold; 
(ii) The acquisition of utility services at rates not exceeding those 
established to apply uniformly to the general public, plus any 
applicable reasonable connection charge; or 
(iii) The acquisition of commercial items exempted under 15.403-1. 
(2) For facilities acquisitions, the contracting officer shall use 
the clause with its Alternate I. 
(3) For cost-reimbursement contracts with State and local 
Governments, educational institutions, and other nonprofit 
organizations, the contracting officer shall use the clause with its 
Alternate II. 
(4) When the examination of records by the Comptroller General is 
waived in accordance with 25.901, the contracting officer shall use the 
clause with its Alternate III. 
(c) When issuing a solicitation for information or planning purposes, 










L410009605:52.215-3L, Request for Information or Solicitation for 
Planning Purposes, and clearly mark on the face of the solicitation 
that it is for information or planning purposes. 
(d) [Reserved] 
(e) The contracting officer shall insert the provision at 
L410009607:52.215-5L, Facsimile Proposals, in solicitations if 
facsimile proposals are authorized (see 15.203(d)). 
(f) The contracting officer shall insert the provision at 
L410009608:52.215-6L, Place of Performance, in solicitations unless the 
place of performance is specified by the Government. 
(g) The contracting officer shall insert the provision at 
L410009609:52.215-7L, Annual Representations and Certifications 
Negotiation, in solicitations if annual representations and 
certifications are used (see 14.213). 
(h) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 
L410009610:52.215-8L, Order of Precedence -- Uniform Contract Format, 
in solicitations and contracts using the format at 15.204. 
15.210 -- Forms. 
Prescribed forms are not required to prepare solicitations described in 
this part. The following forms may be used at the discretion of the 
contracting officer: 
(a) Standard Form 33, Solicitation, Offer, and Award, and Optional 
Form 308, Solicitation and Offer -- Negotiated Acquisition, may be used 
to issue RFPs and RFis. 
(b) Standard Form 30, Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of 
Contract, and Optional Form 309, Amendment of Solicitation, may be used 
to amend solicitations of negotiated contracts . 
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The Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and the Defense Acquisition Regulations 
Council (the Councils) have agreed to adopt the interim rules published in the Federal 
Register at 63 FR 35719, June 30, 1998; 63 FR 36120, July 1, 1998; 63 FR 52426, 
September 30, 1998; and 63 FR 71721, December 29, 1998, as final rules with changes. 
These amendments conform to a Department of Justice (DoJ) model for reform of 
affirmative action in Federal procurement. DoJ's proposal is designed to ensure 
compliance with the constitutional standards established by the Supreme Court in 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
Dates: 
Effective Date: October 1, 1999. 
Applicability Date: The policies, provisions, and clauses of this final rule are effective 











For Further Information Contact: 
Ms. Victoria Moss, Procurement Analyst, Federal Acquisition Policy Division, General 
Services Administration, at (202) 501-4764, or Mr. Charles Zuckerman, Office of the 
Director of Defense Procurement, Department of Defense, at (703) 697-0895. For 
general information, contact the FAR Secretariat, Room 4035, GS Building, Washington, 
DC, 20405, (202) 501-4755. Please cite FAC 97-13, FAR case 97-004. 
Supplementary Information: 
A. -- Background 
DoD, GSA, and NASA issued the following Federal Acquisition Circulars (FACs) to 
make amendments to the FAR concerning programs for small disadvantaged business 
concerns: 
FAC 97-06, 63 FR 35719, June 30, 1998 
FAC 97-07, 63 FR 36120, July I, 1998 
FAC 97-08, 63 FR 52426, September 30, 1998 
FAC 97-07 Addendum, 63 FR 71721, December 29, 1998 
These amendments conformed to the DoJ model for reform of affirmative action in 
Federal procurement. This rule revises and finalizes the above interim rules. The 
Councils received twenty-four letters containing 63 comments in response to the interim 
rules and considered them in the formulation of this final rule. The Councils made only 
one significant change to the rule, as follows: 
• FAC 97-07 Addendum amended the FAR to allow contractors acting in good 
faith to rely upon the self-representations of their subcontractors as to their 
status as small disadvantaged business concerns. The change provided an 
additional period of time for subcontractors to become certified under rules 
issued by the Small Business Administration. That time period is being 
extended to September 30, 1999. Accordingly, this final rule, which becomes 
effective on October I, 1999, rescinds the change made by FAC 97-07 
Addendum. 
• Also, the Councils made several clarifying amendments in this final rule, 
including removing all references to a list of SDBs to be maintained by the 
Small Business Administration and referring instead to SBA's PRO-Net 
database. 
• This rule was subject to Office of Management and Budget review under 
Section 6(b) of Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 
dated September 30, 1993. This is a major rule under 5 U.S.C. 804. 
B. -- Regulatory Flexibility Act 
The changes may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities within the meaning of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.601 et seq., 
because the rule provides preferences through which the Government may provide small 
business concerns benefits in Federal contracting. The Final Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (FRFA) is summarized as follows: 
• In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), the Supreme 












that use racial or ethnic criteria as a basis for decision-making. Following the 
decision, the Department of Justice (DoJ) published, at 61FR26042 (May 
23, 1996), Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement. 
This DoJ model was implemented in several parts: Small Business 
Administration (SBA) regulations; publication of the Department of 
Commerce price evaluation adjustments for use in Federal procurements; and 
interim FAR rules. 
Four interim FAR rules established in the FAR three procurement 
mechanisms benefiting small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs). The first 
mechanism is a price evaluation adjustment of up to 10 percent in certain 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Major Groups. The second 
mechanism is a source selection evaluation factor or subfactor for planned 
SDB participation in the performance of a contract. The third mechanism 
provides for a monetary incentive for subcontracting with SDBs. 
We received one public comment that specifically addressed the Initial 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. That comment provided that the rule 
imposes a complicated tracking system and will not increase opportunities for 
small disadvantaged businesses. We made no changes to the rule based on 
this comment. While we recognize that the rule calls for more detailed 
reporting of SDB subcontractors in order to comply with the DoJ proposal, 
no alternatives to that reporting exist. The commenter provided no evidence 
to support the commenter's opinion that this rule will not increase 
opportunities for small disadvantaged businesses. It is our opinion that, to 
the contrary, this rule will increase opportunities for such finns, particularly 
in the award of prime contracts by civilian agencies that, unlike DoD, have 
not previously granted procurement preferences to SDBs. The FAR 
Secretariat has submitted a copy of the FRF A to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration. Interested parties may 
obtain a copy from the FAR Secretariat. The Council will consider 
comments from small entities concerning the affected FAR subpart in 
accordance with 5 U.S.C.610. Interested parties must submit such comments 
separately and should cite 5 U.S.C 601, et seq. (FAC 97-13, FAR Case 97-
004 ), in correspondence. 
C. -- Paperwork Reduction Act 
The Paperwork Reduction Act (Pub.L.104-13) applies because the rules being converted 
to a final rule contain reporting and recordkeeping requirements. OMB approved the 
information collections under OMB clearance numbers 9000-0007 through June 30, 
2000, and 9000-0150 through June 30, 2000. This final rule does not affect those 
previously approved information collection requirements. 
List of Subjects in 48 CFR Parts 1, 12, 14, 15, 19, 26, 33, 52, and 53 Government 
procurement. 
Dated: June 25, 1999. 
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(1) It has received certification as a small disadvantaged business concern 
consistent with 13 CFR part 124, subpart B; and 
(i) No material change in disadvantaged ownership and control has 
occurred since its certification; 
(ii) Where the concern is owned by one or more disadvantaged individuals, 
the net worth of each individual upon whom the certification is based 
does not exceed $750,000 after taking into account the applicable 
exclusions set forth at 13 CFR 124.104(c)(2); and 
(iii) It is identified, on the date of its representation, as a certified small 
disadvantaged business (SDB) concern in the database maintained by 
the Small Business Administration (PRO-Net); or 
(2) For a prime contractor, it has submitted a completed application to the Small 
Business Administration or a private certifier to be certified as a small 
disadvantaged business concern in accordance with 13 CFR part 124, subpart 
B, and a decision on that application is pending, and that no material change 
in disadvantaged ownership and control has occurred since it submitted its 
application. In this case, a contractor must receive certification as an SDB by 
the SBA prior to contract award. 
***** 
3 . Amend section 19.304 to revise paragraph (c)(l) to read as follows: 
19.304 -- Disadvantaged Business Status. 
***** 
(c) * * * 
( 1) If the apparently successful offeror has represented that it is currently 
certified as an SDB, the contracting officer may confirm that the concern is 
identified as a small disadvantaged business concern by accessing SBA's 
database (PRO-Net) or by contacting the SBA's Office of Small 
Disadvantaged Business Certification and Eligibility. 
***** 
4. Amend section 19.703 to add two new sentences after the first sentence of 
paragraph (b) to read as follows: 
19.703 -- Eligibility Requirements for Participating in the Program. 
***** 
(b) ***The clause at 52.219-25, Small Disadvantaged Business Participation 
Program -- Disadvantaged Status and Reporting, requires the contractor to obtain 
representations of small disadvantaged status from subcontractors through use of a 
provision substantially the same as paragraph (b )( 1 )(i) of the provision at 52.219-
22, Small Disadvantaged Business Status. The clause requires the contractor to 












concern is identified by SBA as a small disadvantaged business concern by 
accessing SBA's database (PRO-Net) or by contacting the SBA's Office of Small 
Disadvantaged Business Certification and Eligibility. * * * 
5. Revise section 19.1102 to read as follows: 
19.1102 -- Applicability . 
(a) Use the price evaluation adjustment in competitive acquisitions in the authorized 
SIC Major Groups. 
(b) Do not use the price evaluation adjustment in acquisitions --
6. 
(1) That are less than or equal to the simplified acquisition threshold; 
(2) That are awarded pursuant to the 8(a) Program; 
(3) That are set aside for small business concerns; 
( 4) That are set aside for HUBZone small business concerns; 
(5) Where price is not a selection factor so that a price evaluation adjustment 
would not be considered (e.g., architect/engineer acquisitions); or 
(6) Where all fair and reasonable offers are accepted (e.g., the award of multiple 
award schedule contracts). 
Amend section 19.1103 to revise paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), and (b) to 
read as follows: 
19.1103 -- Procedures. 
(a) * * * 
(2) An otherwise successful offer of eligible products under the Trade 
Agreements Act when the acquisition equals or exceeds the dollar threshold 
in 25.402; 
(3) An otherwise successful offer where application of the factor would be 
inconsistent with a Memorandum of Understanding or other international 
agreement with a foreign government; 
(4) For DoD, NASA, and Coast Guard acquisitions, an otherwise successful offer 
from a historically black college or university or minority institution; or 
(5) For DoD acquisitions, an otherwise successful offer of qualifying country end 
products (see DFARS 225.000-70 and 252.225-7001). 
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(b) Apply the factor to a line item or a group of line items on which award may be 
made. Add other evaluation factors such as transportation costs or rent-free use of 
Government facilities to the offers before applying the price evaluation adjustment. 
***** 
7. Amend section 19 .1104 to revise the heading and the first sentence to read as 
follows: 
19.1104 -- Contract Clause. 
Insert the clause at 52.219-23, Notice of Price Evaluation Adjustment for Small 
Disadvantaged Business Concerns, in solicitations and contracts when the circumstances 
in 19.1101and19.1102 apply. * * * 
8. Amend section 19.1202-3 to revise the introductory text to read as follows: 
19.1202-3 -- Considerations in Developing an Evaluation 
Factor or Subfactor. 
In developing an SDB participation evaluation factor or subfactor for the solicitation, 
agencies may consider 
***** 
19.1202-4 --Amended 
9. In section 19.1202-4, remove paragraph (c). 
Part 26 -- Other Socioeconomic Programs 
10. Revise section 26.304 to read as follows: 
26.304 -- Solicitation Provision. 
Insert the provision at 52.226-2, Historically Black College or University and Minority 
Institution Representation, in solicitations exceeding the micro-purchase threshold, for 
research, studies, supplies, or services of the type normally acquired from higher 
educational institutions. For DoD, NASA, and Coast Guard acquisitions, also insert the 
provision in solicitations that contain the clause at 52.219-23, Notice of Price Evaluation 
Adjustment for Small Disadvantaged Business Concerns. 
Part 52 -- Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses 
11. Amend section 52.212-3 to revise the date of the provision and paragraph 
(c)(7)(i)(A) to read as follows: 
52.212-3 -- Offeror Representations and Certifications --
Commercial Items (Oct 1999) 
***** 
Offeror Representations and Certifications -- Commercial Items (Oct 1999) 
***** 
















(A) It/_/is,/_/is not certified by the Small Business Administration 
as a small disadvantaged business concern and identified, on the 
date of this representation, as a certified small disadvantaged 
business concern in the database maintained by the Small 
Business Administration (PRO-Net), and that no material change 
in disadvantaged ownership and control has occurred since its 
certification, and, where the concern is owned by one or more 
individuals claiming disadvantaged status, the net worth of each 
individual upon whom the certification is based does not exceed 
$750,000 after taking into account the applicable exclusions set 
forth at 13 CFR 124.104(c)(2); or 
12. Amend .section 52.219-8 to revise the date of the clause and paragraph (c)(3) to 
read as follows: 
52.219-8 -- Utilization of Small Business Concerns (Oct 1999) 
***** 
Utilization of Small Business Concerns (Oct 1999) 
***** 
(c) *** 
(3) Small business concern owned and controlled by socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals and small disadvantaged business concern mean a 
small business concern that represents, as part of its offer that --
***** 
(i) It has received certification as a small disadvantaged business concern 
consistent with 13 CFR 124, Subpart B; 
(ii) No material change in disadvantaged ownership and control has 
occurred since its certification; 
(iii) Where the concern is owned by one or more individuals, the net worth 
of each individual upon whom the certification is based does not 
exceed $750,000 after taking into account the applicable exclusions set 
forth at 13 CFR 124.104(c)(2); and 
(iv) It is identified, on the date of its representation, as a certified small 
disadvantaged business in the database maintained by the Small 
Business Administration (PRO-Net). 
13. Amend section 52.219-9 to revise the date of the clause and paragraph (d)(5) to 
read as follows: 
52.219-9 -- Small Business Subcontracting Plan (Oct 1999) 
***** 










(d) * * * 
(5) A description of the method used to identify potential sources for solicitation 
purposes (e.g., existing company source lists, the Procurement Marketing and 
Access Network (PRO-Net) of the Small Business Administration (SBA), the 
National Minority Purchasing Council Vendor Information Service, the 
Research and Information Division of the Minority Business Development 
Agency in the Department of Commerce, or small, HUBZone, small 
disadvantaged, and women-owned small business trade associations). A firm 
may rely on the information contained in PRO-Net as an accurate 
representation of a concem's size and ownership characteristics for the 
purposes of maintaining a small, HUBZone, small disadvantaged and 
women-owned small business source list. Use of PRO-Net as its source list 
does not relieve a firm of its responsibilities (e.g., outreach, assistance, 
counseling, or publicizing subcontracting opportunities) in this clause. 
***** 
14. Amend section 52.219-22 to revise the date of the provision and paragraph 
(b)(l)(i)(C) to read as follows: 
52.219-22 -- Small Disadvantaged Business Status (Oct 1999) 
***** 
***** 
(b) * * * 
(1) 
***** 
Small Disadvantaged Business Status (Oct 1999) 
*** 
(i) * * * 
(C) It is identified, on the date of its representation, as a certified 
small disadvantaged business concern in the database maintained 
by the Small Business Administration (PRO-Net); or 
15. Amend section 52.219-23 to revise the date of the clause and paragraphs (a)(l)(iii) 
and (b) to read as follows: 
52.219-23 -- Notice of Price Evaluation Adjustment for Small 
Disadvantaged Business Concerns (Oct 1999) 
***** 














(iii) It is identified, on the date of its representation, as a certified small 
disadvantaged business concern in the database maintained by the 
Small Business Administration (PRO-Net). 
(b) Evaluation adjustment. 
(1) The Contracting Officer will evaluate offers by adding a factor of __ _ 
[Contracting Officer insert the percentage] percent to the price of all offers, 
except --
(i) Offers from small disadvantaged business concerns that have not 
waived the adjustment; 
(ii) An otherwise successful offer of eligible products under the Trade 
Agreements Act when the dollar threshold for application of the Act is 
equaled or exceeded (see section 25.402 of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR)); 
(iii) An otherwise successful offer where application of the factor would be 
inconsistent with a Memorandum of Understanding or other 
international agreement with a foreign government; 
(iv) For DoD, NASA, and Coast Guard acquisitions, an otherwise 
successful offer from a historically black college or university or 
minority institution; and 
(v) For DoD acquisitions, an otherwise successful offer of qualifying 
country end products (see sections 225.000-70 and 252.225-7001 of the 
Defense FAR Supplement). 
(2) The Contracting Officer will apply the factor to a line item or a group of line 
items on which award may be made. The Contracting Officer will apply 
other evaluation factors described in the solicitation before application of the 
factor . 
***** 
The factor may not be applied if using the adjustment would cause the 
contract award to be made at a price that exceeds the fair market price by 
more than the factor in paragraph (b )( 1) of this clause. 
16. Amend section 52.219-25 to revise the date of the clause and paragraph (a) to read 
as follows: 
52.219-25 -- Small Disadvantaged Business Participation 
Program -- Disadvantaged Status and Reporting (Oct 1999) 
***** 
Small Disadvantaged Business Participation Program -- Disadvantaged Status and 
Reporting (Oct 1999) 
(a) Disadvantaged status for joint venture partners, team members, and subcontractors. 












arrangement members, and subcontractors and is applicable if this contract contains 
small disadvantaged business (SDB) participation targets. The Contractor shall 
obtain representations of small disadvantaged status from joint venture partners, 
teaming arrangement members, and subcontractors through use of a provision 
substantially the same as paragraph (b)(l)(i) of the provision at FAR 52.219-22, 
Small Disadvantaged Business Status. The Contractor shall confirm that a joint 
venture partner, team member, or subcontractor representing itself as a small 
disadvantaged business concern, is identified as a certified small disadvantaged 
business in the database maintained by the Small Business Administration (PRO-
Net) or by contacting the SBA's Office of Small Disadvantaged Business 
Certification and Eligibility. 
***** 
[FR Doc. 99-16855 Filed 7-1-99; 8:45 am] 
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[DOCID :fr02jy99-14] 
Department of Defense 
General Services Administration National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
48 CFR Chapter 1 Federal Acquisition Regulation; Small Entity Compliance Guide 
Agencies: 
Department of Defense (DoD), 
General Services Administration (GSA), 
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
Action: 
Small entity compliance guide. 
Summary: 
This document is issued under the joint authority of the Secretary of Defense, the 
Administrator of General Services and the Administrator for the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration. This Small Entity Compliance Guide has been prepared in 
accordance with Section 212 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 
of 1996 (Public Law 104-121). It consists of a summary of the rule appearing in Federal 
Acquisition Circular (FAC) 97-13 which amends the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR). A Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) has been prepared in accordance 
with 5 U.S.C.604. Interested parties may obtain a copy of the FRFA from the FAR 
Secretariat. In addition, interested parties may obtain further information regarding this 
rule by referring to FAC 97-13, which precedes this document. This document is also 




For Further Information Contact: 
Laurie Duarte, FAR Secretariat, at (202) 501-4225. For clarification of content, contact 
Victoria Moss, Procurement Analyst, General Services Administration, at (202) 501-
4764. 
Reform of Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement 
FAC 97-13, FAR Case 97-004. FAR Parts 19, 26, and 52 are amended to rescind the 
changes made in FAC 97-07 Addendum and finalize interim rules published in FACs 97-
06, 97-07, and 97-08. These rules establish in the FAR three procurement mechanisms 
benefiting small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs). 
The first mechanism is a price evaluation adjustment of up to ten percent in certain two-
digit Standard fudustrial Classification (SIC) Major Groups. The second mechanism is a 
source selection evaluation factor or subfactor for planned SDB participation in the 
performance of a contract. The third mechanism provides for a monetary incentive for 
subcontracting with SDBs. 
Dated: June 25, 1999. 
[FR Doc. 99-16856 Filed 7-1-99; 8:45 am] 
Billing Code 6820-EP-P 
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Edward C. Loeb, 
Director, 
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[Federal Register: June 22, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 119)] 
[Rules and Regulations] 
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [ wais.access.gpo.gov] 
[DOCID:fr22jn98-17] 
48 CFR Chapter 1 
Partm 
Department of Defense 
General Services Administration 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR); Final Rule 
48 CFR Chapter 1 
Department of Defense 
General Services Administration 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Federal Acquisition Circular 97-05; Introduction 
Agencies: 
Department of Defense (DoD), General Services Administration (GSA), and National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
Action: 
Summary presentation of final and interim rules, and technical amendments and 
corrections. 
Summary: 
This document summarizes the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) rules issued by the 
Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council irr 
this Federal Acquisition Circular (FAC) 97-05. A companion document, the Small Entity 
Compliance Guide (SECG), follows this FAC. The FAC, including the SECG, may be 
located on the Internet at http://www.amet.gov/far. 
Dates: 
For effective dates and comment dates, see separate documents which follow. 
For Further Information Contact: 
The FAR Secretariat, Room 4035, GS Building, Washington, DC 20405, (202) 501-4755, 
for information pertaining to status or publication schedules. For clarification of content, 
contact the analyst whose name appears in the table below in relation to each FAR case 
or subject area. Please cite FAC 97-05 and specific FAR case number(s). Interested 
f _E_artJ.es may also v1s1t our website at hgp_://www.amet:S_ov/ ar. 
Item Subject FAR Case Analyst 
I. Subcontract Consent. 95-011 Klein. 










m. qguidated Dama_g_es. 89-042/97-300 Moss. 
IV. Limits on Fee for Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee and 97-042 Destefano 
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracts. 
v . Rehabilitation Act, Workers With Disabilities 96-610 O'Neill. 
(Interim). 
VI. Trade Agreements Thresholds. 97-044 Linfield. 
VII. Restrictions on Purchases from Sudan. 97-301 Linfield. 
vm. Software Copyrights. 97-614 O'Neill. 
IX. Travel Reimbursement 97-007 Nelson. 
x. No-Cost Value Engineering Change Proposals 96-011 Klein. 
(Interim). 
XI. Technical Amendments. 
XII. Availability of FAR via Internet. 
Supplementary Information: 
Summaries for each FAR rule follow. For the actual revisions and/or amendments to 
these FAR cases, refer to the specific item number and subject set forth in the documents 
following these item summaries. 
Federal Acquisition Circular 97-05 amends the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) as 
specified below: 
Item I -- Subcontract Consent (FAR Case 95-011) 
This final rule amends FAR Parts 4, 22, 35, 36, 44, and 52 to reduce requirements for 
consent to subcontract. The rule eliminates consent requirements for contractors that 
have an approved purchasing system, except when specific contracts requiring consent 
are identified by the contracting officer; eliminates consent requirements for fixed-price 
incentive contracts and fixed-price redeterminable contracts; and increases, to the 
simplified acquisition threshold, the dollar level at which consent requirements are 
included in time-and-materials, labor-hour, and letter contracts. 
Item II -- Availability of Specifications (FAR Case 97-034) 
This final rule amends FAR Parts 9 and 11 and the provisions at 52.211-1, 52.211-2, and 
52.212-1 to update addresses and other information regarding the availability of 
specifications, standards, and item descriptions that may be cited in Government 
solicitations and contracts. In addition, the rule clarifies the pricing policy regarding 
specifications, standards, and commercial item descriptions issued by GSA. 
Item III -- Liquidated Damages (FAR Cases 89-042 and 97-300) 
This final rule amends FAR Parts 11, 19, 52, and 53 to clarify policy on liquidated 
damages and commercial subcontracting plans pertaining to requirements for 
subcontracting with small, small disadvantaged, and women-owned small business 
concerns. The rule implements Section 304 of the Business Opportunity Development 
Reform Act of 1988 (Pub.L.100-656) and OFPP Policy Letter 95-1, Subcontracting Plans 
for Companies Supplying Commercial Items. The interim rule published in FAC 84-50, 
FAR case 89-042, 54 FR 30708, July 21, 1989, has been merged with this final rule. 
Item IV -- Limits on Fee for Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee and Cost-Plus-Award-Fee 
Contracts (FAR Case 97-042) 
This final rule amends FAR Part 16 to clarify fee limitations pertaining to cost-
reimbursement contracts. The FAR Part 15 rewrite in FAC 97-02 eliminated non-
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statutory fee limitations for cost-plus-incentive-fee and cost-plus-award-fee contracts. 
This final rule makes conforming changes to FAR Part 16. 
Item V -- Rehabilitation Act, Workers With Disabilities (FAR Case 96-610) 
This interim rule amends FAR Subpart 22.14 and the clauses at 52.212-5 and 52.222-36 
to implement revised Department of Labor regulations regarding affirmative action to 
employ and advance in employment qualified individuals with disabilities. The dollar 
threshold for use of the clause at 52.222-36 has been increased from $2,500 to $10,000. 
Item VI -- Trade Agreements Thresholds (FAR Case 97-044) 
This final rule amends FAR Part 25 to implement revised thresholds for application of the 
Trade Agreements Act and the North American Free Trade Agreement, as published by 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative in the Federal Register on January 
14, 1998 (63 FR 2295). 
Item VII-- Restrictions on Purchases from Sudan (FAR Case 97-301) 
This final rule amends FAR 25.701 and the clause at 52.225-11 to add Sudan to the list of 
countries whose products are banned from importation into the United States. This rule 
implements Executive Order 13067, dated November 3, 997. 
Item VID-- Software Copyrights (FAR Case 97-614) 
This final rule amends FAR 27.405 to add contracts for certain computer software 
programs to the list of examples of contracts for special works to which the Government 
may obtain copyrights. 
Item IX -- Travel Reimbursement (FAR Case 97-007) 
The interim rule published as Item IX of FAC 97-03 is converted to a final rule without 
change. The rule amends FAR 31.205-46 to increase from $25.00 to $75.00 the threshold 
at which contractor personnel must provide a receipt to support travel expenditures. 
Item X -- No-Cost Value Engineering Change Proposals (FAR Case 96-011) 
This interim rule revises FAR 48.104-3 to clarify that no-cost value engineering change 
proposals (VECPs) may be used when, in the contracting officer's judgment, reliance on 
other VECP approaches likely would not be more cost-effective, and the no-cost 
settlement would provide adequate consideration to the Government. 
Item XI -- Technical Amendments 
Amendments are being made at FAR 5.20l(b)(2), 8.404(a), 31.002, and 45.607-2(b) to 
update references and make editorial changes. 
Item XII -- Availability of FAR via Internet 
The FAR, along with Federal Acquisition Circulars and other informational items, is 
available on the Internet at http://www.arnet.gov/far. 
Dated: June 11, 1998. 
June 22, 1998. 
Edward C. Loeb, 
Director, Federal Acquisition 
Policy Division. 
Federal Acquisition Circular (FAC) 97-05 is issued under the authority of the Secretary 
of Defense, the Administrator of General Services, and the Administrator for the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
Unless otherwise specified, all Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other directive 
material contained in FAC 97-05 are effective August 21, 1998, except for Items V, X, 







Dated: June 11, 1998. 
Dated: June 11, 1998. 
Dated: June 10, 1998. 
[FR Doc. 98-16111Filed6-19-98; 8:45 am] 
Billing Code 6820-EP-P 
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Eleanor R. Spector, 
Director, Defense Procurement. 
Ida M. U stad, 
Deputy Associate Administrator, 
Office of Acquisition Policy, 
General Services Administration. 
Torn Luedtke, 
Deputy Associate Administrator for 
Procurement, National Aeronautics 
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Michael W. Boudreau, Colonel, US Army (Ret) 
COL Boudreau came to the Naval Postgraduate School from Warren, Michigan where he 
was the Army's Project Manager, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, 1992-1995. He 
commanded the Materiel Support Center, Korea, 1989-1991. As a lieutenant colonel, he 
served as Military Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army, 1986-1988. He 
commanded the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant, 1982-1984. He held numerous acquisition 
and logistics staff positions in the Abrams Tank System Office; the Army Tank-
Automotive Command; and the United States Army, Europe. He served as a logistics 
advisor in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and commanded a maintenance 
company in Europe. COL Boudreau is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces; Defense Systems Management College; Anny Command and General Staff 
College; Long Armour-Infantry Course, Royal Armoured Corps Centre, United 
Kingdom; and Ordnance Officer Basic and Advanced courses. He retired from active 
duty in October 1995, after serving more than 28 years. He holds a Bachelor of 
Mechanical Engineering degree ( 1964) and Master of Business degree ( 1966) from Santa 






J. Holmes Armstead, J.D., Ph.D. 
Dr. Jim Armstead comes to Team Poland from National Security Affairs Department at 
the Naval Postgraduate School where he is a Visiting Professor, teaching Regional 
Security, environmental policy law and international law for the past three years. 
Professor Armstead has practiced law for twenty-five years in Chicago, Washington 
D.C., Los Angeles and London. He has practiced with 3 prestigious law firms and 
several government agencies. Professor Armstead's military experience in the Army 
includes active and reserve tours as an armor officer, JAG officer and Civil Affairs 
officer with assignment as a special staff assistant to the Secretary of the Army. Over the 
years, Professor Armstead has taught at the University of Nevada where he also served as 
Deputy Director of the Great Business Policy Research Institute, Pepperdine University, 
Lewis University, Southern University, the Richmond College (the University of 
London) and the Universite d' Pau in France. In 1996, Professor Armstead served as 
visiting legal expert with the United Nations in Vienna, Austria where he assisted in 
drafting the new International Criminal Code and the treaty creating the International 
Criminal Court. He received his J.D., in1975 from De Paul University in Chicago, 
studied international affairs and regional planning at the University of Illinois, and was 
awarded a Ph.D. in public policy from Pacific Western University (Los Angeles) in 1981. 
His dissertation concerning Lightweight Power Projection was funded by the Defense 
Nuclear Agency at the RAND Corp in Santa Monica. Professor Armstead is a Visiting 
Scholar (1999-2000) with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University examining 
environmental security, human rights and peacekeeping issues. He frequently lectures 
for the Naval War College, the National Judicial College and serves as an Adjunct 
Professor of Law at Santa Clara University. He has published articles in prestigious law 
journals and chapters in two books on Environmental law/policy problems. Professor 
Armstead represented the United States in Canada during the Acid Rain Treaty 
negotiations and has advised several Congressional committees. He also holds a 
Certificate in International Law from the Institute Superiore Internationale Criminali 
Science in Seracusa, Italy. 
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Richard Doyle, Ph.D. 
Richard Doyle is an Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, where he teaches courses in public budgeting, defense technology policy and 
DoD resource and policy analysis. He also teaches in the Executive Management 
Education program developed for the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the civil-
military affairs curriculum of the Center for Civil-Military Relations and the Center for 
Executive Education, both at the Naval Postgraduate School. His principal areas of 
research include the defense budget, defense technology policy, the congressional budget 
process, health care and other entitlement programs. His work has been published in 
Global Affairs, Public Budgeting and Finance, Policy Studies Journal, Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, Judicature, Armed Forces and Society, Defense Analysis, Military 
Review and the International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration. 
Professor Doyle received a Bachelor of Science degree in International Affairs from the 
USAF Academy in 1969. He served as an Air Force Intelligence officer in the Tactical 
Air Command, including a tour in Vietnam in 1971-72. Following service in the Air 
Force, Professor Doyle received an MA and PhD in Political Science from the University 
of Washington. After teaching Political Science for several years in the Pacific 
Northwest, Dr. Doyle accepted a position as Legislative Assistant for Defense and 
Foreign Policy for Senator Slade Gorton, in Washington, D.C. In 1987 he joined the staff 
of the Senate Budget Committee, serving Senator Pete Domenici as Senior Analyst for 
Defense. He has been on the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1990. In 
1996 he received tenure, as well as the Admiral John Jay Schieffelin Award for 
Excellence in Teaching, the highest award for teaching at the School. 





Leroy J. Haugh, J.D. 
Mr. Haugh, after 14 years as Vice President, Procurement and Finance, Aerospace 
Industries Association, left in January 1999 to become a private Government Business 
Consultant. His responsibilities at AIA covered the entire spectrum of the acquisition 
process. He prepared, presented and defended industry positions on all proposed 
legislation, policies and regulations which impacted or might impact acquisition, 
including intellectual property rights, tax matters, industrial base issues, industrial 
security, and numerous others. He is currently employed by AIA as a consultant. 
His prior experience included military (Navy) service during WWII and Korea, followed 
by over 30 years with the government in the procurement field, at both operational and 
policy levels. Positions held included: Director of Contract Placement and Finance, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Installations and Logistics); Deputy 
Director of Procurement, Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations & 
Logistics); and Associate Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Office of 
Management and Budget. After leaving the government in 1984 he was briefly a 
consultant to Harbridge House Incorporated before joining the Aerospace Industries 
Association in February 1985. 
Education: BA (Political Science), College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN; JD, Georgetown 
University; MSBA, George Washington University; and graduate of the Industrial 
College of the Armed Forces. 
Affiliations: Member of the Bar in Virginia and the District of Columbia; the Federal Bar 
Association; American Bar Association (Public Contract Law Section); and Board of 
Advisors of the National Contract Management Association. 
Mr. Haugh was one of the 13 members of the Acquisition Law Advisory Panel (Section 
800 Panel), set up by a provision in the FY 91 DoD Authorization Act to review all DoD 
acquisition laws and make recommendations for streamlining and simplifying. Its 1800 
page report to Congress in January 1993 was the foundation for the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act of 1994. He has been a key participant in industry-wide acquisition 
reform efforts throughout the last decade, both in initiating legislative proposals and in 
developing implementing regulations. 
Publications: Mr. Haugh has authored or co-authored numerous articles and reports on a 
wide range of subjects in the acquisition field. His 1966 Master's thesis on Foreign 
Military Sales was published as a monograph by George Washington University and used 
for many years as an authoritative source of information on that subject. He was a 
principal architect and author of the Proposal for a Uniform Federal Procurement System, 
presented to Congress by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in 1981, and also of 
OFPP' s Study of DoD Spare Parts Procurement in 1984. Other publications include: the 
Statutory and Regulatory Foundations of Procurement, published by the National 
Contract Management Association in 1983; several articles in the NCMA Journal 




published by the ABA Public Contract Section titled "Is There a Tunnel at the end of the 
Light?" which traced the development of the current regulations on rights in technical 
data. 
Other pertinent experience: Frequent lecturer at procurement training classes, executive 
refresher courses, and seminars covering the entire spectrum of acquisition and business 
management. Adjunct Professor at the University of the District of Columbia School of 
Business in 1983 and 1984; and adjunct Professor, Marymount University (MBA 
program), in 1985-1987. Visiting lecturer at both UDC and Marymount, and at graduate 
programs offered by George Washington University, American University, University of 
Virginia, the Navy Postgraduate School, and others. Visited Beijing, China in the fall of 
1999 at the request of the Chinese government Ministry of Finance to discuss the U.S. 
Government procurement system. 
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Commander Jeffrey R. Cuskey, US Navy 
Commander Jeffrey R. Cuskey, SC, USN is currently assigned to the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS), Monterey, California as a Systems Management faculty member in the 
Acquisition and Contracting Management Curriculum and Course Coordinator for Major 
Weapon System related acquisition management courses. In his current position, CDR 
Cuskey is qualified to provide graduate level education to mid grade and senior military 
officers in the following professional fields: Program Management, Acquisition 
Management, Pre-Award and Post-Award Contracting, Field Contracting, Contingency 
Contracting, Service Contracting, Research and Development Contracting, Acquisition 
Reform, Business Financial Management and Major Defense Systems Acquisition and 
Contract Management. CDR Cuskey has been designated an Acquisition Career 
Professional by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition. He holds an undergraduate degree in Political Science from the University 
of Delaware, a Master of Science in Management degree from the Naval Postgraduate 
School and a Level ill DA WIA Certification in Contracting. He reported to NPS's 
Systems Management Department in July 1997 from the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAV AIR). While assigned to NAV AIR, CDR Cuskey performed duties as a Warranted 
Contracting Officer for the F/A-18E/F "Super Hornet" Program and as the Business 
Financial Manager (BFM) for the Navy's F/A-18 Strike Fighter Program. In addition to 
his recent Major Weapon Systems acquisition experience, CDR Cuskey received post-
award contract management training while assigned as a Navy Acquisition and 
Contracting Officer Intern at Defense Contract Administration Services Management 
Area (DCASMA) Philadelphia. Outside of the acquisition and contracting field, he has 
held various operational, administrative, staff and management positions, including such 
diverse jobs as Fleet Plans Officer and Assistant Strike Warfare Officer for Commander 
Sixth Fleet and Assistant Supply Officer of a Combat Stores Ship during Operations 
Desert Storm and Desert Shield. CDR Cuskey is married to the former Patricia Brady of 
Willow Street, PA. They are the parents of seven year old twin daughters, Karina and 
Kaitlin. 
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-Captain John E. Mutty, US Navy, Retired 
John E. Mutty is a member of the Financial Management Faculty of the Naval 
Postgraduate School where he teaches courses in DoD financial management. He is the 
immediate past incumbent of the RADM Peter C. Conrad Chair of Financial 
Management. He is a retired Navy Captain whose previous assignments include a variety 
of operational and staff tours. Significant billets in Washington DC included the 
following: Comptroller for the Naval Air Systems Command; Deputy Director for the 
Investment and Development Division of the Office of Budget and Reports on the staff of 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller); Head of 
the Congressional Liaison Branch and Air ASW Analyst in the Office of Program 
Appraisal on the staff of the Secretary of the Navy; and Head of the Educator Liaison 
Branch, Navy Recruiting Command. He is a former P-3 Orion pilot who, in addition to 
his Washington experience, had numerous operational tours. While assigned to various 
patrol squadrons, he deployed to Keflavik, Iceland; Rota, Spain; Sigonella, Sicily; 
Bermuda; and Lajes, Azores. He was Commanding Officer of Patrol Squadron Sixteen, 
based in Jacksonville, FL. and he served as the Chief of Staff for the Commander 
Maritime Surveillance and Reconnaissance Forces Sixth Fleet in Naples, Italy. He is a 
graduate of the United States Naval Academy, the Naval War College, and has an MS in 
Financial Management from the George Washington University. 
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